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ABSTRACT
ASSESSING THE ROLE OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CORPS’
EXTRATERRITORIAL ACTIVITIES IN ATTAINING IRAN’S FOREIGN POLICY GOALS
Hamza Demirel
Old Dominion University, 2016
Director: Dr. Regina C. Karp

This dissertation aims at analyzing the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’
(IRGC) extraterritorial activities in attaining Iran’s foreign policy goals. Based on observations
and assessments from internal and external determinants, Iran’s foreign policy goals are defined
as follows: regime survival, which is an indispensable goal of Iranian foreign policy, is above
everything; state security and survival; projecting power and becoming the dominant power in
the region.
The regime has deliberately supported several armed non-state actors to achieve the
aforementioned goals, and as seen in the case studies, the IRGC has served as a node in
providing a broad range of state support.
Although the IRGC has the characteristics of conventional armed forces, its
extraterritorial activities contradict the legal frame of ‘use of military force’ and mostly fit the
characteristics of ‘state sponsorship of terrorism.’ Moreover, these activities challenge
international norms and provoke other regional actors. This condition creates an obstacle to
Iran’s integration into the international system which is increasingly globalized and
interconnected and an environment which is costly to live within and leaves it isolated. These
attitudes paradoxically place Iran in a situation that challenges the goals of ‘state security and
survival’ and ‘becoming the regional power’ in the long run. Thus, it is argued that the real
reason behind the regime’s insistence on this strategy is preserving the current political system

and the power of current ruling elites; in brief, it is labeled ‘regime survival’ in this study.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This study examines the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ (IRGC)
extraterritorial activities in attaining Iran’s1 foreign policy goals. I specifically explore how the
IRGC’s extraterritorial activities contribute to the survival of the regime. This study will
illustrate that the deployment of IRGC in operations beyond national borders not only serves
foreign policy goals and interests, but also supports regime survival back at home.
The 1979 Iranian revolution does not just represent a change in political leadership. In
Walt’s words, it also introduced new principles of legitimacy, new symbols of authority and
identity, new rules for elite recruitment and new political institutions and governmental
procedures.2 Although the revolution was made by a variety of segments of Iranian society,
which ranged from Marxists to the liberal National Front, from secularists to Islamic activists, in
the end Khomeini and his supporters hijacked it. Since the revolution, the concept of velayat-e
faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists) that was developed by Ayatollah Khomeini has been
the core of Iran’s newly-established political system and ideology, which can be characterized as
a blend of Persian nationalism and Khomeini’s interpretation of Shiism. The revolution has
influenced every aspect of life including political structure, preferences of policy makers and
regional and global relations.
The new regime has a dual and unique political system; in addition to an ideological
velayat-e faqih system, it also enjoys republican institutions. In the political structure of Iran,
there is a parliament and a president, both selected by Iranian voters. There is also a Supreme
1

The word “Iran” is the unofficial but commonly used name for the Islamic Republic of Iran, abbreviated IRI.
Throughout this work, in an effort to avoid undue repetition, I will vary the nomenclature.
2
Stephen M. Walt, “Revolution and War,” World Politics 44, no. 3 (1992): 334, doi:10.2307/2010542.
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Leader who is not democratically elected and ranks above the state president. The concept of
velayat-e faqih has positioned the Supreme Leader as the temporal, spiritual and legal leader of
the ummah (Muslim community) during the absence of the Twelfth Imam. In addition to his
religious status, ultimate political power resides in the Supreme Leader: He appoints and
dismisses all key senior positions - the head of the judiciary, the supreme commander of the
IRGC, the supreme commander of the regular military and security services, the head of state
radio and television, and the clerical jurists of the Council of the Guardian; controls all important
institutions of state such as the courts, the police, the military; can veto candidates for office and
veto parliamentary legislation; and approves/disapproves foreign policy initiatives.
The dual political system, the superiority of unelected institutions (in addition to the
Supreme Leader, Expediency Council and Guardian Council) over elected ones, factional
rivalries and powerful key individuals make strategic decision-making opaque and unpredictable.
While ideology was the dominant factor in decision-making until the mid-1980s, since then
pragmatism and strategies based on rational calculations have come to the fore. Although,
particularly after the death of Khomeini, reformist and pragmatist policies have become
dominant, the regime’s core ideological principles have always remained as the limits of
decision-making under the protection of the supreme leader and conservative faction. Until now,
different factions’ priorities based on regional and domestic concerns have placed Iranian foreign
policy at different places on the scale of isolation/integration with the international system at
different times.
Besides the shift back and forth between “isolation” and “integration with the
international system,” an expectation gap -the difference between what is expected and what is
actually possible- has also been another characteristic that influences Iran’s foreign policy
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making. Shiite-Sunni mutual hostility, Sunni dominance in the region, Iran’s comparative
economic and conventional military weakness, post-revolution hostile relations with Israel and
the United States (US) and potential ethnic fragmentation on the one side versus aspirations for
being the regional power and leader of the Muslim world and a desire for a high profile in the
global arena on the other side leads to an expectation gap originates mostly from the regime’s
ideology.
Reflections of these ideological motivations can be seen in Iran’s relations with Shiite
groups beyond national borders. Despite Muslim populations -regardless of sect differences- that
initially shown considerable interest in the Revolution, the regime soon realized the
inapplicability of Muslim world leadership. Thus, the regime turned its attention to Shiite groups
in the region. Among those groups, the most well-known relationship has been with the
Lebanese Hezbollah. The revolution had a stimulating effect on Lebanese Shiites. Besides the
convergence of mutual interests and ideological affinity, Iran’s ideological and material support
has been a vital instrument in the movement's development. In turn, Hezbollah served Iran in
various ways such as a deterrent and retaliatory force against the adversaries of Iran, a tool for
projecting power, and most importantly as a laboratory for Iran’s subsequent foreign
engagements.
Iran’s ideologically motivated relations with Shiite groups then became an outcome of
strategic calculations by the regime’s ruling elite. Since the deployment of an IRGC contingent
in Lebanon in the early 1980s, the IRGC has been the key actor in establishing, improving and
directing these groups by giving birth and providing a wide scope of support ranging from
finance, know-how, military logistics, ideological and military training. Although there was not a
geographical connection with Lebanon, Iran’s most successful foreign involvement has been
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with the Lebanese Hezbollah. Iran’s engagement with the Lebanese Hezbollah has worked as a
laboratory and provided very crucial experiences, which would be used in post-Saddam Iraq.
In the post-revolutionary era, the Iranian military has been composed of two main
segments: regular (conventional) forces and revolutionary forces. The latter actively took on the
role both as a means of securing and consolidating the revolution at home, and achieving
ideological and strategic goals abroad. The IRGC’s roots are based on the militias who actively
supported the revolution and had unquestioning loyalty to Khomeini. Over time the IRGC has
been transformed in to a kind of regular military entity, which has a navy, ground forces, air
force, headquarters, hierarchical structure, and different levels of military training centers. Today
the IRGC is domestically an economic and political power and also has been Iran’s primary
mechanism for foreign extraterritorial activities. In addition to the Lebanese Hezbollah, the
IRGC has relations with Shiite groups in different states such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen and
Syria.
The regime saw the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities as a solution to the expectation gap
problem. As an invisible army, the IRGC has enabled the Regime to achieve its interests without
provoking conventional military retaliation. This strategy can be characterized as asymmetric,
low cost, easy to deny, and difficult to prove.
However, the strategy has provoked some regional and other international actors and Iran
has been accused of being a state sponsor of terrorism. For example, according to the Global
Terrorism Database, the number of Hezbollah or Hezbollah-suspected fatalities is roughly 1200
between 1983 and 2014 in 398 incidents.3 In many incidents, such as hostage taking,
assassinations, subversion, bombings, aircraft hijackings, the IRGC’s name is associated with
3

“Hezbollah,” Terrorist Organization Profile - START - National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism, accessed December 7, 2015,
http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3101.
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Lebanese Hezbollah.
Despite international actors’ efforts concentrated on stopping Iran’s nuclear weapons
programs, I argue that the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities are as dangerous as the possession of
nuclear weapons, which, to date, have caused thousands of fatalities in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and
Yemen.
Some prominent scholars believe that the further spread of nuclear weapons would have a
stabilizing impact on the Middle East. Conversely, the regime’s strategy of using the IRGC in
extraterritorial activities for attaining foreign policy goals provokes other regional actors to adopt
similar strategies, deepens the sectarian divide, and subsequently creates chronic instability in the
Middle East.
Iran is the second largest economy in the Middle East and North Africa region after Saudi
Arabia, which mainly depends on its hydrocarbon sector. It also has the second largest
population of the region with an estimated 79 million people in 2015. It ranks second in the
world in natural gas reserves and fourth in proven crude oil reserves.4 Its natural resources,
population and the rooted tradition of statecraft that has been created over centuries naturally
make Iran a potential regional power. Nevertheless, Iran’s strategies challenging international
norms are an obstacle to its recognition in its region and in the international arena as a legitimate
regional power and impede integration into the international system. If we take into account both
the regional and global consequences of this strategy, which creates a more unstable, hostile and
competitive environment and conditions, in the long run the strategy has high costs for Iran.
Given this background, this study raises the following research questions: What is the
role of the IRGC in Iranian foreign policy making? How and to what extent do the extraterritorial
activities of the IRGC contribute to Iranian national and state interests and objectives? What
4

“Iran Overview,” The World Bank, April 1, 2016, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iran/overview.
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might the broader implications of this particular case be for foreign and domestic policy-making
and for domestic and regional security in an increasingly globalized and interconnected world
system? This study advances two major claims: First, despite the fact that Iran has natural
potential for being the regional power, its aggressive strategy that challenges international norms
and provokes other regional actors is an obstacle to its integration into the international system
which is increasingly globalized and interconnected. Additionally, by provoking other regional
actors who are mostly Sunni, Iran creates an environment that is costly for the country to live
within and highly isolating. Thus, the real reason behind the regime’s insistence on this strategy
is to preserving the current political system and the power of the current ruling elites; briefly it is
labeled as ‘the survival of the regime’ in this study.
I argue that the survival of the regime is paramount and defines the limits of domestic and
foreign policy-making. Second, the IRGC is the key executor and instrument of this strategy. In
addition to providing security against internal and external threats, the extraterritorial activities
of the IRGC helps the Iranian political leadership consolidate the Islamic regime at home. This
phenomenon can be defined as ‘boomerang effect.’ It refers to a situation in which policies,
discourse and actions in external relations also target social and political actors in the domestic
sphere. In the Iranian case, IRGC activism in foreign policy also serves regime survival. Iranian
political leadership considers the IRGC an instrument to safeguard the political regime against
domestic threats and challenges. Regarding the nexus between domestic and foreign policy
making, most analyses focus on how domestic politics shape foreign policy making. Little
attention has been paid on how foreign policy-making affects domestic politics. Hence, the case
of the IRGC provides a rather interesting context in which we can analyze how foreign-policy
making tools and strategies can also become instruments of reinforcing the political regime.

7
Methodologically, the study is structured as single case study. In terms of data sources,
this study utilizes the secondary literature, official publications and documents of Iranian
governments, official statements of various international organizations and states, speeches by
political leaders, and newspaper articles, including interviews with prominent political and
military figures.
This study is not based on a single system of transliteration. The reader is asked to
forgive any transliteration inconsistencies.
The study is divided into six chapters. This Introductory chapter is followed by Chapter
2. The second chapter aims to give critical background that clarifies the dynamics that today
drive Iran’s domestic politics and international affairs. Undoubtedly, among several factors,
particularly the clerics’ role in the society that has improved over time, foreign interventions,
domestic events such as the 1891-92 Tobacco Movement, the Constitutional Revolution of 19051909, the Coup D’etat 1921 and most importantly the CIA/MI-6-orchestrated 1953 Coup that
overthrew the democratically-elected Prime Minister and, finally, the emergence of Khomeini all
created the structural roots of the 1979 Revolution. In the words of Meyer, these common
historical experiences, geo-strategic circumstances and developments in society were planted
deep into the collective memory of Iranians as ‘lessons learnt’ and ‘beliefs held.’5 The
combination of ‘lessons learnt’ and ‘beliefs held’ deeply influenced the ideology of Khomeini
and subsequent Iranian political structure and policy makers’ post-revolutionary worldview.
Most importantly the effects of these long, short and immediate historical events can be seen in
the new regime’s Constitution. The goal of the second chapter is to minimize opacity by focusing
on the components that are the long term, shorter term, and immediate historical, political and

5

Christoph O. Meyer, “Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for
Explaining Changing Norms,” European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 4 (December 2005): 525.
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social events that have shaped the priorities, worldview and mindset of Iranian policy makers.
Intensified focus will be on the post-Revolutionary period political structure and decisionmaking process. In addition to Iran’s demography, geopolitical position and strategic importance,
the chapter aims to draw and define Iran’s position in the Muslim world and its sphere of
influence in the region.
The third chapter aims to explore the characteristics of Iran’s foreign policy and its
foreign policy goals through analyzing internal and external determinants. To this end, the
chapter introduces the key individuals and bodies in charge of Iran’s foreign policy-making,
including their functions, responsibilities, and limits. Additionally, to outline the characteristics
of Iran’s foreign policy, this chapter deals with the evolution of Iran’s foreign policy under two
supreme leaders; Khomeini (1980-1988) and Khamenei (1988-present); and four presidents;
President Rafsanjani (1989-1997), Khatami (1997-2005), Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), and
Rouhani (2013-present). The Khomeini period is addressed as a whole period during Khomeini’s
rule without separation of presidential periods because of his dominance over decision-making.
Lastly, by analyzing the characteristics of foreign policy, explicitly stated objectives of
politicians and foreign policy practices, Iran’s foreign policy goals will be outlined.
In the fourth chapter, based on the findings in the previous chapter, Iran’s use of the
IRGC in attaining foreign policy goals will be analyzed through two cases: First, relations with
the Lebanese Hezbollah and, second, Shiite groups in post-2003 occupied Iraq. In both cases,
Iran’s relations with the Shiite groups dates to the early days of the Revolution. Indeed, personal
relations between the Iranian revolutionaries and the leaders of these Shiite movements are
rooted in the pre-revolutionary era. But, these relations were institutionalized after the
Revolution. Following Israel’s 1982 invasion, Iran deployed its first contingent to Lebanon. The

9
IRGC’s activities in Lebanon were Iran’s first and most successful extraterritorial engagement.
All forms of Iranian support have been essential to Hezbollah’s long-standing success. In turn,
Hezbollah served Iran in several ways. Lebanese Hezbollah became a laboratory for the IRGC’s
future foreign engagements particularly in post-2003 occupied Iraq and the 2011 Syria civil war.
During the Iran–Iraq war, Iran and Iraqi Shiite groups actively fought against Saddam’s Baathist
regime. This cooperation was a part of the war, and an alliance against a common enemy. In
post-2003 occupied Iraq, however, despite the fact that Iran was not a part of the conflict, as was
not the case in Lebanon, it used the IRGC to shape Iraq’s internal politics for its own interests.
Both cases have common characteristics in terms of the strategies followed and the desired
outcomes. Although the covert nature of these activities is an important obstacle to research, the
IRGC’s relations with Hezbollah and its activities in Iraq are relatively well-documented. Thus,
both cases are very valuable for observing Iran’s motivations, and the level and characteristics of
the IRGC involvement in these engagements. In this context, after some background about the
post-revolution military and the IRGC’s establishment, structure, and responsibilities, this
chapter covers two case studies; the IRGC’s relations with Lebanese Hezbollah and Shiite
groups in post-2003 occupied Iraq.
The fifth chapter assesses the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities. The IRGC is a
constitutional organization and has the characteristics of regular army structure. Generally, the
conditions of the use of military force are defined by international law and norms. Owing to the
IRGC’s extraterritorial activities, Iran is accused of being a state sponsor of terrorism. The state
sponsorship of terrorism literature gives comprehensive insights on the dynamics of stateterrorist organization relations. Thus, this chapter intends to analyze the IRGC’s extraterritorial
activities through the lenses of international law and state sponsorship of terrorism literature.

10
The following questions are the focus of the chapter: what is the status of the IRGC’s
extraterritorial activities within the international legal framework of use military force? What is
the basis of these activities in international law? Are these activities categorized as state
sponsorship of terrorism? If so, what is the regime’s real motivation behind the decision to use
the IRGC in extraterritorial activities, despite the risk of being labeled as a terrorism sponsor?
Since the revolution, Iran has always prioritized internal security concerns above external
ones. Iran's first priority has consistently remained the survival of the regime and regime survival
has been the most influential factor in the decision-making process. I argue that there is a strong
connection between the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities and the ruling elites’ regime survival
strategy. This issue has not been addressed adequately in the literature of state terrorism
sponsorship, and studies on Iran and the IRGC. To fill this gap, the remaining part of the chapter
will investigate the dynamics between the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities and the survival of
the regime, which is also the specific objective of this study.
The sixth (final) chapter will be a general conclusion, stating the main arguments of this
thesis and provide a brief discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of the particular
case.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND

If you want to understand today, you have to search yesterday.
Pearl S. Buck

Introduction

The strategic decision-making of Iran is shaped by its formal and informal power centers,
which are quite opaque, even to its own citizens. The goal of the first chapter is to minimize this
opacity by focusing on the components that are the long term, shorter term, and immediate
historical, politic and social events that have created today’s conditions and changed the
worldview and mindset of Iranian policy makers.
The 1979 Iranian Revolution was not merely a leadership change. It also made
Khomeini’s ideology which is blend of his interpretation of Shiism and Persian nationalism, the
dominant character of the post-revolutionary era, and has influenced every aspect of Iranian life.
The revolution changed the political structure, the preferences of policy makers and the
economic structure of Iran, but even more fundamentally, its culture and society.
This chapter is structured into six main topics as shown below, which aim to identify the
fundamental factors that affect the post-revolutionary Iranian foreign policy mindset and
subsequent decision-making. Intensified focus will be on the post-Revolutionary period political
structure and decision-making process. In addition to Iran’s demography, geopolitical position
and strategic importance, the chapter aims to draw and define Iran’s position in the Muslim
world and its sphere of influence in the region. The outline of the chapter is as following;
-‐

Demographic structure, Iran’s geopolitical position, and strategic importance
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-‐

The Roots of the 1979 revolution

-‐

Foreign Policy of Iran after the Revolution

-‐

Post-Revolutionary Worldview and Political Structure

-‐

Mutual perceptions of Sunnis and Shiites

-‐

Iran’s sphere of influence.

Iran’s Demographic Structure, Geopolitical Position and Strategic Importance

Iran is a Gulf and Middle East country, which is bounded by the Caspian Sea,
Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Persian Gulf, Iraq, Turkey, and Armenia.
Iran is the 18th largest state in the world with its 1.648.000 km2 area. However, only a tenth of its
total area is in economic use; the rest is desert, steppe, and high mountains.1

1

Keith McLachlan, The Boundaries of Modern Iran (London: UCL Press, 1994).
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Figure 1: Topographic Map of Iran

Source: University of Texas Libraries - Perry-Castañeda Map Collection2

These high mountains draw most of Iran’s borders. The geographic structure of Iran
looks like a bowl with a high outer rim that is formed by the Zagros, Talish, and Alburz
mountain chains. Especially in the west and north, the mountains are not only high, but also
extensive in ground area, while those of the south and east are narrower and lower in general,
more interrupted by lowland basins, and therefore less of a barrier. The Zagros Mountains extend
from northwest to southeast and occupy the entire western part of Iran as a natural wall along
Iran’s Iraq-Turkey border. The Talish and Alburz chains diverge from the northern Zagros in an
easterly direction which are narrower, equally high and also relatively unbroken.3

2

“Iran Maps - Perry-Castañeda Map Collection,” University of Texas Libraries, accessed July 7, 2016,
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/iran.html.
3
WB Fisher, “The Land of Iran, Vol. 1. The Cambridge History of Iran,” ed. W. B. Fisher i (1968): 6,
doi:10.1017/CHOL9780521069359.
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While the mountain chains along its borders provide strategic defensive terrain to Iran
against any external threat, the long coastline along the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea prevent
Iran from being isolated and blockaded. This geography puts Iran in a favored and privileged
position to dominate land accesses to oil-producing regions of the Persian Gulf, the Middle East,
and the Caspian Sea and other strategically important zones particularly Iraq, Afghanistan and
the Central Asian Republics. Moreover, Iran controls the northern coast of the Strait of Hormuz,
which is the sole waterway leading out of the Persian Gulf. “The Strait of Hormuz is the world's
most important oil chokepoint because roughly 30% of all seaborne-traded oil flowed through
the Strait of Hormuz in 2013.”4
Iran is the second largest economy in the Middle East and North Africa region after Saudi
Arabia, and mainly depends on the hydrocarbon sector. It ranks second in the world in natural
gas reserves and fourth in proven crude oil reserves.5
Iran is home to the region’s most populous country with almost 75 million people.6 The
Islamic Republic of Iran is ethnically, religiously and linguistically diverse-roughly 50 percent of
its citizens are of non-Persian origin.
Despite its multiethnic composition and unlike many of its neighbors, Iran has had a long
history as a state-as Persia, the land has been an empire or state for millennia. However, this long
history has not made Iranians a nation.7 Persian ethnicity has been the dominant nationality and
the heterogeneity within the state has not been recognized by the authorities. The absence of
detailed data on ethnic, sectarian, and linguistic diversity, and their geographical distribution is a
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sign of the way authorities perceive ethnic fragmentation as a threat to Iran’s unity. Thus, the
ethnic composition of Iran cannot be determined precisely. The lack of precise and objective
information about ethnolinguistic groups constrains researchers to a very limited number of
sources that mostly depend on estimations and very old data.
One of the sources that is used widely on this issue is the Central Intelligence Agency
World Fact Book. According to the World Fact Book, the estimation of Iran’s ethnic distribution
is as follows; Persian 61% (includes Gilakis and Mizandranis), Azeri 16%, Kurd 10%, Lur 6%,
Baloch 2%, Arab 2%, Turkmen and Turkic tribes 2%, other 1%.8 Another source is Brenda
Shaffer’s Borders and Brethren: Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity. In this book,
Shaffer defines the percentage of Azerbaijanis and tribal Turks as ‘20-30’, Kurds as 9, Baluchis
as 3, Arabs as 2.5, Turkmens as 1.5.9 Shaffer cites this data from Shahrzad Mojab and Amir
Hassanpour’s article of The Politics of Nationality and Ethnic Diversity. Mojab and
Hassanpour’s ethnic distribution is roughly the same, except the distribution of Azerbaijanis that
is precisely defined as 24%. Mojab and Hassanpour state that the only official data regarding
ethnic and linguistic distribution dates back to 1956, which is the ‘population according to
language’ figures released after 1956 census.10
In addition to the above mentioned references, by reviewing the literature it has been
observed that Mojab and Hasspour’s figures are widely shared by scholars; the central authority
is dominated by Persians who constitute roughly half (51%) of Iran’s population. The other half
of population is classified as 24% Azeri, 8% Gilaki and Mazandarani, 7% Kurd, 3% Arab, 2%
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Lur, 2% Baluch, 2% Turkmen, and others (1 percent).11, 12, 13
Linguistic distribution in Iran is almost the same as ethnicity: Persian (official) 53%,
Azeri Turkic and Turkic dialects 18%, Kurdish 10%, Gilaki and Mazandarani 7%, Luri 6%,
Baluchi 2%, Arabic 2%, other 2%.14
We can see the same opacity in the official data of religious-sectarian and linguistic
composition. For these categories, there is no data published by Iranian government. However,
the data of both of these categories is more consistent than the data of ethnic composition in the
literature. The widely accepted percentage of Muslims is approximately 98 percent. Among
Muslims, the estimate of Sunnis ranges from 5 to 9 percent, but 9 percent is broadly accepted.
Zoroastrians, Jews, Christians, and Baha'is make up two percent of the total population.15, 16
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Table 1: Ethnic, Linguistic and Sunni-Shiite Distribution
Ethnic

Linguistic

Sunni- Shiite
Sunni- Shiite

Distribution
Persians

Distribution Distribution

51

53

Shiite

8

7

Shiite

Gilaki and
Mizandrani
%89
Lur

2

6

Shiite

Azeris

24

18

Shiite

Arabs

3

2

Predominantly Shiite

Kurds

7

10

Predominantly Sunni

Baluchis

2

2

Sunni

Turkmens

2

2

Sunni

Other

1

2

%9

%2

Source: Compiled by the author from the aforementioned studies for the ethnic distribution and the
linguistic distribution, and from Sanarisan17 for the Sunni-Shiite distribution

As shown above, in contrast its ethnic diversity, Iran’s religious diversity is relatively
homogeneous. Including its biggest ethnic minority, Azeris, the Shiite population represents 89
percent of the total population, the 9 percent of the population that is Sunnis includes Kurds,
Baluschis, and Turkmens.
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Figure 2: Map of Iranian Ethno-Religious Distribution

Source: University of Texas Libraries - Perry-Castañeda Map Collection18

Shiism is a non-dominant branch of Islam, and Iran has the highest Shiite population in
the Muslim world. The division of Shiism dates back to the early days of Islam. Keddie states
that it was originally a political movement of followers of Ali, the son-in-law and cousin of
Prophet Mohammad. They “believed that legitimate succession to Mohammad could only be in
Ali's line and that these leaders, called Imams, had divine power and knowledge.”19
However, as time passed by, this political view evolved into a new branch of Islam;
Shiism. Shiism has been divided into different branches with different interpretations. Twelvers
is the one that represents the overwhelming majority in Iran. They believe that their Twelfth
18
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Imam had gone into hiding but would return as the messianic Mahdi. In the absence of the
twelfth Imam, leading clerics, through their knowledge, have become the will of the Imam. This
status formed a kind of clerical hierarchy embedded in the society where leading clerics, and
mostly a single top leader, were accepted as the source of correct belief and action. This
development has made the imams very powerful actors not only in Iran’s religion history, but
also in its political history. According to Keddie, “[t]he history of Iran's Shi'i clergy is unique in
the Muslim world and forms a background to clerical participation in the two major twentiethcentury Iranian revolutions--the constitutional revolution (l905-1911) and the Islamic Revolution
(1978-79).”20

The Historical Developments Before the 1979 Iranian Revolution

The 1979 Iranian Revolution is the most important turning point in Iran’s late history that
has put Iran in a controversial and exceptional position in the Islamic World and in the regional
and global arena. After the revolution, Iran declared itself a theocratic republic guided by
religious principles and named itself the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Calling the 1979 revolution ‘Islamic’ shouldn’t bring us to the conclusion that the causes
of the revolution were entirely religious. As Kimmel states, “[r]evolutions do not simply happen
because of an economic crisis, or because a religious leader urges his or her followers to rebel, or
because a group of people suddenly find themselves discontent with political arrangements in
society, or because a nation is defeated in a war and is there for vulnerable to mass discontent –
although each of these has been offered as a casual explanation of revolution.”21 There is no
doubt that Shiite clerics were very crucial actors in the making of the Iranian Revolution against
20
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the Shah, but not the only ones. According to Skocpol,
In Iran, uniquely, the revolution was "made" - but not, everyone will note, by any of
the modern revolutionary parties on the Iranian scene: not by the Islamic guerillas or
by the Marxist guerillas, or by the Communist ("Tudeh") Party, or by the secularliberal National Front. Instead it was made through a set of cultural and
organizational forms thoroughly socially embedded in the urban communal enclaves
that became the centers of popular resistance to the Shah.22

Kimmel asserts that structural roots of revolutions are deeply embedded in society’s past
including long term structural causes, short term events, and the immediate historical events.
These three levels include the long term, structural shifts in the social foundations of the society;
the short term historical events that allow these deeply settled structural forces to emerge as
politically potent and begin to mobilize potential discontents; and the immediate historical events
that set the entire revolutionary process in motion. These three levels, which are named as the
preconditions, the precipitants, and the triggers, allow us to make an adequate analysis of 1979
revolution.23 Analyzing the Iranian revolution through these lenses contributes to understanding
the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Several long-term factors in Iranian history prepared the conditions for the revolution.
Among these factors, the roles of clerics and Shiism in daily life occupy a very noticeable place.

Safavid Dynasty

The establishment of Shiism as the state religion of Iran dates back to the foundation of
the Safavid Empire in 1501. Until that date, different branches of Sunni Islam were believed and
practiced by the majority of the Iranian population. Under the Safavid authority Iranian society
22
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was subjected to mass conversions to Shiism by using various assimilation strategies: “example,
zeal, massacre, pillage, and torture.”24 Additionally, by importing Shiite theologians and building
up theological centers, Safavid Shahs tried to establish an intellectual and institutional basis for
the Shiite creed in the predominantly Sunni population of Iran.25
In this period, the systemic institutionalization of Shiism into the state power obviously
became the priority of Safavid rulers. It was a way of controlling the society. Ashtiani states that
“[a]part from the political and military structure of the Safavid state, Shiism was instrumental in
giving the new Iranian nation-state a sense of political unity and cultural cohesion.”26 At the
same time, “the state religion provided an ideological justification and theological basis for the
Safavid political power.”27 In addition to surmounting the new state’s initial problems,
conversion to Shiism “clearly differentiated the Safavid state from the Sunni Ottoman Empire,
the major power in the Islamic world in the sixteenth century, and thus gave it territorial and
political identity”28 that aimed to block the expansion of Ottomans.
As Shiism became more and more institutionalized, Shiite clerics not only dominated
daily religious life, but also rose to a position of political power. It was a two-way interaction: to
empower clerics to spread and consolidate Shiism in the society made them more powerful in the
bureaucracy of the state.29, 30
The process of conversion to Shiism and its institutionalization in Iranian society was a
political act not for spiritual reasons. Thus, without any doubt; this Safavid designed process
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made Shiism the essential ingredient not only of religious, but also social, cultural, political and
even economic aspects of life.

Pre-Qajar Period

In the aftermath of the Safavid’s collapse in 1722, until the establishment of the Qajar
Dynasty (1785), a strong central authority, and permanently stabilized region couldn’t exist
under the rule of Sunni Afghans, Nader Shah and the Zand Dynasty. Barrett states that
“[w]ithout a strong authoritarian state, Persia reverted to a fractured tribal society in which
political power and identity reverted to political factions including the Shi’a clergy.”31 Despite
temporary stability due to the powerful personality of leaders such as Nader Shah and Karim
Khan, tribally-led wars and Russian and Ottoman invasions became characteristic of this period.
In this period, the Shi’ite clergy began to lose their privileged position that was given by
state authority and most of the power that was gained under the Safavids. Dorraj says that Shiism
was downgraded to the status of other Islamic schools, and Shiite endowment properties were
seized, which in turn weakened the power of the clerics.32 These changes compelled the Shi’ite
clergy to depend on their own resources and develop an autonomous structure that could survive
without government sponsorship.33

Qajar Dynasty

After this fluctuation between stability and chaos following the Safavids, the Qajar
Dynasty, whose reign stretched from 1785 to 1925, reestablished stability and reunified Iran to
31

Roby C Barrett, “JSOU Report 12-8 Iran  : Illusion , Reality , and Interests” (Florida, 2012), 25.
Manochehr Dorraj, From Zarathustra to Khomeini: Populism and Dissent in Iran (Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1990), 88.
33
Arjomand, “Shi’ite Islam and the Revolution in Iran,” 305.
32

23
some extent. According to Keddie, this roughly two-century-era was a “key transitional period
between pre-modern Iranian culture and society and Iran’s modern development.”34
The Qajar period marked a noteworthy breakpoint in Iran’s political and social history in
several important respects:
-‐

Iran was transformed from a predominantly tribal territory into a relatively
centralized monarchy.35 Centralization increased but remained limited. Owing to
the political and financial weaknesses of the central government, the reforms that
were necessary for a strong central authority could not be fully implemented.
“The vested or territorial interests of notables, tribal khans, religious figures
(ulama) and others who stood to loose power if the central government became
stronger”36 were the chief obstacles to fully accomplish these reforms.

-‐

In this period, relations with the West increased. The West’s colonial expansion
efforts driven by their own interests and the enthusiasm of a few reform-minded
Qajar politicians who believed that the country’s progress could be advanced
through increasing its economic and diplomatic ties with Europe, contributed to
the growth of significant political, socioeconomic, intellectual relations for Iran.
In general, these factors turn Iran into a playground international rivalry and
competition.37 However, this environment also created strong opposition to
Western imperialism.

-‐

The independent power and wealth of the clergy that began under the Safavids
became fully operative under the Qajar Dynasty. There were a number of
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developments strengthened the Shiite clerics. As a result of the
deinstitutionalization and weakening of Shiite clergies’ status in the government,
the clerics developed an autonomous structure and a set of religious doctrines,
which consolidated their status in social life and made it possible to survive
without any government support and against any challenge by Qajar authorities.38
Arjmond states that during the Qajar period, the autonomous power of the
religious leaders reached its zenith.39 Furthermore, ‘alliances among many ulama
merchants and others sometimes forced the government to change policies.’40
The extensive network of the Shiite clergies and their direct and regular contact with the
laity –in particular with the traditional merchant class–provided the institution of Shiism room to
maneuver in domestic and foreign policy.41 Thus, the Shiite clergy played a prominent role in
several rebellious movements: the 1891-92 Tobacco movement, the 1905-06 Constitutional
Revolution, the 1951-53 Oil Nationalization Movement, and the 1979 Iranian revolution.

1891-92 Tobacco Movement

Among rebellious movements, the Tobacco movement is an important milestone in
Iranian social and political history, which allowed the clerics to establish themselves as
‘defenders of nationalism and independence in Iran.’42
In 1892, after the Shah granted a monopoly to the British in the sale and export of
tobacco in addition to the other concessions, the widely-joined opposition movement started,
which included clerics, bazaar traders, intellectuals, and military officers, who saw these
38
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concessions as a threat to national sovereignty. To protest government policies, smoking was
prohibited, and the bazaars were closed in addition to strikes and demonstrations. The Shiite
leader, Ayatollah Hasan al-Shirazi, had a prominent role in the religious legitimation of the
protests. He issued a fatwa against smoking tobacco. Mosques served as centers of resistance and
sanctuary to protesters, and also mobilized society.43 The successfully orchestrated protests, later
named the Tobacco movement, led to the cancelation of the tobacco concession and embodied
the cooperation between the clergy, merchants, and dissident intellectuals. The tobacco
movement, which should be seen as the first sign of popular revolt against the prevailing order,
was a rough rehearsal for the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1906.44

The Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1909

As a result of the Tobacco movement, the clergy and their cooperation with other
discontented elements of Iranian society appeared as a noteworthy development in Iranian politic
history. A decade and a half later, these groups actively participated in the Constitutional
Revolution of 1905-1909, which was a seminal event in the country's history that forced the
Shah to grant a Western-style constitution including a parliament.45 The dominant motivation for
this rebellion was the public’s sense that political leaders’ were selling national resources for
personal profit, but was not the only reason; in addition the revolutionaries wanted to replace
“arbitrary power with law, representative government, and social justice and to resist the
encroachment of imperial powers with conscious nationalism, popular activism, and economic
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independence.”46
The revolutionaries tried to establish a strong centralized state by reducing the power of
the tribes and institutionalizing modern education and judicial reforms. According to Keddie,
“although internal discord and especially a Russian invasion ended this experiment in 1911, the
constitution remained until a new regime replaced it in 1979.”47
However, despite the Constitutionalists’ efforts, a strong centralized modern state could
not be established. In contrast, it was followed by a period of disintegration, anarchy and the
involvement of foreign powers such as Russia and England until 1921.48
Britain’s strategic and economic interests continually evolved in the Gulf. Initially, the
importance of the Gulf was dominated by the security of the principal lines of communication
and supply between Britain and British India. The discovery of Persian oil in the first decade of
the twentieth century, and the 1912 decision to convert the Royal Navy to one powered by oil,
instead of coal, renewed the strategic value of the Gulf to London.49
Iran's geographic importance and its oil made it indispensable for the British and
Russians to dominate this state. ‘The Great Game’ referred to the strategic rivalry and conflict
between the British and Russian empires for control of the Central Asia. In 1907, two imperialist
powers agreed to divide Iran into three parts; a Russian zone in the north, a British zone in the
south, and a neutral buffer zone between the two.50 World War I and post-war improvements
radically altered the Great Powers’ calculations in Iran. However, roughly a decade later AngloRussian cooperation ended with the Bolshevik revolution. With this developments, Russian
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imperialism was removed from the picture. Subsequently, the possible expansion of the
Bolshevik revolution was seen as a threat and “Britain was favorably disposed toward the
creation of a strong nationalist state to withstand the threat of Bolshevism.”51
The agreement of 1919 between Iran and Britain was designed to strengthen the central
government and make Iran a virtual British protectorate. Despite British pressure for
implementation, it was not ratified by the Iranian parliament (Majles). Britain’s efforts and a new
Russian intervention in northern Iran provoked the Iranian people and also increased instability
in the state.52 Many, including local British officials, feared that the withdrawal of British troops
from Northern Persia would be followed by an attack on Tehran with Bolshevik backing and
looked for preventive measures.53 During the great destruction of World War I, the imperialist
powers’ struggles over Iran and its use as a battlefield increased nationalist and democratic
sentiment among Iranians.54

The Coup D'etat-1921

Under these circumstances in 1921, Reza Khan, an army officer, and Sayyed Zia, a
journalist, initiated a successful coup d’état. In 1925, continuing instability and chaos in Iran
allowed Reza Khan to assume authority. He had himself named Shah, ‘styling himself a
cosmopolitan Persian King in the 2,500-year-old image of Cyrus the Great.’55 Thus, formally the
Qajar dynasty was replaced by the new Pahlavi dynasty. The coup not only prevented the spread
of revolutionary Bolshevism, but also opened a new era of modernization and state centralization
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in Iran.

1925-1941 Reza Khan Period

Reza Shah wanted to create a Western-style modern state under his autocratic power by
establishing a powerful central state with modern fiscal and economic tools, a modernized
judiciary, education, health and transportation systems, the establishment of industry and largescale corporations and, most importantly, a modern and powerful military.
During his reign, Reza Shah stressed nationalism and “Iran gained greater national unity
and autonomy than ever before in modern times.”56 According to Abidi, his most significant
contribution to Iran was that he enabled the country to continue to exist as a single unit.57
Arjomond states that the modernization programs of the Pahlavi era also entailed the significant
secularization of Iranian culture.
New branches of learning, the history of pre-Islamic Iran, Ferdawsi's Epic of the
Kings, and the secular nationalist ideology of the Pahlavi state were propagated by
the new system of national education in the 1930s. This ideology bypassed
constitutionalism and was emphatically monarchist, as best illustrated by the order of
the three words in the motto it inscribed in the minds of the whole generation of its
school children: God, the King, the Fatherland. Perhaps the most spectacular aspect
of the state promoted secularization of culture was the unveiling of women in 1935, a
forced but nevertheless courageous break with the Islamic tradition.58

Nonetheless, the Shah’s modernization program and his nationalist policies disturbed two
parties. Within Iran, on the one hand, the clergy, the traditional business class (the bazaari
merchants) and tribal leaders saw modernization as a direct threat to their status in society. On
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the other hand, the British viewed the Shah’s nationalist policies as a potential threat to their
economic interests in the AIOC (Anglo-Persian Oil Company).59
Since first discovering oil in the early years of the twentieth century, the British
maintained control of Iranian oil through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), which
strengthened British economic and military power rather than improving Iranian socioeconomic
life. As Kinzer explains, the AIOC was an immensely profitable company, with the Abadan
refinery constituting Britain’s largest overseas asset and the largest installation of its kind in the
world. While the refinery produced enormous profits and provided fuel for the Royal Navy, Iran
owned only 20% of the company.60 British monopoly on the production and sale of Iranian oil
maintained British leverage over Iranian politicians and society.
After World War II broke out, Reza Shah declared a policy of neutrality; however,
increasingly close relations with Germany made the Allies anxious. As stated by Kinzer
“[w]estern leaders feared that the Nazis were planning to use Iran as a platform for an attack
across the Soviet Union’s southern border that would greatly complicate the Allied war effort.”61
Therefore, the Allies invaded Iran in August 1941 and Reza Shah was forced to abdicate. This
ended Reza Shah's reign and started the era of Mohammad Reza (his eldest son), which would be
ended by the 1979 Iranian Revolution.
To fund Iranian modernization with oil revenue, the National Front demanded the
nationalization of the oil industry throughout the late 1940s. In particular, Dr. Mohammad
Mossadegh was a passionate figure in the nationalization struggle. He believed no country could
be independent without economic independence. According to him, "[t]he moral aspect of oil
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nationalization is more important than its economic aspect."62 This issue caused a great debate in
the Majlis (parliament). After the assassination of Prime Minister General Ali Razmara who
opposed nationalization for technical reasons, the Majlis nationalized foreign oil interests under
the insistence of the National Front on 20 March 1951. Almost a month later, Dr. Mohammad
Mossadegh was nominated for the position of Prime Minister, and was elected by a majority of
the Majlis.63
The nationalization of the oil industry, Mossadegh’s populist brand of nationalism and
the advent of the Tudeh (a well-organized and disciplined Communist Party) resulted in the
alienation of the Shah and the army. As Mosaddegh's power grew, the neo-patrimonial power of
the Shah was restricted and he was reduced to a constitutional monarch and a ceremonial
figurehead.64 These changes also were seen as direct threats to British interests.
After the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the issue was raised at the
United Nations, although some in the British government wanted to invade Iran as a response.
The British government perceived that it would not be easy to solve this problem in the UN and
decided to convince the U.S. government for a joint operation. The British government knew that
their transatlantic allies would not participate in a plan that was motivated purely by British oil
and economic interests, so instead they emphasized the Communist threat. Eventually, Operation
Ajax, which comprised propaganda, provocations, demonstrations, and bribery, and employed
agents of influence, dissident military leaders, and paid protestors, was created. On August 19,
1953, with CIA/MI6-orchestrated support, under General Fazollah Zahedi’s leadership, a coup
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was carried out.65 The 1953 coup removed democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister
Mohammed Mossadegh from power. Then the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza, was installed as
an absolute monarch and became a reliable ally of the United States.

1953-1979 Mohammed Reza Period

With the support of the U.S., in 1963, the Shah announced the modernization program
called the “White Revolution”. It included land reform, the privatization of state-owned
enterprises and a profit-sharing plan for industrial workers, etc. Additionally, the program
increased women's minimum legal marriage age to 18, improved women's legal rights in divorce
and granted women the right to vote. These reforms brought the Shah into conflict with the
clergy.66 Khomeini, who harshly criticized as land reform and votes for women, came to
prominence during this conflict. After that time, Khomeini would be one of the most influential
figures in modern Iran history. Due to his opposition, in 1964 he was sent into exile in Turkey
and subsequently Iraq. Some of the fashionable Leftist and Third Worldist ideology of the time
influenced him during his exile. In 1970, he devised a clerical government as an alternative to
monarchy. This would, ultimately, pave the way to his Supreme Leadership.67
With the rise in oil prices in 1973–1974, Iran’s annual revenue increased “from about US
$1bn to about US $25bn.”68 By starting industrial and military modernization with this revenue,
Abidi states that, Mohammed Reza initiated a series of measures aimed at transforming his
nation from the preparatory phase of the “White Revolution” to the grand era of the “Great
Civilization.” However, almost 18 months later, world demand for Iranian oil contracted, and
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many projects had to be cut and workers lost their jobs. Thus, the Shah’s dream ended in the
chaos of inflation, port congestion, and shortages of basic goods and services.69
These changes led to a variety of social problems in Iran. In addition to economic chaos
and suppression of society, the Shah’s populist policies such as the new calendar dating from
Cyrus the Great caused the Shah’s prestige loose. Discontent with the Shah’s policies was
spreading through various segments of Iranian society. After that time, protests and major
demonstrations against the government became increasingly common, and several sequential
events triggered the turmoil.
First, Khomeini’s son, Mostafa, was accidentally killed in Karbala on 23 October 1977,
and it was widely suspected that he was killed by SAVAK, the Shah’s security service.70
Second, an insulting article published in a January 1978 issue of the newspaper Ettelaat,
accused Khomeini of being an Indian agent of the British. The seminary town of Qom, which
was the center of Khomeini’s supporters, reacted very severely to this article. Uprisings spread to
several cities, tens of people died, and the army was deployed for the first time.71
Last and the worst of the incidents, on 19 August 1978, militants set fire to the first floor
corridor of the Rex Cinema in Abadan. More than 400 people died, suffocated by the fumes.
Shiite clergy under Khomeini’s leadership and the liberal opposition claimed that the fire was the
work of SAVAK and was designed to discredit the religious protest.72
All of these issues fueled the revolutionary movement gave the most prominent role to
Khomeini, who was in Najaf, Iraq at this time. Mohammed Reza’s first reaction was to dismiss
premier Amouzegar and replace him with Jafar Sharif Emami. Although Emami tried to calm the
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religious opposition by taking some measures such as rescinding the imperial calendar and
closing casinos, he could not break the momentum of the demonstrations. The lack of
improvement pushed PM Emami to attempt to silence Khomeini. Because of pressure from
Iranian officials, the Iraqi government increased the pressure on Khomeini. Khomeini found a
solution by going to France where he was safer than in other countries of the region and where
Iranians could stay for 90 days without a visa.73 In France, Khomeini kept severe opposition
alive by doing print and broadcast interviews, and sending messages to his supporters.
Meanwhile in Iran, the weakness of Emami government led the Shah to form a military
government to end the chaos. Initially, the government was successful to some extent, however,
the month of Moharram, when Iranians traditionally mourn the death in the battle of the
Prophet’s grandson, Hosein, protests and street marches intensified. According to Buchan, “those
marches were a decisive rejection of the monarchy and an endorsement of Khomeini as the
undisputed leader of the rebellion. The Left and the liberals convinced themselves that Khomeini
and the clergy would mobilize the masses and then somehow leave the modern classes to
establish the new government.”74
In the end, Reza Shah was convinced to temporarily leave Iran for Egypt believing his
absence might soothe the protests and chaos. Despite attempts to stop him, Khomeini returned to
Iran on February 1st, 1979 and ten days later, on February 11, the power in Iran switched to “the
coalition of Khomeini and his followers, including clericals, lay religious figures led by
Barzagan, and for a time, a few lay National Front and other ministers, notably Dr. Karim
Sanjabi.”75
Keddie states that at the beginning Khomeini and the clergy seemed reluctant to govern
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the state. Khomeini’s appointment of the non-clerical Mehdi Bazargan as Prime Minister and
support of Bani Sadr in the first presidential elections can be seen as proof of this perspective.76
However, immediately after eliminating their common enemy, ideological differences surfaced
amongst the revolutionary partners. Rather than returning to their mosques, Khomeini and many
clerics began to take steps to increase their power and to control the government. President Bani
Sadr and PM Bazargan were driven from office.77 According to Keddie, some opposition
Iranians saw this as Khomeini’s hijack of the revolution.78 Thus, Pahlavi family rule ended, and
the era of Khomeini and his clerics started. Buchan well sums up Pahlavi family rule periods:
Both Reza and Mohammed Reza claimed to be constitutional monarchs, but both
sought absolute rule: Reza from the late 1920s till his abdication in 1941, and
Mohammed Reza from 1964 until the end of 1978. Thus, even as their schools,
factories and model armies were creating a new middle class, they refused to admit
that class to power. During those periods of absolute rule, Parliament, the Press and
intellectual life were suppressed. The Pahlavi Court took on a composite, or
Ruritanian, character. Their reforms brought both Shahs into conflict with the Shia
clergy, which had long seen itself as the guardian of Iranian character and traditions.
There was nothing new in that. What was new was the character and will of Ruhollah
Khomeini.79

Thus the Pahlavis’ suppressive and autocratic rule was replaced by the rule of Khomeini.
“The decade of Khomeini’s rule was marked by the ever-growing power of his followers and
elimination, often by violence and despite resistance, of opposition groups, and by increasing
enforcement of ideological and behavioral controls on the population.”80
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The Causes of the 1979 Iranian Revolution

Sociological and Political Causes

Skocpol puts different and more comprehensive perspectives on the causes of the Iranian
Revolution. First, in general, the Iranian revolution can be regarded as a result of an excessively
rapid period of modernization. During both Shahs’ reign, and particularly, the later Shah period,
Iranian society saw “land reform, massive migrations from countryside to cities and towns
(above all to Teheran), unprecedentedly rapid industrialization, and the sudden expansion of
modern primary, secondary, and university education.”81 Excessively rapid social change and
additionally, a mismanaged economic policy increased the discontent of Iranian society with the
Shah. As stated by Skocpol “the Revolution was straightforwardly the product of societal
disruption, social disorientation, and universal frustration with the pace of change,”82 but this
was one aspect of the revolution. Because “disruption and discontent alone do not give people
the collective organizational capacities and the autonomous resources that they need to sustain
resistance to political and economic power holders.”83
Second, remarkably, the Shah’s army and police were ineffective in preventing the
revolution, even though immense investment had been made in the modernization of both
organizations.84
Third, Skocpol’s last departure from other theorists is the concept that ‘revolutions come,
not made.’ According to Skocpol, the Iranian revolution “did not just come; it was deliberately
and coherently made - specifically in its opening phase, the overthrow of the old regime.’ It was
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made by ‘a mass-based social movement aiming to overthrow the old order.”85 Undoubtedly; the
revolution was not made by a single segment of Iranian society; the segments ranged from
Marxist to the liberal National Front, from secularists to Islamic activists. It was made “through a
set of cultural and organizational forms thoroughly socially embedded in the urban communal
enclaves that became the centers of popular resistance to the Shah.”86

The Role of Shiism and Clergy in the Revolution

During both Shahs’ period, the clergy perceived that the modernization policies and
reforms had significantly weakened the foundation of the religious institutions and their
influence on Iranian culture. Land reform, the loss of judicial and educational functions, the loss
of control of religious endowments, and an increasing number of well-educated secular
competitors caused the clergy to fear the permanent loss of their historically important social
functions and their power in society. This led the Shiite clergy to react and to be the most
influential actor in the revolution.
Shiite clergy mosque network that had been rooted in Iranian communities since the
Qajar Dynasty served as centers for propaganda, mobilization, and organization of urban mass
movement and gave moral-religious justification to the struggle against the Shah. Additionally,
as Esposito states, “Shiite Islam provided a common set of symbols, historical identity, and
values - an indigenous, non-Western alternative. Shiite belief provided the basis for an
ideological framework for opposition and protest against oppression and injustice.”87
In Islam and Democracy, Esposito and Voll highlight Shiism’s role in Iranian politics and
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society as well in its latest revolution.
Shiism has been integral to Iranian identity and a source of a political legitimacy
since the sixteenth century when it was declared the state religion of Iran. Shia Islam
has been embroiled in politics from its origins, and as such provides history and
system of the belief that can be interpreted and used in political crisis. In Iranian
History, “Twelver Shiism (Ithna Ashari) has often been apolitical, finding a tolerable
accommodation with the state. However, at critical points throughout history, Shia
belief, leadership, and institutions have played an important role in Iranian politics
and society. Shiism has been interpreted and utilized to safeguard national identity
and independence and to mobilize popular support.”88

The replacement of one set of rulers or a ruler by another doesn’t solely mean a
revolution. A revolution is more than this. According to Walt, “revolutions redefine the political
community within a given territory by creating a "new state" that rests on principles and
procedures that are a sharp departure from those of the old regime.”89
Walt’s definition of ‘a sharp departure from those of the old regime’ totally explains what
happened in Iran during the 1979 Revolution. Following the revolution, Shiite doctrines have
formed the basis of all facets of life: the political, educational, legal, social, and religious.

Post-Revolutionary Worldview and Political Structure

Velayat-e Faqih

After the revolution, the concept of velayat-e faqih that was developed by Ayatollah
Khomeini has been the basis of Iran’s political system. The origin of velayat-e faqih dates back
to the debate between the akhbari and usuli schools of Shiism in the 18th century. The akhbari
school asserts that since the disappearance of the twelfth imam, the Quran and the hadith
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(sayings and actions of Prophet Muhammad) were sufficient for Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and
there was no need for the leadership of the mojtahed (highest learned clergy who have the
authority to make ijtihad (interpretation of the religion)). Conversely, the supporters of the usuli
school believe in the necessity of ijtihad and that the leadership of the mojtahed need to update
interpretations depending on current circumstances. The debate between the akhbari and usuli
schools ended in the late eighteenth century with the victory of the latter. This dynamic created
the Shiite clerical hierarchy in Iranian society and gave the right of ijtihad to only the mojtahed
or to the ayatollah, whose interpretations had to be followed by each believer. This highest rank
of Twelver Shiites who execute sharia later called marja-e taqlid (religious authority followed as
the source of emulation). Additionally, zakat (religious tax) and the khums (which is one fifth of
the annual net profit of a Shiite Muslim) enhanced the financial autonomy of the clergy and their
status in the society. According to Eva Patricia Rakel these four developments politicized Shiism
and increased the clergies power in Iran;
1. The triumph of usuli school
2. Ijtihad
3. Marja-e taqlid, and
4. The khums.90
In this context, the concept of velayat-e faqih states that the supreme leader is the
temporal, spiritual and legal leader of the ummah (muslim community) during the absence of the
Twelfth Imam. Velayat-e faqih has provided the ideological justification for the regime’s
political reconstruction. Iran’s interpretation of Shiism has shaped the worldview of Iranian
decision makers; thus it is almost impossible to separate the government’s decision-making from
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its religious principles. And this is also guaranteed by the 1979 constitution.
Article 177: The contents of the Articles of the Constitution related to the Islamic
character of the political system; the basis of all the rules and regulations according to
Islamic criteria; the religious footing; the objectives of the Islamic Republic of Iran;
the democratic character of the government; the wilayat al-'mr the Imamate of
Ummah; and the administration of the affairs of the country based on national
referenda, official religion of Iran [Islam] and the school [Twelver Ja'fari] are
unalterable.91

Political Structure

The concept of velayat-e faqih is not the sole character of the power structure of the
Islamic Republic of Iran. It has a dual and unique political system; in addition to deriving its
legitimacy from the velayat-e faqih system, Iran enjoys republican institutions inherited and
adapted from the constitution of 1906.
In terms of regime type, there is opacity whether Iran has a democratic or authoritarian or
totalitarian regime. Linz contrasted each regime with reference to five characteristics:
-‐

The selection of leaders through elections,

-‐

The degree of pluralism,

-‐

The nature of participation,

-‐

The scope of the regime’s ideology,

-‐

The degree to which the political system is institutionalized.92

In terms of these characteristics, it is not easy to place Iran into a particular regime type.
According to Chehabi, “Iran, like totalitarian regimes, proclaims absolute supremacy over the
public life of an ideology; like authoritarian regimes it permits a limited degree of pluralism, and
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like democracies it holds elections.”93
In the political structure of Iran, there is a parliament and a president, both selected by
Iranian voters. However, it also has a supreme leader who is both more powerful than the
president and not democratically elected. Moreover, the unelected institutions of Iran's
government are more powerful than the elected ones.

Figure 3: Political Structure of Iran

Source: BBC News, 200994

The structure of Iran’s political system contains two power centers; formal (as mentioned
above) and informal which are “a multitude loosely connected and generally fiercely competitive
power centers.”95 Whereas the formal power centers are grounded in the Constitution and can be
seen as a concrete structure, the informal power centers are different political factions of the
political elite that are embedded in the concrete power structure; “such as the heads and members
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of state institutions, religious-political associations, religious foundations, and paramilitary
organizations; those individuals that directly or indirectly participate in the decision-making
process in Iran and/or in the ideological discourse.”96

Informal Power Structure

Buchta describes the informal power structure by using a model made up of four
concentric rings. In this model, the power of each faction increases in size from the inner to the
outer circles.

Figure 4: The Informal Power Structure in Iran

Source: Buchta, 199997
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The First Ring: Patriarchs (Conservatives)
This group represents the regime's most powerful decision-making body that controls not
only their own ring of power, but also a large portion of the remaining political spheres. It
includes the most influential political clerics from the executive, judicial, and legislative
branches; the Council of Guardians; the Assembly of Experts; and the Society of Teachers of
Qom Theological Colleges.98 According to Rakel, since the revolution, conservatives have
controlled the politics, the military and economic system.99
The Second Ring: This group includes representatives from the executive, judicial, and
legislative branches, provincial governors; mayors of major cities and technocrats. They are the
ideologically right-wing traditionalist.100
The Third Ring: (The Power Base of the Regime) This group includes revolutionary
institutions, religious security forces, law enforcement forces, committees, IRGC, revolutionary
newspapers, and the media. It is dominated by ideologically left-wing Islamicists and right-wing
traditionalists.101
The Fourth Ring: (Formerly Influential Individuals and Groups) Buchta states that this
ring includes the "semi-opposition" who are positioned between the regime and civil society and
whose goal is the peaceful reform of the system from the inside.102

Formal Power Structure

The formal power centers consist of the president, the cabinet, the parliament, the
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assembly of experts, the guardian council, the supreme leader, the head of the judiciary, the
armed forces, and the expediency council. The responsibilities and functions of these institutions
briefly will be explained in this section.

The Supreme Leader

The Supreme Leader is the most powerful institution in the newly established political
system, which is based on the Khomeini's politico-religious theory of velayat-e faqih. According
to the article 110 of the constitution, the important duties and powers of the Supreme Leader are
as follows:
-‐

Assuming supreme command of the armed forces.

-‐

Declaration of war and peace, and the mobilization of the armed forces.

-‐

Appointment, dismissal, and acceptance of resignation of:

-‐

•

Six clerical jurists in the Guardian Council (six laymen, six clerical jurists),

•

The supreme judicial authority of the country,

•

The head of the radio and television network of the Islamic Republic of Iran,

•

The chief of the joint staff,

•

The chief commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps.

•

The supreme commanders of the armed forces.

Signing the decree formalizing the election of the President of the Republic by the
people. The suitability of candidates for the Presidency of the Republic, with respect
to the qualifications specified in the Constitution, must be confirmed before elections
take place by the Guardian Council; and, in the case of the first term [of the
Presidency], by the Leadership;

44
-‐

Dismissal of the President of the Republic, with due regard for the interests of the
country, after the Supreme Court holds him guilty of the violation of his
constitutional duties, or after a vote of the Islamic Consultative Assembly testifying
to his incompetence on the basis of Article 89 of the Constitution.103, 104

The Parliament

The members of the parliament are elected by popular vote every four years. Although
article 56 of the constitution emphasizes the absolute sovereignty of God, it also explicitly states
that Parliament is the trustee of this sovereignty. The following are the Parliament's important
functions;
-‐

Drafting legislation (Articles 71-75 of the Constitution);

-‐

Ratifying international treaties (Article 77);

-‐

Approving state-of-emergency declarations (Article 79) and loans (Article 80);

-‐

Examining and approving the annual state budget (Article 52);

-‐

Moreover, if necessary, removing from office the state president and his
appointed ministers.105

The President

The president is elected for four years and no more than two consecutive terms. The
Guardian Council vets all presidential candidates. The president is the second most powerful
official in the Iranian political system, “but his influence is primarily over the social, cultural,
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and economic policies of the country.” According to Buchta, it is a false belief that the executive
plays a dominant role in setting domestic and foreign policy, which originates from the high
public profile of the president and other representatives of the executive in the media and at
international conferences. The Supreme Leader controls the armed forces and makes decisions
on security, defense and major foreign policy issues. Buchta states that Iran's presidency is
unlike any other in many respects;
-‐

A supreme religious authority who is not elected by the people approves the
president who is elected by the people,

-‐

The state executive does not have control over the armed forces,

-‐

The entire executive branch is subordinate to a religious authority.106

The Council of Guardians

It consists of twelve jurists (six theologians appointed by the Supreme Leader and six
jurists nominated by the judiciary and approved by parliament) who determine the compatibility
with sharia of laws passed by the Parliament. The council has the power to veto laws if they
consider the laws inconsistent with the constitution and Islamic law.107

The Assembly of Expert

Consists of 86 members who are elected for an eight-year term. The responsibilities of
the Assembly of Experts are to appoint and monitor the Supreme Leader. The assembly gathers
at least once a year. Most importantly, according to Article 111, the assembly has the right to
“remove the supreme leader if he becomes unable to fulfill his duties, if he loses one or more of
106
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the qualifications necessary to perform in his office, or if it is revealed that he never possessed
these qualifications in the first place.”108

The Expediency Council

The Supreme Leader appoints its thirty-one members, who are prominent religious, social
and political figures. It has a mediation role in disputes between the parliament and the Guardian
Council. There are two Constitutional Responsibilities of the Expediency Council:
-‐

Advise the supreme leader in all matters related to the leader's right to establish
guidelines for the overall policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran (de facto, not
invoked until 1997).

-‐

Discern the supreme interest of the system through ultimate arbitration in cases in
which the legislative authority of Parliament is overruled by a veto of the Council
of Guardians.109

Armed Forces

The armed forces comprise the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the
regular forces under the Joint Armed Forces General Staff. The regular forces (the Artesh) are
responsible for defending Iran's borders and maintaining internal order. Both the Artesh and
IRGC are comprised of army, navy and air force.110
As is stated in Article 150 of 1979 Constitution, “[t]he Islamic Revolution Guards Corps,
organized in the early days of the triumph of the Revolution, is to be maintained so that it may
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continue in its role of guarding the Revolution and its achievements.”111 The reason behind the
establishment of IRGC was Khomeini’s concerns about the loyalty of the Shah’s military.
The Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC-QF) is an elite unit that
“conducts clandestine operations outside Iran; provides training, financial, and other support to
Islamic militant groups; and collects strategic and military intelligence…”112 All leading army
and Revolutionary Guard commanders are appointed by the Supreme Leader.

Foreign Policy of Iran after the Revolution

This topic will be addressed broadly in Section 3. Here, the Iranian Revolution’s initial
effects on foreign policy are described.
The revolution altered not only Iran’s internal dynamics, but also led to a dramatic
change in the Iranian foreign policy outlook. Iranian foreign policy adopted two principles just
after the revolution: “Neither East nor West” and “Export of the Revolution, based on the
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran rejected an alliance with both the US (West)
and USSR (East), two superpowers of the Cold War period and tried instead to achieve unity
with other Muslim countries. Several articles of the Constitution mention Iran’s foreign policy
preferences;
Article 152: The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based upon the
rejection of all forms of domination, both the exertion of it and submission to it, the
preservation of the independence of the country in all respects and its territorial
integrity, the defense of the rights of all Muslims, nonalignment with respect to the
hegemonist superpowers, and the maintenance of mutually peaceful relations with all
non-belligerent States.
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Article 153: Any form of agreement resulting in foreign control over the natural
resources, economy, army, or culture of the country, as well as other aspects of the
national life, is forbidden.

Article 154: The Islamic Republic of Iran has as its ideal human felicity throughout
human society, and considers the attainment of independence, freedom, and rule of
justice and truth to be the right of all people of the world. Accordingly, while
scrupulously refraining from all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other
nations, it supports the just struggles of the mustad'afun against the mustakbirun in
every corner of the globe.113

These articles draw attention to the basics in the conduct of Iranian foreign policy. These
are ‘sovereignty’, ‘independence’, ‘peaceful relations with states that are not hostile to Iran or
Islam in general’ and ‘opposition to any form of intervention and subjugation.’
Article 11: In accordance with the sacred verse of the Koran "This your community is
a single community, and I am your Lord, so worship Me" [21:92], all Muslims form a
single nation, and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran have the duty of
formulating its general policies with a view to cultivating the friendship and unity of
all Muslim peoples, and it must constantly strive to bring about the political,
economic, and cultural unity of the Islamic world.114

In article 11 Iran emphasizes the unity of the Islamic world. The new leadership viewed
its victory as a model for imitation by other Muslim countries and aimed to universalize its
revolutionary appeal by exporting it. However, in the first decade after the Revolution, there was
no success institutionalizing revolution abroad. According to Olivier Roy, there were two causes
in the failure of the revolution to export itself abroad: “First the revolution was unable to
transcend the Shi’a-Sunni divide to any substantial degree. … Secondly, the revolution was
carried unanimously by all Shi’a, even if the majority of non-Iranian Shi’a did feel solidarity.”115
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Without any doubt, Khomeini’s success created admiration in Muslim countries, but mutual
suspicions between parties and deep religious and political divisions, even in Shiite World,
prevented other countries from accepting Khomeini’s leadership.

Mutual Perceptions between Sunnis and Shiites

At this point, in order to understand the level of the schism in Islam, we look at the
distribution of the two major Islamic sects. According to Pew Research Center, Shiites constitute
10-13% of the total Muslim population. Almost 75% of the total Shiite population live in Iran,
Pakistan, India and Iraq. Shiite Muslims make up a majority of the total population in four
countries: Iran (where ~93% of Muslims are Shiite), Azerbaijan (~70%), Bahrain (~70%) and
Iraq (~67%).116
These two main sects of Islam divide into branches. Sunnism includes followers of the
Hanafi, Shafi, Maliki and Hanbali (Wahhabi or Salafi movement) schools of Islamic
jurisprudence. Shiism includes Twelvers (Ithna Asharis), Seveners (Ismailis), Zaydis and Alawis
as shown below
The Sunni- Shiite divide is not just a simple differing interpretation of Islam; it is also a
result of a 1,400-year old political disagreement. The world’s 1.6 billion Muslims all agree that
‘there is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah (Shahada-the declaration
of faith). Muhammad is the last prophet of Allah who has brought the final revelation.’ To make
this profession of faith is the first prerequisite for those who wants to become a Muslim. While
Sunnis believe that Quran, the practice of the Prophet and his teachings (the sunnah) are
sufficient to live Islam, the Shiites believe that ayatollahs are divinely guided and considered as
116
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the only legitimate interpreters of the Quran. Furthermore, the Shiites see their ayatollahs as
reflections of God on earth. The perceived exaggerated status of Ali and of ayatollahs have led
Sunnis to accuse Shiites of heresy.
Analyzing the mutual acceptance of the two principal sects helps to clarify the level of
division and the nature of contemporary relations. A Pew Research Center analysis makes crystal
clear the level of mutual acceptance between two main sects of Islam.
According to the Pew Research Center survey, the acceptance of Sunnis is universally
very high; the answer to the question of whether Sunnis are Muslims is ‘yes’ by more than half
of respondents in 17 of the 23 countries. For instance, in three countries with significant Shiite
population -Iraq (~67%), Lebanon (~50%) and Azerbaijan (~70%)- the majority agree that
Sunnis are members of the Islamic community.117

Table 2: The Acceptance of Sunnis as Muslims in the States that Have Shiite Majorities
% of Shiites in the Total
Population

% of the acceptance of Sunnis as
Muslims

Iraq

~67

99

Lebanon

~50

97

Azerbaijan

~70

78

Source: Pew Research Center, 2012118

The acceptance of Sunnis as Muslims even in Shiite dominant states is very high.
However, the converse is not nearly as true. In 11 of the 23 countries, the acceptance of Shiites
as Muslims is not higher than %50 of total respondents. This value is lower particularly in
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countries where Shiites 5% or less of the population.119

Figure 5: Percentage of Sunnis Who Accept Shiites as Muslim (Countries Where 5% or
Fewer Self-identity as Shiites)
Attitudes of Sunnis Toward Shiites:
% of Sunnis Who Accept Shiites as Muslim
(Countries Where 5% or Fewer Self-identity as Shiites)
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Unsurprisingly, in countries where 6% or more of Muslims self-identify as Shiite, the
acceptance of Shiites as Muslims is higher. It ranges from 90% in Azerbaijan, to 85% in Russia,
to 83% in Afghanistan, to 82% in Iraq, to 77% to Lebanon. The sole exception is Pakistan where
the approximate percentage of the Shiite population constitutes 10-15%, and half of the
correspondents from Pakistan recognize Shiites as Muslims.121

Figure 6: Percentage of Sunnis (Countries Where 6% or More Self-identity as Shiites)
Attitudes of Sunnis Toward Shiites
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In the context of the survey, if we focus on the countries that are in the Iran’s region and
possibly related to it, Jordan, the Palestinian territories, and Egypt, majorities of the populations
do not accept Shiites as Muslim.
From these findings, it can be said that in those where there is a substantial Shiite
population mutual recognition between Sunnis and Shiites is higher. On the other hand, Sunni
121
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dominant countries have a significant bias against accepting Shiites as Muslims.

Figure 7: Percentage of Sunnis Who Accept Shiites as Muslim (Iran and Related States)
Attitudes of Sunnis Toward Shiites:
% of Sunnis Who Accept Shiites as Muslim
(Iran and Related States)
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Without question, the Iranian Revolution created initial enthusiasm among other Muslim
nations, but after a time, Khomeini’s call for Islamic upheaval did not appeal broadly to Arab
Muslims. Sunnis’ psychological resistance stems from the 1,400-year old religious-political
Sunni– Shiite divide but was not the only reason for the failure of the revolution to export itself
abroad. The start of the Iran–Iraq war in 1980, just after the Iranian Revolution, deepened the
split between Iran and the Sunni-dominated Arab world. According to Roy, this dynamic created
another geostrategic factor: ‘Persians’ against ‘Arabs.’ He states “two vectors interacted here: for
the Arabs, Arab and Sunni solidarity; for all Sunni Islamists, condemnation of millenarist Shiite
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theories and role of the imam and as such, of Khomeini.”124
Iran’s expansionist ambitions were seen as a threat by Sunnis and thus triggered sectarian
tensions between Shiite and Sunnis. To balance this threat Sunni dominant states, namely Saudi
Arabia and Pakistan, encouraged the development of Sunni movements whose inspiration was
Salafist. Increasing the influence of Salafist and Wahhabi sects was intended to isolate the Shiite
and caused them “to lose all hope to reach out to Sunnis, but to face the emergence of a Sunni
religious movement that was both radical and anti- Shiite.”125 The Revolution unquestionably
moved different Islamic groups from a phase of quiet passivity into activism.
In the meantime, Iran gave up expansionism and began to follow a more pragmatic
policy. Instead of expansionism, Iran supports Shiite movements in neighboring states. Iran’s
support for Hezbollah has increased Iran’s weight in the regional balance of power.
The Taif agreement brought an end to the Lebanese sectarian civil war and made it
possible for Hezbollah to enter into Lebanese politics. This ‘revealed the foreign policy shift of
Iran, which strove for rapprochement with the conservative Arab states during Rafsanjani’s
presidency.’126
Additionally, after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the US-led ‘war on terror’
removed Iran’s two principal enemies; Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-dominated regime in Iraq and
the Sunni fundamentalist regime of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Thus, inadvertently, Iran gained
an active transnational role in the regional power vacuum.
Salamay and Othman argue that “the so-called ‘war on terror’ has, in effect, not only
removed key obstacles from the path of an expansionist Iranian foreign policy agenda but has
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also provided a rational pretext to justify the revival of an ideological Shiite agenda.”127
At the same time, despite a sectarian divide, Tehran has always supported the Sunni
Palestinian cause to position itself as a defender of the Muslim world.
The pro-Iranian Shiite domination of political power in Iraq, the relations with the
Alawite Shiite Assad regime and the success of Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah reinforced the power
of Shiites from the Mediterranean to Pakistan. Naturally, several Sunni leaders have urged the
West to counter the expansion of Iran’s sphere of influence and its rising power in Iraq, Syria
and Lebanon.

Conclusion

With the 1979 Revolution, Iran drastically changed from being a secular and autocratic
monarchy to an Islamic Republic. In Iran, the Revolution did not simply result in a change of
leadership, it also completely transformed Iran’s foreign policy and international standing. The
revolution made Iran prominent on the international scene but also severely isolated the country.
As Skocpol states the 1979 Revolution did not occur as commonly thought, it was made
by ‘a set of cultural and organizational forms systematically socially embedded in the society,’
that developed over the course of Iranian history. In a series of events, the Tobacco Monopoly
revolt (1890-1891), the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1906), the Oil Nationalization
Movement of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh (1951-1953), and the Iranian Islamic
Revolution (1978-1979), which were all reactions to foreign influence over Iran and the
exploitation of its wealth and resources by foreign powers.
The clergy and Shiism have played a disproportionate role in these reactions. Since 1501,
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when Shiism became the state religion along with the compulsory conversion of the Iranian
people to Shiism as a political reaction against the expansion of foreign influence, Shiism and the
clergy have been significant actors in Iranian politics, which has also diminished the potential
fragility of an ethnically heterogeneous nation.
The 1979 Iranian revolution created a hybrid and a unique political system. In addition to
the democratic elements of the newly established regime, the clergy’s influential role in society
was institutionalized as the concept of velayet-e faqih in the political structure. The dominant
role of the appointed political institutions controlled by the clergy over the elected political
institutions has been the key feature of Iranian politics.
The 1979 revolution altered not only Iran’s internal dynamics but also led to a dramatic
change in Iranian foreign policy. Iranian foreign policy switched from pro-Western bias to one
that is fundamentally anti-Western, anti-US and anti-Israel.
After the revolution, the fundamental principles driving the conduct of Iranian foreign
policy can be summarized as ‘sovereignty’, ‘independence’, ‘peaceful relations with states that
are not hostile to Iran or to Islam in general’, ‘opposition to any form of intervention and
subjugation’ and, particularly, two principles, ‘neither east nor west’ and ‘export of the
revolution’ which became the primary goals of Iranian foreign policy. While the former principal
can be characterized as pacific, the latter principal envisions activist goal, which have provoked
Sunni states in the region.
Without any doubt, the Iranian revolution initially created enthusiasm among many
Muslim nations, but after a time, Khomeini’s call for Islamic upheaval did not appeal to Arab
and Sunni Muslims. In light of Pew Research Center research, it can be said that the rift between
Sunni and Shiite Islam does not originate simply from a different interpretation of Islam. There is
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a longtime historical rivalry and hostility between them. While the acceptance of Sunnis as
Muslims is very high even in Shiite dominant states, the acceptance of Shiites as Muslims is
relatively low in the Muslim world. As noted in the survey, in 11 of the 23 majority Muslim
countries, the acceptance of Shiites as Muslims is not higher than 50% of total respondents.128
This figure is very important in understanding the rift between two sects. The Iran–Iraq war was
another factor which deepened the rift, particularly among Arabs. The war emphasized
nationalist goals, in the sense of ‘Persians against Arabs.’
In the meantime, Iran understood the limits of expansionist policies because of the latent
hostility of Sunni Arab states for religious reasons and the psychological barrier of Arab versus
Persian nationalism. Nevertheless, Iran supplemented a rational and pragmatic foreign policy
pre-revolution with more ideologically driven policies. Iran chose to support indigenous Shiite
movements in other states to amplify its influence in the region. Due to Iran’s dominant states in
the Shiite world, and because it is religiously well-institutionalized and organized, Iran sees itself
as the natural leader of the Shiites. Although rational and pragmatic policies are deployed by the
ruling elites, the presumption of Shiite Islamic leadership and deeply held anti-Western, anti-US
and anti-Israel beliefs will continue to have a significant impact on Iranian foreign policy.
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CHAPTER III
CONCEPTUALIZING IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND IRAN’S FOREIGN POLICY
GOALS

Introduction

Hill defines foreign policy as a “purposive action with the view towards promoting the
interests of a single political community or state.”1 This “purposive action” may be a product of
a state’s internal agenda, as well as a response to other actors’ actions in the external world. As
stated by Hunter, there are two determinants of purposive action: internal and external. The
interaction between state’s domestic needs and realities, and the features of the external
environment within which they operate, determines the pattern of a state’s external behavior; to
wit, the state’s foreign policy.2
This chapter will discuss the characteristics and determinants of Iran’s foreign policy, as
well as its foreign policy goals. To this end, the chapter is divided into the following sections;
-‐

Foreign policy decision-making: key individuals and bodies. This section
introduces key individuals and bodies in charge of Iran’s foreign policy making,
including their functions, responsibilities, and limits.

-‐

Evolution of Iranian foreign policy and the emergence of factions. This section
deals with the evolution of Iran’s foreign policy since the revolution and the
factions that have emerged under the rule of two supreme leaders (Khomeini
(1980-1989) and Khamenei (1989-present)), and four presidents (Rafsanjani
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(1989-1997), Khatami (1997-2005), Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), and Rouhani
(2013-present)). In this evolution, the roles of domestic, regional and global
improvements, the roles of factions and the limits of ideology and pragmatism are
examined. The Khomeini period is addressed as a whole period under Khomeini’s
rule without inclusion of presidential periods during his rule because of
Khomeini’s control of decision-making.
-‐

The characteristics of Iranian foreign policy and its foreign policy goals. This
final section describes the characteristics of Iran’s foreign policy and foreign
policy goals.

Foreign Policy Decision-Making and Key Individuals and Bodies in Charge of Foreign
Policy

Iranian foreign policy decision-making is complex and multi-faceted due to the dual
structure of the state’s post-revolutionary political system. In addition to theocratic and
republican features of the political system, the state’s formal and informal power centers create
different and often conflicting goals in foreign policy making. The most important components
of the formal power structure are the Supreme Leader, the President, the Foreign Minister, the
Council of the Guardian, the Expediency Council, The Supreme National Security Council
(SNSC), and the Parliament, which are responsible for Iranian foreign policy and impact
decision-making.
The Supreme Leader is constitutionally the ‘guardian jurist’ and ‘leader of the Islamic
revolution,’ and ranks above the state’s President. Posch states that the Bureau of the Supreme
Leader is regarded as the country’s real power center. The office is an active at all levels of
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policy-making, including foreign policy.3 The Supreme Leader approves or disapproves foreign
policy initiatives and has the final say in foreign policy decision-making.
Although the Supreme Leader is the most prominent and powerful political figure in Iran,
foreign policy-making also depends on the President. Particularly after 1989, on the basis of the
constitution, the President and his office have gained an increased role in foreign policy making.4
According to Article 125 of the Iranian constitution, “[t]he President or his legal representative
has the authority to sign treaties, protocols, contracts, and agreements concluded by the Iranian
government with other governments, as well as agreements pertaining to international
organizations, after obtaining the approval of the Islamic Consultative Assembly.”5 The only
limitation is that the President must be in agreement with the Supreme Leader. This
constitutional subordination to the Supreme Leader is the most serious structural impediment
constraining the Iranian President’s powers.6
The foreign minister is responsible for the conduct of Iran’s foreign policy and
implementing decisions approved by the Supreme Leader, but has a very limited role in
determining policies and strategies.
The parliament (the Majlis) does not interfere in the executive’s foreign policy decisionmaking. However, the parliament discusses foreign policies and deputies individually can make
public statements on policies. Additionally, in order to sign international agreements, treaties,
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memoranda of understanding, etc., the government needs the approval of the Majlis.7
The President and the parliament are constrained by the Guardian Council. The Guardian
Council, which examines all laws passed by the parliament, is one of the most powerful bodies
within the Iranian political structure. The council has the power to veto laws if it considers them
inconsistent with the constitution and Islamic law.8 Thus, its role in foreign policy making is to
ensure that foreign policy decisions are compatible with the constitution and Islamic law. Taking
into account that half of the council’s members are appointed by the Supreme Leader, it is clear
that the Supreme Leader’s influence on decision-making is not limited merely to
‘approve/disapprove’ authorization.
The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) is another of the key institutions in
which foreign policy is debated. Institutionally, the SNSC is responsible for coordinating,
facilitating and streamlining activities on security and foreign policy.9 Article 176 of Iran’s
Constitution gives emphasis to the following responsibilities: “safeguarding the national interests
and preserving the Islamic Revolution, territorial integrity, and national sovereignty.”10 The
SNSC is chaired by the President and includes the most important representatives of the military
(the General Staff, the IRGC) and the secret service, the foreign minister, representatives of the
Supreme Leader, and other ministers as required.11 12 The SNSC deals with highly sensitive
security issues such as US-Iran relations and the nuclear dossier.
Another body in charge of foreign policy making decision-making is the Expediency
Council. It was set up in 1988 by Ayatollah Khomeini because of stalemates between Parliament
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and the Guardian Council. It was charged with mediating disputes between the two bodies. In
April 1989, Khomeini ordered the revision of the 1979 Constitution to address the issues of
leadership and constitutional recognition of the new Expediency Council.13
The Expediency Council is charged with the role of “determin[ing] expediency in cases
in which there is a conflict between parliamentary legislation and the opinion of the Guardian
Council.” The Expediency Council also responsible for “determining the general policies of the
System” and “solving the challenges of the country,” as well as consulting on important issues
that “are referred to it by the Leader” and “in consideration of the complete set of regulations
outlined in the Constitution” as a “supreme consultative council for the Leadership of the System
of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”14
As an advisory body to the Supreme Leader and a mediator between the Guardian
Council and the Parliament, the Expediency Council “designs the Grand Strategy for the Iranian
regime, and proposes guidelines for foreign policy.”15
Foreign policy in Iran is not formulated and conducted only by the President, his cabinet,
and the Foreign Ministry. As stated by Warnaar, foreign policy “is a product of negotiation and
competition among various powerful individuals and institutions.”16 At present, at least seven
power centers can be identified as having input on foreign policy decision-making; the Supreme
Leader, the President, the Foreign Minister, the Guardian Council, the Expediency Council, the
SNSC, and the Parliament. While the most influential of these is the Supreme Leader (who must
approve any ﬁnal foreign policy decision), the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and
13
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the Expediency Council also have significant influence on the basic direction of Iran's foreign
policy and key foreign policy issues.
In this complex structure of foreign policy decision-making, the Supreme Leader
occupies a central role. Posch explains the foreign policy decision-making mechanism as
follows:
-‐

Foreign policy analysis and the real opinion-forming process take place within the
formal institutions.

-‐

The decision-making process takes place formally (institutions) and informally
(political networks) within the political elites, to which not only active but also
former politicians belong, as do “non-political” clerics.

-‐

The final decision is formulated by the Supreme Leader as a consensus reached
by the political elite.17

As Posch states, in addition to the formal power structure, there are also informal power
centers that impact the direction of Iran's foreign policy. In Iran’s political system, there are no
conventional legal political parties. It is instead a system in which different political factions of
the political elite represent different approaches to foreign policy.
The elaborate system of checks and balances, the inter-agency and factional rivalries, the
veto power of the Supreme Leader, and ideological precepts make foreign policy decisionmaking inherently complicated and difficult to execute.18 19
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Evolution of Iranian Foreign Policy and the Emergence of Factions

Since the mid-1980s, the Iranian political elite has gradually factionalized. Different
approaches to policy-making and rivalries for power have created these factions. Saikal
maintains that by 1987, three very loosely bonded factions, representing different approaches to
policies, economics, sociocultural issues, and foreign relations, emerged on the scene:
conservative, reformist and pragmatist.20 As noted by Smith, this degree of political diversity did
not disturb Khomeini, so long as the factions remained loyal to him and to certain fundamental
principles of revolutionary Iran. Even after the death of Khomeini, the factions refrained from
violating these principles. They have been aware that “their survival depended on the continuity
of the regime and that their differences in approach to Iran’s Islamic transformation had to take
secondary importance.”21 Thus, while there is a consensus on these principles among the
factions, their differences stem from how they view how the principles should be put into
practice.
The factions have emerged and transformed under the rule of two Supreme Leaders,
Khomeini (1980-1989) and Khamenei (1989-present), and four presidents; Rafsanjani (19891997), Khatami (1997-2005), Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), and Rouhani (2013-present). Three
factions have emerged on the scene. Factionalism in Iranian politics and its effects on policymaking is addressed under the leadership periods in the remaining section.

Khomeini Period

Walt argues that revolutionary foreign policy is primarily “a result of the ideology of the
20
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revolutionary movement.”22 Without a doubt, the 1979 Iranian Constitution reflects the
worldview of its founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. This worldview is responsible for the
revolutionary aspects of the state ideology and subsequently the revolutionary foreign policy.
Following the revolution, due to an ideology that is a blend of Persian nationalism and
Khomeini’s interpretation of Shiism, Iranian foreign policy moved from a status quo pro-western
ideology to an ideologically and revolutionary anti-western one. The key revolutionary aspects
that have shaped Iran’s foreign policy can be traced through the following statements in the
constitution;
-‐

Framing the foreign policy of the country on the basis of Islamic criteria,

-‐

The expansion and strengthening of Islamic brotherhood and public cooperation
among all the people,

-‐

The complete elimination of imperialism and the prevention of foreign influence,

-‐

All Muslims form a single nation, and the government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran has the duty of formulating its general policies with a view to cultivating the
friendship and unity of all Muslim peoples,

-‐

Rejection of all forms of domination,

-‐

The preservation of the independence of the country in all respects and its
territorial integrity,

-‐

The defense of the rights of all Muslims, non-alignment with respect to the
hegemonic superpowers,

22
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-‐

Any form of agreement resulting in foreign control over the natural resources,
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economy, army, or culture of the country, as well as other aspects of national life,
is forbidden,
-‐

The attainment of independence, freedom, and rule of justice and truth to be the
right of all people of the world. Accordingly, while scrupulously refraining from
all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other nations, it supports the just
struggles of the mustad'afun (oppressed) against the mustakbirun (oppressors) in
every corner of the globe.23

In the light of these key aspects of the constitution, the key characteristics of Iran’s
revolutionary foreign policy can be listed briefly as follows: rejection of all forms of domination,
preservation of independence, non-alignment, equality, resistance, anti-imperialism, nationalism,
self-sufficiency, establishment of relations with peace-seeking states, Islamic unity and
responsibility for other Muslim and ‘oppressed’ nations.
In the early days of the Islamic Revolution, these characteristics were crystallized as two
main policies; ‘Neither East nor West’ and the ‘Export of the Revolution.’ The former policy did
not mean only being an independent foreign policy-maker, but also non-involvement in the
expensive military/security struggle between the East and the West and the improvement of
relationships with Muslim and non-Muslim regional neighbors.24 Thus, Iran positioned itself in
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) where it could pursue these post-revolutionary goals.
However, several unpredictable post-Revolution events deeply impacted the
implementation of the aforementioned policies; namely, the American hostage crisis, the Iran–
Iraq war, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As a result of these events, Iran’s relations with
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the United States and the West has become a defining paradigm of Iranian foreign policy. 25
The US/West’s attitudes during Iran–Iraq war, including the West’s “closed eyes” to
Iraq’s chemical weapon usage, the US’s attacks on Iranian oil rigs in the Persian Gulf in 1987,
and the shooting down of an Iranian civilian commercial airliner in 1988, created a measure of
distrust and anger in Iran toward the United States and the West that has never dissipated.
Furthermore, the Cold War conditions and ‘Neither East nor West’ policy totally isolated Iran at
the regional and global level.
Likewise, the policy of the ‘Export of the Islamic Revolution’ failed too. The revolution
initially created enthusiasm among Muslim nations, but after a time the call for Islamic upheaval
did not resonate with the Muslim world. Rakel argues that there are two main reasons for the
failure:
(1) The mainly Sunni populations in the Persian Gulf states had no interest in
following the Iranian Shi’ite Islamic revolution;
(2) Iran’s interest in overthrowing other governments declined, due to its own
problems, such as the war with Iraq and the domestic economic crisis.26
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Sunni–Shiite divide is not simply due to a
different interpretation of Islam. There also is a deep rift in mutual acceptance between Sunnis
and Shiites. This divide deepened as a result of Iran’s ambition to spread its revolution into
Muslim states and its assertion of Muslims unity under its own leadership. The commencement
of the Iran–Iraq war in 1980,which created a sense of ‘Persians against Arabs,’ further deepened
the split. These policies and events have fueled sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shiites,
creating a hostile environment for Iran and increasing its isolation.
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In the meantime, Khomeini and the ruling elite realized the impracticability of these
expansionist and ideological policies. These political failures, combined with economic
challenges, gradually pushed Iran to adopt a more pragmatist approach in foreign policy making.
According to Ehteshami, there were two main political factions during the first decade of
the revolution: the Conservative faction and the Radical Left.27 With Khomeini’s elimination of
the secular and liberal Islamic social forces from power, the Radical left faction became
dominant just after the revolution. It held the view of a very strict isolationist policy towards the
West, a dogmatic policy based on state-controlled and egalitarian economic policy and export of
the Revolution.28
In the mid-1980s, a more pragmatic domestic and foreign policy orientation gradually
emerged because of the pressure of economic strain, the collapse in oil prices, the question of
whether the revolution could still be exported by Iran without conflict, and harsh conditions of
the war with Iraq. Therefore, as stated by Sadri “from 1985 to the death of Khomeini in 1989, the
Islamic Republic held more talks with both the East and the West and began to increase
economic relations without compromising its overall commitment to self-reliance and
determination.”29
The transition from ideologically driven foreign policy to pragmatism can be exemplified
in the case of Iran’s arms deal with the United States and recognition of UN Resolution 598
in1988 (calling for a ceasefire between Iran and Iraq). As noted by Ramazani, the secret
purchase of arms from the United States and Israel was the most striking example of pragmatism
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trumping ideology in Iran's foreign policy during Khomeini's lifetime.30 To defend Iran against
Iraqi aggression and to meet Iran’s arms needs, Khomeini believed that a deal with even the ‘the
Great Satan’ (the US) and ‘the lesser Satan’ (Israel) was advisable.31
The realities of international politics, and the need for foreign capital and technical
expertise to carry out economic reconstruction, convinced Khomeini to temper the ideological
principles of the early days of the Islamic Republic, which were mainly isolationist,
confrontational, and influenced by his own interpretation of Shiite doctrine.
The end of the costly Iran–Iraq war, the death of Khomeini, the collapse of the bipolar
international system, and the failure of expansionist policies pushed Iran to reevaluate its
domestic and foreign policy orientation. Pragmatists and reformists’ measures were proposed
against revolutionary policies in order to enhance domestic and regional stability and to integrate
Iran into the international system. However, anti-Americanism, anti-Zionism and the
presumption of leadership in Muslim world (at least in rhetoric) have remained important pillars
of Iranian state ideology as a heritage of the first decade of the revolution.

Khamenei Period

After Khomeini’s death, the Assembly of Experts appointed the Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei, who played an important role in the Revolution and served as the president for two
successive terms from 1981 to 1989.32
Khamenei is not as charismatic and powerful as Ayatollah Khomeini, but has substantial
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influence in the government. Constitutionally, his power is undebatable, and the dominance of
the Supreme Leader in Iranian politics has continued. He continues to control important
institutions such as the courts, military, and media by appointing the heads of the judiciary, state
radio and television, the regular armed forces and the IRGC. Moreover, he is still very influential
on the Guardian Council, which has authority over parliamentary decisions and the selection of
electoral candidates. These constitutional powers make the power of the Supreme Leader
unchallengeable, whomever is appointed to this position.
Since becoming the Supreme Leader, Khamenei has tended to follow Khomeini’s
principles instead of initiating his own. While he has been trying to balance ideology and the
realities of international politics, he has avoided both confrontation and accommodation with the
West in general.
When he was president, Khamenei launched an ‘open door’ policy in 1984 and stated,
“Iran seeks to have rational, sound and healthy relations with all countries.”33 Khamenei’s
primary criteria for good relations were reciprocity and mutual respect. As stated by Ganji,
without any doubt he is quite rational; however his deeply rooted views and suspicion of the
US’s intentions toward the Islamic Republic have been an obstacle to any serious improvement
in the relationship between Iran and West, particularly with the United States.34
Despite Khamenei’s rooted anti–Western and anti-imperial views, pragmatist approaches
have been employed during his Supreme Leadership. In order to achieve foreign policy goals,
this was inevitable. Accordingly, Islamic ideology has become less significant in policy-making.
Khamenei’s lack of authority has affected domestic political improvements as well as
foreign policymaking. He was not able to suppress different factional approaches and impose
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consensus. Thus, Khamenei followed Khomeini's tendency to seek conciliation among factions.
Particularly with the election of Khatami, his reformist domestic and foreign policies during his
presidency were seen as threats to the ideological basis of the regime by the Supreme Leader and
conservatives. This concern was doubled with regional developments. Khatami period
developments will be addressed broadly in the following section.

Rafsanjani Period

In 1989, Hashemi Rafsanjani won the presidential election and became the first President
of Khamenei’s era. Following the death of Khomeini, Rafsanjani has been one of the most
influential actors in Iranian politics. The 1989 amendment of the Iranian constitution that gave
the President more decision–making power and made him an important actor in setting the
direction of Iranian foreign policy.
President Rafsanjani abandoned Khomeini’s foreign policy and its adherence to
isolationism. According to Soltani and Amiri, Rafsanjani’s foreign policy had two pillars:
-‐

Solving economic problems that the Iran-Iraq war had caused.

-‐

Improving Iran’s relations with other countries.35

These two pillars were interconnected. The reconstruction of Iran’s economy necessitated
improving Iran relations with other countries in order to get more foreign investments to develop
the Iranian economy. To balance the traditional principles of Iran and the necessities and realities
of international politics, he followed a pragmatist policy.
Therefore, during his presidency, Rafsanjani attempted to improve Iran’s relationship
with European countries that had two permanent members on the UN Security Council. He
35
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aimed to make Iran’s economy open to European countries. He also tried to improve hostile
relations with Sunni Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the
smaller Gulf monarchies. Moreover, Iran expanded relations with Russia, as well as the newly
independent republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus after the fall of Soviet Union. Ramazani
states that “with no ideological baggage he emphasized Iran’s common interests in culture,
economic development and trade with these states.”36 Additionally he moderated pressures on
Iranian society in domestic politics. All these policies have been seen as the constructive
improvements by West.37
In general, it can be said that Iran’s foreign policy under Rafsanjani was based on
pragmatic approaches that took into account geopolitical necessities and Iran’s economic and
socio-cultural needs.
During Rafsanjani presidency, as Rakel states, a power struggle existed between three
factions, the Conservative faction, the Radical left faction, and the Pragmatist faction that had
parted from the Conservative faction. In time, the Radical Left faction was eliminated from
power and the rivalry remained only between the Conservative and the Pragmatist factions. The
Conservative faction accepted liberal economic measures, but opposed Rafsanjani’s pragmatic
foreign policy and liberal approaches on socio-economic issues.38 Liberal socio-economic
measures and a pragmatic foreign policy did not cause much concern for Khamenei; instead he
took a mediator role between the factions.
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Khatami Period

In the May 1997 elections, Mohammad Khatami was elected President of the Islamic
Republic. He kept Rafsanjani’s pragmatist foreign policy approach and focused more on
domestic issues. Khatami, as the leading actor of the Reformist faction, attempted to avoid past
ideological priorities. Instead he tried to improve basic principles of a democratic political
system, such as freedom of speech, the rule of law, civil society and pluralism.39 Needless to say,
his reformist agenda that advocated these democratic values was “an unprecedented bid for
reintegration of the Iranian society into the modern international system.”40 In Ramazani’s words
“democracy at home and peace abroad were two sides of the same coin.”41
In addition to political reforms in domestic affairs, Khatami’s presidency inaugurated
important changes in Iranian foreign policy. The post-Soviet and post-Iran–Iraq war environment
was the main reason for this policy reorientation. Afghanistan and Pakistan were in chaos and
challenged by Wahhabist religious fanaticism. The newly independent states of Central Asia and
the Caucasus were trying to overcome weak social, political and economic conditions. Iraq was
suffering from sectarian and ethnic tensions. There were very hostile relations with proAmerican Sunni regimes.42 Last and most importantly, there was the growing US presence in the
region.
To minimize uncertainties in this chaotic environment, Khatami promoted a strategy for
improving Iran’s regional and international relations. According to Ramazani, this strategy
consisted of three general components, “decontainment, deterrence, and détente.” In Ramazani’s
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words:
Decontainment aims at circumventing the American policy of isolating Iran
economically, diplomatically, and militarily across the world. Deterrence aims at
sufficient military capability to deter any other act of aggression such as Iraq’s
against Iran, especially in its now even more dangerous neighborhood,” to use
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright’s words. India, Israel, and Pakistan are three
nuclear powers in the vicinity of Iran. And detente aims not only at assisting the other
two goals of Iranian foreign policy but also at overcoming the deepening pains of
what President Khatami calls Iran’s ‘sick economy.’43

On the basis of this strategy, Khatami tried to behave less ideologically and promote
relations with European countries, the stability of the region, and active participation in
international organizations.
According to Soltani and Amiri “[d]etente policy caused European countries to change
their policy towards Iran; they tried to convince the United States to change its offensive policy.
Changing European attitudes toward Iran strengthened Iran’s position and power in the region…
.”44 Khatami’s government also initiated additional efforts to improve relations with the US.
In the aftermath of 9/11, within hours after the attacks by al-Qaeda extremists, Khatami
condemned the attack. As noted by Ramazani “Khamenei was the first cleric in the Muslim
world to call for ‘holy war’ (jihad) against terrorism as a ‘global scourge,’ and many Iranians
held candlelight vigils for the American victims of terrorism.”45 The Khatami government
cooperated with the US against the Taliban regime, which had harbored the anti-American alQaeda terrorists in Afghanistan. Relations between the United States and Iran seemed to be
warming up. However, following President Bush’s 2002 “Axis of Evil” speech in which “the
U.S. charges Iran with sponsoring terrorism, pursuing weapons of mass destruction, exerting a
43
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destabilizing influence in western Afghanistan, and possibly harboring Al Qaeda fugitives,”46
Khatami’s moderate domestic and international stance received its first major setback and
opened a new era in Iran’s international relations. After the speech, US–Iran relations entered a
long period of stalemate.47
Until 2005, the end of Khatami’s second term, thanks to Khatami’s moderate domestic
and international stance and despite the “Axis of Evil” speech, the Khatami administration
skillfully managed to handle the nuclear issue by negotiating with European powers. No
additional sanctions were imposed on Iran. These policies produced economic growth to some
extent.
From 1997 to 2005, during Khatami’s two terms, rivalries took place among the
Conservative faction, the Pragmatist faction, and the Reformist faction. Khatami institutionalized
the Reformist faction that had emerged out of the Radical Left faction when it had ceased to
exist. During his presidency, his preferences were to improve basic principles of the democratic
political system, reintegrate Iranian society into the modern international system, and
subsequently to save Iran from economic crisis by focusing on the expansion of trade, cooperative security measures, and diplomatic dialogue. While the Conservatives priorities were to
preserve and even strengthen the regime, the Reformists were mainly concerned with improving
the country’s position in the global economy and international system.48
However, Khatami could not be successful in continuing his moderate domestic and
foreign policy, and he lost the support of the Iranian population despite a modest economic
recovery, mainly because of resistance to these reforms by the Conservative faction. The
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Conservative faction feared losing its power and thought the regime was under threat and thus
supported Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the presidential elections of 2005.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

Since the end of the Iran–Iraq War, Iran’s foreign policy switched to one that prioritized
cooperation and interaction with the West from one that was isolationist. Economic-political
realities and civil society demands necessitated this transition during the Rafsanjani (1989-1997)
and Khatami (1997-2005) administrations.
When President Ahmadinejad won the presidential election in 2005, he introduced a new
tone in Iranian foreign policy orientation that rejected the foreign policy based on cooperation
and interaction with the West that was followed by the two previous Presidents of Iran. Instead,
he adopted a foreign policy based on confrontation with the West and interaction with other
states.
His confrontationist approach aggressively criticized the status quo of the international
system, the dominant powers of this system (the West, particularly Israel and the United States).
According to him, during the Cold War international organizations were tools of the superpowers
for shaping the international environment according to their interests, and the end of the Cold
War did not change the nature of the international system.49, 50
Ahmadinejad also tried to create a balance against the heavy US presence in the region,
and its alliance with Israel. He tried to improve diplomatic and friendly relations with Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf countries, continued the strategic alliance with Syria, and supported
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Hezbollah in Lebanon. To these ends, he intensely used anti-Israel rhetoric.
In addition to neighboring states, he aimed for active interaction with Islamic and Third
World countries.51 He tried to strengthen ties with Latin American and African states such as
“Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Senegal, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, by signing important
cooperation, commercial and strategic contracts.”52
Furthermore, Iran joined as an observer to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), which aims to promote regional intergovernmental security. The goal of this policy was
to improve closer ties with major countries like China and Russia, which are two permanent
members of the UN Security Council. Iran’s involvement in the SCO, and subsequently
improving good political and economic relations with China and Russia, empowered it in the UN
and helped it to overcome the challenges confronting Iran resulting from Western-imposed
economic sanctions.53
During Ahmadinejad’s presidency, relations with Israel and debates on Iran’s nuclear
program became prevailing topics. These two issues also shaped relations with the US. Needless
to say, Israel has been viewed as an enemy of Iran since the Islamic Revolution; however,
Ahmadinejad increased tensions radically and aggressively. He officially denied the Holocaust
and announced “the plan of wiping Israel off from the map.” He criticized the restrictions placed
on Iran’s development of nuclear weapons and declared that Iran would continue its nuclear
programs.54
The US’s setbacks in both Iraq and Afghanistan and the emergence of strong world
criticisms of the US invasion of Iraq strengthened the Iranian regional position. After the 2005
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election, the rise of pro-Iranian Shiites to power in Iraq paved the way for gaining regional
dominance.
During Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Iran’s foreign policy resembled the policies of the
Revolution’s early years. He seemed to be “a hardliner á la Khomeini and used a very hostile
tone, especially against the US and Europe, and also Israel.”55 Ahmadinejad adopted a more
confrontational, assertive and active foreign policy in order for Iran to become a regional
hegemon. The IRGC was a very influential actor in this strategy. The IRGC’s role in these
developments was indisputably important and undeniable.
However, this new strategy not only deepened hostile relations with the US and Israel but
also provoked Sunni-Arab states who were concerned about Ahmadinejad’s nuclear ambitions
and support for Shiite groups.
With Ahmadinejad’s presidency, the faction of Neo-Conservatives came to the power.56
Ahmadinejad presented himself as the true follower of Khomeini and revitalized the conservative
faction in a new form. During the past four periods under the leaderships of Rafsanjani and
Khatami (who were the heads of the Pragmatist and Reformist factions), the conservatives’
influence waned. However, for the first time since Khomeini’s death, the Neo-Conservatives –
the new form of the conservative faction– seized power. According to Saikal, by “claiming that
the United States and its allies, especially Israel, were determined to destroy the Islamic regime,”
Ahmadinejad tried to build Iran’s military and nuclear power and maintain support for Iran’s
partners, including Syria, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and proxies in Iraq.57
Despite his confrontational and aggressive foreign policy populism, rising inflation and
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unemployment, UN sanctions over Iran’s nuclear program, discontent with the regime’s tight
rule, and Khamenei’s turning a “blind eye” to Ahmadinejad’s policies, resulted in criticisms of
Ahmadinejad by the Pragmatist and Reformist factions. Saikal argues that “as his factional
opponents intensified their criticism, Ahmadinejad adopted a more authoritarian attitude,
pursuing more populist measures and treating his critics with disdain.”58

Rouhani Period

Ahmadinejad’s chronic combative rhetoric with the West, the government’s increasing
pressures on society and the erosion of basic rights and freedoms, Iran’s ailing economy caused
by the imposition of sanctions by the West and the government’s inability to manage the
economy effectively resulted in bitterness and unhappiness among the Iranian people. Thus,
public discontent prepared the way for Rouhani’s victory in the 2013 election. According to
Monshipouri;
Rouhani’s victory in Iran’s 2013 presidential election is a clear protest vote against
his predecessor’s management of the country’s relations with the Western world.
Although Rouhani’s support for broader social freedoms, as well as his advocacy for
women’s rights, rendered him a favorite candidate for change, undoubtedly economic
insecurity – caused by the imposition of sanctions by the Western world in reaction to
Iran’s nuclear program – was a key factor in his victory.59

Rouhani won 51 percent of all the votes cast in the first round against five conservative
rivals.60 His election was a reaffirmation of the demand for a more moderate and sensible course
in both domestic and foreign policy. Rouhani embraced reformist rhetoric during his campaign
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as “[h]e questioned the necessity of the expanding security state and the constant oversight of
student and civil society associations by the security agencies. He spoke of the need for greater
freedom of press and speech and devoted attention to women’s rights issues.”61
Since Hassan Rouhani came to power in summer 2013, Iranian foreign policy has
undergone a significant shift. Significant progress on nuclear talks and a noticeable detente with
the West and the region has been observed so far.
According to Zarif, the Foreign Minister of Rouhani administration, the new foreign
policy of Iran can be described as follows:
Rouhani’s foreign policy platform was based on a principled, sober, and wise critique
of the conduct of foreign relations during the preceding eight years under the previous
administration. Rouhani promised to remedy the unacceptable state of affairs through
a major overhaul of the country’s foreign policy. The changes he proposed
demonstrated a realistic understanding of the contemporary international order, the
current external challenges facing the Islamic Republic, and what it will take to
restore Iran’s relations with the world to a state of normalcy. Rouhani also called for a
discourse of ‘prudent moderation.’ This vision aims to move Iran away from
confrontation and toward dialogue, constructive interaction, and understanding, all
with an eye to safeguarding national security, elevating the stature of Iran, and
achieving long-term comprehensive development. …. Prudent moderation is an
approach based on realism, self-confidence, realistic idealism, and constructive
engagement.62

Even though Rouhani, as stated by Maloney, is “a blunt pragmatist with plenty of
experience maneuvering within Iran’s theocratic system,”63 he seems more visible and active in
policy making. Nevertheless, it is still the Supreme Leader, Khamenei, who has the final word
on important foreign policy decisions.
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Factions and their Worldview

Conservatives

According to Saikal, the conservatives advocated “a patriarchal Islamic government;
consolidation of the revolution’s gains; preservation of a traditional style of life; promotion of
self-sufficiency, with no dependence on the outside world; cultural purity; and social
conformity.”64 Preservation of the current political system and consolidation of the revolution’s
gains have been the primary objectives for the Conservatives. Conservatives have seen the West
as the primary threat to their ideology and viewed it as antithetical to the West. They strictly
reject what they perceive to be defining principles of Western culture: “materialism, secularism,
immorality, and the separation of religion from politics”65 For the conservatives, their opposition
the West has been at the core of their ideology.
As the oldest and founding faction, the Conservative faction of the political elite has
dominated the most influential positions in Iran’s political, the military, and the economic
system.66

Pragmatists

As stated by Ramazani, pragmatism is the “opposite of principle,” whether it is religious,
moral or ideological.67 In this sense, there is no absolute right and wrong, good and evil, in
pragmatism. Worth is determined by desired practical consequences.
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The pragmatist camp, which stood between the conservative and reformist factions,
includes elitist groups organized around former President Hashemi Rafsanjani.68 While the
Pragmatists were close to the Conservatives in their socio-cultural ideas, in contrast to the
Conservatives, they believe in economic modernization from above, and favor technical and
economic relations with the West, including the United States.6970 They do not have serious
interest in the democratization of politics, and take hard-line positions on sensitive ideological
issues such as Iran–US relations and the Arab–Israeli issue.71 In terms of foreign policy issues,
they have a more moderate stance than the Conservative faction.

Reformists

The reformist faction, which coalesced around Khatami, advocated “promotion of civil
society, relaxation of political and social control, economic openness, cultural renaissance and
more interaction with the outside world.”72 They emphasized the necessity of a pluralist and
democratic Islamic political system. According to Khatami, reformists’ core political goal was to
“introduce to the world the model of religious democracy.”73 Reformists have been “questioning
the entire concept of Iran being in conflict with the West and demand a limit to religious
authorities’ interference in political affairs.”74 However, these demands do not mean that
reformists are liberals in the Western sense. According to Haas, reformists “are trying to find a
balance between liberal values and the Islamist system that has existed in Iran since 1979,” and
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“[t]he ideological distance dividing reformists from Western regimes, however, is much smaller
than the ideological gap separating Iranian conservatives from these states.”75
All in all, in terms of foreign policy, two main groups can be identified. The first group is
the Conservatives who strictly follow Khomeini’s ideology and reject the concept of improving
relations with the West. The second group, which comprises the Pragmatist and Reformist
factions, has a pragmatic foreign policy approach. Instead of an absolutely ideologically driven
foreign policy, this group advocates softening the radical tone, improving relations with the
West, and integrating into the international system.

The Limits of Ideology and Pragmatism

Revolutionary governments in their early days have a strong tendency toward ideological
approaches to domestic and foreign policy. Walt cites from North’s Structure and Change in
Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981, p.53) that ideology serves "to energize groups to
behave contrary to a simple, hedonistic individual calculus of costs and benefits . . . since neither
maintenance of the existing order nor its overthrow is possible without such behavior."76 To this
end, according to Walt, revolutionary ideologies tend to emphasize three key themes.
-‐

Revolutionary groups usually portray their opponents as intrinsically evil and
incapable of meaningful reform.

-‐

Victory is inevitable.

-‐

Our Revolution has universal meaning.77

We can observe each of these three themes in statements by Khomeini in the early
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periods of the Iranian revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini used these themes to consolidate the
revolution. The first theme was initially used against the Shah at the domestic level, and then the
US and Israel became the next “evils” at the global and regional levels.
In terms of foreign policy, the third theme was particularly constituted in one of two
pillars of Khomeini’s policies, which were “Export of the Revolution” and “Neither East nor
West.”
Walt argues that “[i]n the extreme case, the ideology may go so far as to reject the nationstate as a legitimate political unit and call for the eventual elimination of the state-system itself.
… Khomeini's version of Shiite theology foresaw the eventual establishment of a global Muslim
community (ummah) following the abolition of the ‘un-Islamic’ nation-state system.”78 The
structure of the international system was perceived to be unjust, and needed to be replaced by a
true Islamic order, which would be (by definition) just, fair and virtuous.79 Thus, the regime was
founded on Khomeini’s version of Shiism, and the basis of the new state was ideological.
With the second policy, “Neither East nor West”, the Regime challenged both
superpowers of the Cold War period, the USSR, and the US. This policy did not mean only being
an independent foreign policy maker, but also avoiding involvement in the expensive
military/security struggle between the East and the West and improving relationships with
Muslim and non-Muslim regional neighbors.
Both policies were reflections of key aspects of the foreign policy rooted in the
revolutionary Constitution. These key aspects of Iran’s revolutionary foreign policy can
concisely be listed as follows: non-domination, independence, non-alignment, equality,
resistance, anti-imperialism, nationalism, self-sufficiency, establishment of relations with peace78
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seeking states, Islamic unity and responsibility for other Muslim and “oppressed” nations.
Independence has been the basic feature of foreign policy; it can be said that it has been an
obsession to some extent. According to Moshirzadeh, Iranian ambition for independence is based
on three major resources: “Iran’s glorious past; historical victimization by the invaders; and
(semi)-colonial/imperial encounters”80 These motivations based on experiences throughout its
history caused an overemphasizing of the characteristics of non-domination, anti-imperialism,
self-sufficiency, and non-alignment in the early days of the revolution. However, while most of
these aspects are shared by most states, overemphasizing them did not fit the realities of the
outside world, particularly the aspects which originated from the ideological basis of the Regime.
These overemphasized characteristics isolated Iran from the international system and blocked
integration into it.
In the meantime, Iran began to suffer from the results of these policies and understand
their inapplicability. In the mid-1980s, a more pragmatic domestic and foreign policy orientation
gradually emerged because of the pressures of economic strain, the question of whether the
revolution could still be exported by Iran without conflict, and the harsh conditions of the war
with Iraq.
According to Ramazani, the secret purchase of arms from the United States and Israel
was the most striking example of shifting to pragmatic policies over ideological influences in
Iran's foreign policy during Khomeini's lifetime.81
The following cases also illustrate how pragmatism has gradually become one of the
basic characters of Iranian foreign policy:
-‐
80
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fire, Resolution 598, in 1988.
-‐

Iran’s cooperation with the United States to remove the Taliban government in
Afghanistan and later to topple the Saddam regime in Iraq.

-‐

Iran’s condemnation of the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001.
“Khamenei was the first cleric in the Muslim world to call for ‘holy war’ (jihad)
against terrorism as a ‘global scourge,’ and many Iranians held candlelight vigils
for the American victims of terrorism.”82

-‐

“Formally and publicly withdrawing Iran’s support for the fatwa on the author of
the Satanic Verses.”83

-‐

“Iran’s mediation in the civil war between the Islamist opposition and the Russian
backed government of Tajikistan.”84

-‐

The policy of neutrality in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia, a
Christian state, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, an Islamic state with a Shi‘a
majority.85

-‐

Iran’s disregard of the Chechen struggles against Russia.

Sadjadpour’s following words also clearly shows the level of pragmatism:
Though justice, Islamic solidarity, and independence are invoked to defend the
Palestinian cause, the Chechen cause is studiously ignored for fear of antagonizing
Russia. Muslim unity is invoked to support Hamas and Hizbollah, yet Iran supported
Christian Armenia in its war against Shi’i Muslim Azerbaijan. Iran denounces the
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United States for its ‘godlessness’ and lax social values, yet forms close alliances
with socialist governments in Venezuela and Cuba.86

Domestic pressures and geopolitical factors convinced Iranian leaders to balance their
ideological and pragmatist approaches to foreign policy.
In the adoption of pragmatism, domestic challenges, which mostly originated from
economic conditions, were a motivating factor as well. In addition to the cost of an eight-year
war, Iran’s ideologically international isolation affected the Iranian economy desperately. This
situation deteriorated with decreasing oil prices. According to Maloney;
The costs were enormous: Productivity plummeted. Urban poverty doubled. Real per
capita income dropped by 45 percent since the revolution. And price controls and
strict rationing of basic consumer goods failed to prevent rampant inflation.
Meanwhile, the factional battles over the economy polarized the political
environment and eroded what was left of the private sector.87

The deteriorating economy explains Khomeini’s acceptance of ceasefire Resolution 598
in 1988 and the tempering of Khamenei’s ideological approach. Thus, the cease-fire and
Khomeini's death in 1989 facilitated a major shift in Iran's domestic and foreign policies.
Rafsanjani, as an influential actor of the post-Khomeini period, loudly emphasized the necessity
of integration in the international system and the fundamental reorientation and liberalization of
Iran's economy.88
The death of Khomeini opened more room for pragmatist maneuvers not only for
Rafsanjani but also for the following presidents. As noted by Ramazani,
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Rafsanjani did not hesitate to forego Islamic doctrines if it were practically necessary,
Khatami struck relative balance between the two, and although Ahmadinejad has
produced an image of recalcitrance, he has not been able to disregard the imperative
of practical necessity, or, in other words, to ignore the institutional imperatives of
complex domestic politics or the demands of the international constituency.89

Besides domestic factors, geopolitical improvements also pushed Iranian leaders to revise
the ideological basis of their strategic outlook. The following cases increased threat perceptions,
as well as opportunities for Iran:
-‐

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1991,

-‐

The Kuwaiti crisis leading to the Gulf War and a larger US military presence in
the region since 1990,

-‐

Overthrow of Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 1991,

-‐

The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003.

Iran readjusted its foreign policy according to this new world and regional order. While
the increasing US presence in the region caused a great hesitation because of Iran’s conventional
military weakness and potentially being the next target of the US, the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the overthrow of the Taliban and Saddam regimes also created an opportunity for
expanding its sphere of influence.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran realized that outreach to the newly
independent states situated to the north of Iran that have Shiite populations could minimize Iran’s
political isolation. Additionally, the overthrow of Saddam and the Taliban regime by the US
eliminated Iran’s two most immediate sworn enemies that confine its east and west borders. On
the other hand, after the removal of these two regimes, because of the presence of the US
military in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran felt like ‘a cat on a hot tin roof.’ Although Iran cooperated
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with the US against the two regimes, Iranian policymakers felt concerned that their country
would be the next target of the US for a regime change.
Along these lines, regional changes and feeling vulnerable forced the Rafsanjani and
Khatami administrations to adopt a coalition-making policy and conciliatory tone. Dehghani
states that “in this period, Iran tried to find some friends in the international scene and develop its
relations with other countries, particularly its neighbors, so that it could diminish its external
threats.”90 Needless to say, economic recovery efforts were also a significant factor in improving
relations with other countries. It meant “to slowly start getting back into international trade and
the globalization world order.”91 During the Hashemi and Khatami Administrations, Khamenei
did not oppose their policies, for the sake of national interest, internal stability, the recovery of
Iran’s economy, and balancing external threats.
Despite the “axis of evil” speech, Khatami did not end efforts to improve relations with
the US. However, a permanent conciliation between them could not be achieved. For the US,
the Hostage Crisis; for Iran, the US/West siding with Iraq during Iran–Iraq war, the US attacking
Iranian oil rigs in the Persian Gulf in 1987 and shooting down an Iranian passenger plane in
1988, the west’s closed eyes to Iraq’s chemical weapon usage, and lastly being labeled as a
member of ‘axis of evil,’ were deeply rooted in the memories of both sides. Furthermore, U.S.
relations with Israel has been one of the main obstacles to Iran-US rapprochement.
With Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Iranian foreign policy shifted to an aggressive tone. He
condemned the policies of his predecessors. Although Ahmadinejad followed the same goals as
his predecessors, he preferred a more radical, aggressive and an alternative approach. In alliance-
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making policy, he chose China and Russia in lieu of the West. He also tried to develop good
relations with regional actors, as well as South American and African states, as an alternative
strategy. During his presidency, relations with Israel and debates on Iran’s nuclear program
became prevailing topics. He did not step back on the nuclear issues and the sponsorship of
terrorism. These strategies were a reaction to increasing presence of the US in the region and
regime change debates, and aimed to deter a possible Israel-US attack. He also tried to minimize
Iran’s isolation through improving good relations with other states. It was a way of bypassing
the US hegemony.
During Ahmadinejad’s presidency, his foreign policy orientation was mostly rational in
its own right. Ahmadinejad’s confrontational, assertive and active foreign policy aimed to
preserve Iran’s survival and security in the region and to increase Iran’s visibility at the
international level. Ahmadinejad’s approach also deeply affected the domestic dynamics, which
will be addressed broadly in the following chapters.
Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy was more consistent with Khamenei’s approach, and inline with the conservative faction.
Iran’s abandonment of its claim of be the leader of all Muslims as well as the
abandonment of its policy of ‘Export of the Revolution’ Iran expanding its sphere of influence
through intensifying its relations with Shiite groups, Syria, and Iraq. After the withdrawal of US
troops, the subsequent power vacuum that emerged in the region gave this opportunity to Iran
during Ahmadinejad administration.
The economic and social results of Ahmadinejad’s confrontational and assertive foreign
policy were no longer sustainable. Thus, Rouhani won the 2013 election against five
conservative rivals. Since Hassan Rouhani came to power, Iranian foreign policy has undergone
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a significant shift. In the conduct of foreign relations, the Rouhani administration has adopted an
approach of “prudent moderation” that is based on realism, self-confidence, realistic idealism,
and constructive engagement. Very significant progress has been made on nuclear talks, and
there has been a noticeable detente with the West and the region. “On July 14, 2015, after 20
months of negotiations, Iran and six states led by the United States reached a historic accord to
significantly limit Tehran’s nuclear ability for more than a decade in return for lifting
international oil and financial sanctions.”92
Perhaps this recent improvement in relations can be viewed as the second most important
example of Iran’s pragmatist policies (after the secret purchase of arms from the United States
and Israel during Iran–Iraq war). Iran sat at the same table and reached a deal with the “Great
Satan.” The Supreme Leader, Khamenei, justified this policy as follows:
We do not negotiate with the U.S. about different global and regional issues, … We
do not negotiate about bilateral issues. Sometimes, in some exceptional cases, like the
nuclear case, and due to the expediency, we may negotiate.93

Before Khomeini died, his supreme political position provided him with an opportunity
to institutionalize “expediency” as the main operational principle guiding Iran’s domestic and
foreign policy decision-making. He ordered the establishment of 'The Expedience Council’ in
1988 to operationalize the principle of expediency. This principle then has become a
“justification for the often extreme means used by the regime to stay in power.”94 In this respect,
according to the expediency principle, when an incompatibility arises, political considerations
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take priority over religious precepts.
Ghobadzadeh states that “Iran's ruling clergy opted to overlook religious precepts in
favor of political considerations. … Regardless of different approaches, there has been a
consensus regarding the two overarching categorizations: 'constant precepts' and 'variable
precepts'. As the titles suggest, while the former refers to those precepts which are applicable to
every place and era, the latter represents those which can be adjusted based on different
circumstances. Khomeini bypassed this traditional categorization by authorizing the state to
change each and every one of the religious precepts.”95
In Khomeini’s conceptualization of expediency, we can see the limits, which are broader
than what we think, in his own words;
A government which is a branch of the Prophet Mohammad's absolute guardianship
is one of the primary Islamic precepts and takes priority over all subsidiary precepts,
even over praying, fasting and pilgrimage ... if necessary, [a] governor can close or
destroy mosques ... the government can unilaterally terminate its religious agreements
with the people if an agreement violates the expedience of the country or Islam. And
[it] can abandon every commandment- both worshipping and non-worshipping
precepts- which is against the expedience of Islam.96

According to Khomeini’s expediency principle, even fundamental religious practices
such as worshipping can be excluded. Thus, in contrast to common belief, gradually Iran’s
radical ideology has been replaced with the pragmatism that is still “driven by the cold
calculations of regime survival and national interests”97 as stated by Nasr. However, this does not
mean that ideology has totally been disregarded.
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In Lieu of a Conclusion: The Characteristics of Iranian Foreign Policy and Iran’s Foreign
Policy Goals

Iran’s foreign policy is generally labeled as ideological, irrational, unpredictable and
offensive. However, if we take into account all the internal and external determinants of Iran’s
foreign policy, it is difficult to justify these descriptions.
Iran’s geographical and demographic realities, historical experiences (lessons learned),
post-revolutionary ideology which is a blend of nationalism and Khomeini’s interpretation of
Shiism (beliefs held), post-revolutionary political structure and decision-making process,
national interests, immediate domestic needs, ruling elites’ priorities (ideological/individual),
regional improvements and threat perceptions directly or indirectly impact Iran’s external actions
and behavior.

The Characteristics of Iranian Foreign Policy

The characteristics of Iran's foreign policy can be summarized as followings:

Regime Survival - The Sine Qua Non

In either domestic or foreign policy decision-making, ensuring ‘regime survival’ is the
top priority and supreme value the revolutionary Iran. This is the most important goal of
Khomeini’s ideology and the political system created by Khomeini. As stated earlier, this
priority was defined in Khomeini’s words as follows; “[a] government which is a branch of the
Prophet Mohammad's absolute guardianship is one of the primary Islamic precepts and takes
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priority over all subsidiary precepts, even over praying, fasting and pilgrimage...” 98
In the words of Stanley, Khomeini’s formulation regarding the survival of the regime is
as follows: “the regime is the embodiment of Shia Islam’s authority on Earth and to abandon it
would be to abandon the will of God. Thus, the survival of this government and its form is an
existential imperative as well as an expression of self-interest and Iranian nationalism.”99
Pre-revolutionary experiences, as well as geopolitical and demographic circumstances,
have been important in defining this priority. In short, some of those are set forth below:
-‐

Being an ethnic and religious minority in the Muslim world,

-‐

Powerful external threats (living under the shadow of stronger powers like the
Ottoman Empire, Great Britain and the Russian Empire)

-‐

Colonial policies, and foreign interventions in domestic politics (the strategic
rivalry and conflict in Iran between the British and Russian empires before World
War I, the occupation of Iran during World War II, removing the democraticallyelected Iranian Prime Minister by a 1953 CIA/MI6-sponsored coup.)

-‐

Iran’s heterogeneous population.

Among these, the overthrow of the democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister by a
1953 CIA/MI6-sponsored coup particularly affected the collective memory of Iranians.
Furthermore, post-revolutionary domestic and external events (such as ethnic uprisings,
coup attempts, factionalism, the Iran–Iraq War, the West’s support for Iraq during the war,
relations with the US and Israel, the US’s increasing presence in the region and potential US
military intervention, and regime change debates) fueled hypersensitivity about the survival of
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the regime. Despite the institutionalization of the revolution to some extent after the mid -1980s,
regime survival has always remained as the top priority of the ruling elites, and this priority has
deeply influenced foreign and domestic policy making.

Decision-Making, Key Individuals and Bodies in Charge of Foreign Policy Making

Hunter states that “the character of states’ political systems and their decision-making
apparatus and processes greatly influence their external behavior.”100
The Iranian political system is designed to prevent any individual, institution, or faction
from dominating the system, and to insulate the regime against internal and external threats. The
task of the preservation of the regime is the raison d’être of the Supreme Leader, the IRGC, the
Guardian Council, and the Expediency Council. The power of the Supreme Leader and these
institutions’ influence on decision-making creates an elaborate system of checks and balances,
which seeks to ensure the regime’s survival and to maintain the status quo.
The establishment of the Expediency Council was a strong sign of Khomeini’s efforts to
structure the system according to this priority. To prevent a potential political dispute that might
harm the regime’s legitimacy, Khomeini established the Expediency Council in 1988 to mediate
disputes between the Parliament and the Guardian Council.
There are at least seven power centers in the system of checks and balances that have an
influence on foreign policy making; the Supreme Leader, the President, the Foreign Minister, the
Guardian Council, the Expediency Council, The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC),
and the Parliament. While the most influential of these is the Supreme Leader who confirms the
ﬁnal decisions on foreign policy issues, The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and the
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Expediency Council also have significant influence on the basic direction of Iran's foreign policy
and key foreign policy issues.

Factions

Factions as a form of political diversity did not disturb Khomeini, so long as they
remained loyal to him and to certain fundamental principles of his ideology. Khamenei followed
this approach in the post-Khomeini period. However, after the election of Khatami in 1997, his
reformist domestic and foreign policies were perceived as a threat to the regime, and viewed as
potentially eroding ideological precepts of the revolution.
The unprecedented character of the 2009 election and its immediate aftermath when
hundreds of thousands of protestors occupied the streets to protest the manipulation of the
election results, showed how factional disputes can destabilize the system, and ironically how the
most powerful faction – which appeared to be the Conservatives- was the least institutionally
organized of the factions.101 The consensus among the factions on the revolutionary precepts did
not seem to the conservatives as sufficient protection for the regime’s survival. The factional
disputes were viewed as a potential threat to the regime unless the conservatives were powerful
enough as to control and shape domestic politics. Thus, this led to the conservatives’ efforts to
concentrate their power.
Currently, in terms of foreign policy, two main groups can be distinguished. The first
group is the Conservatives who strictly follow Khomeini’s ideology. The second group, which
comprises the Pragmatist and Reformist factions, has a more pragmatic foreign policy approach.
Instead of absolute ideologically driven foreign policy, this group advocates to soften the radical
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tone, to improve the relations with the West, and integrate Iran into the international system. On
the other hand, as the oldest faction, the Conservatives have dominated the most influential
positions in the political structure. At the same time, this faction’s worldview overlaps with the
Supreme Leader, Khamenei. Taken together, the Conservatives are still the most influential
faction in decision-making.

The Degree of Ideology and Pragmatism

The 1979 Revolution completely transformed Iran’s foreign policy and international
standing. In addition to Khomeini’s interpretation of Shiism, pre-revolutionary historical
experiences, geopolitical and domestic circumstances had been influential in shaping ideological
views. Iran’s new constitution was prepared in this framework of ‘lessons learned’ and ‘beliefs
held.’ The new regime’s fundamental constitutional principles are crafted as follows: rejection
of all forms of domination, preservation of independence, non-alignment, equality, resistance,
anti-imperialism, nationalism, self-sufficiency, the establishment of relations with peace-seeker
states, and Islamic unity and responsibility of other Muslim and ‘oppressed’ nations. In the early
days of the Islamic Revolution, these principles were crystallized as two primary policies;
‘Neither East nor West’ and ‘Export of the Revolution.’ However, these policies resulted in
isolation from the international system and poor conflictual relations with the Sunni Arab states,
which also subsequently increased Iran’s isolation. Domestic and international events, such as
the high cost of the Iran–Iraq war, the death of Khomeini, the collapse of the bipolar
international system, the need for foreign capital and technical expertise to carry out economic
reconstruction, combined with the poor results of these policies, pushed Iran to reevaluate its
foreign policy orientation. The regime abandoned some of its more unrealistic ideological
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policies. Iranian rulers tried to find a middle path between realism and ideology. In the words of
Ehteshami and Zweiri “[t]he tension between realism and idealism leads to pragmatism, which
provides a middle path to explain foreign policies. It breaks down the realist-idealist dichotomy
and emphasizes the necessity for states to respond to the realities of world politics.”102
Pragmatists and reformists measures were proposed to enhance domestic and regional stability
and to integrate Iran into the international system. Thus, Iran would enable to overcome the
pressure of economic strain.
Hunter states that “[i]n ideological systems, the fortunes of the leadership are based on
the maintenance of the ideology, hence the need to justify all decisions in ideological terms.” 103
In this sense, just before the death of Khomeini, the expediency principle was institutionalized to
take the role of justification of decisions that contradicted ideology. With respect to this, there
are many important decisions in which it can be observed that Iran adopted a more pragmatic and
expediency-oriented approach to meet the requirements of the international system.
In a nutshell, in contrast to common belief, Iran’s radical ideology gradually has been
replaced with a pragmatism that is “driven by the cold calculations of regime survival and
national interests”104 as stated by Nasr. However, it does not mean ideology has totally been
disregarded. Anti-Americanism, anti-Zionism and the presumption of leadership in the Muslim
world (at least in rhetoric) have remained as important pillars of Iranian state ideology and as a
heritage of Khomeini. Along these lines, although ideology has ceased to play a dominant role in
Iran's foreign policy making, ideological considerations and rhetoric still can be observed in both
domestic and foreign policy-making to the extent they serve the regime’s interests.
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Reactionary Foreign Policy

Iranian foreign policy making has been sensitive and responsive to domestic, regional
and global improvements. Economic challenges and social demands have always been influential
in the country’s policy shifts. We can observe this in two of the regime’s most important
decisions;
-‐

The acceptance of ceasefire resolution 598 in 1988

-‐

(due to the unbearable economic and social consequences of the Iran–Iraq war)

-‐

Nuclear agreement in 2015.

-‐

(The economic and social results of Ahmadinejad’s confrontational and assertive
foreign policy prepared the victory of the reformist Rouhani, and subsequently the
nuclear agreement.)

In both decisions, economic strains and public reactions had an impact. In this sense, it
can be said that as the cost of ideological policies became unbearable, changes become inevitable
in Iran’s policy-making.
Besides domestic factors, global and regional events such as a larger US military
presence in the region since 1990, the overthrow of the Taliban Regime in Afghanistan in 2001,
and the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, showed how Iran’s
foreign policy is reactionary. Iranian rulers have always been alert to regional developments.
Besides taking measures against immediate threats, Iranian rulers are quick to take advantage of
a power vacuum to enlarge the country’s sphere of influence.
For instance, the West’s turning a “blind eye” to Iraq’s chemical weapon usage during
the Iran–Iraq War pushed Iran to reevaluate its approach to WMD. Although Khomeini stated
that WMD were immoral and that they violated the Koran’s prohibition against the use of
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poison, he sought to ensure that Iran did not remain as vulnerable as it was during Iraq’s
chemical attacks against Iran. The speaker of the Majlis and commander-in-chief of Iran’s
military at that time, Rafsanjani, at the end of the war (October 1988) said that;
Chemical and biological weapons are poor man’s atomic bombs and can easily be
produced. We should at least consider them for our defense. Although the use of such
weapons is inhuman, the war taught us that international laws are only scraps of
paper. With regard to chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons training, it
was made very clear during the [Iran–Iraq] war that these weapons are very decisive.
It was also made clear that the moral teachings of the world are not very effective
when war reaches a serious stage and the world does not respect its own resolutions
and closes its eyes to the violations and all the aggressions which are committed on
the battlefield. We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive
use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons. From now on you should
make use of the opportunity and perform this task.105

To sum up, Iran’s foreign policy is a product of many factors; revolutionary ideology,
interagency and factional rivalry, ruler’s threat perceptions, national interests, regional and
global improvements, and public opinion. Iranian leaders’ employment of balance-of-threat and
balance-of-power calculations can be viewed as a reactionary foreign policy. While increasing
US presence in the region caused great anxiety because of Iran’s conventional military weakness
and potentially being the next target of the US; the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
overthrow of the Taliban and Saddam Regimes created the opportunity for expanding Iran’s
sphere of influence. In reaction to these developments, Iran pursued alliance-making and
deterrent measures including nuclear weapon and ballistic missiles program; on the other hand,
Iran never neglected to take advantage a power vacuum to expand its sphere of influence through
Shiite proxies.
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Implications for Iran’s Foreign Policy Goals

As discussed above, the forces that impact Iran’s foreign policy-making can be identified
as follows: the design of the political structure, key individuals and bodies in charge of foreign
policy-making, the constitutional framework of foreign policy, core ideological principles,
factions’ approaches to foreign affairs, and Iranian leaders’ statements and reactions to internal
and external events based on threat perceptions and national interests.
Based on all these internal and external determinants of Iran’s foreign policy making that
are addressed earlier in this chapter, Iran’s foreign policy goals can be summarized as follows:
-‐

Regime survival, which is an indispensable goal of Iranian foreign policy,

-‐

State security and survival (the defense of Iranian territory against external
threats),

-‐

Projecting power and becoming the dominant power in the region.

Iran’s aspiration of being a regional hegemon is not a new phenomenon. Thaler states
that “[t]he elite of the Islamic Republic of Iran perceive Iran as the natural, indispensable, and
leading power of the Middle East, even of the Muslim world.”106 The strong sense of identity
originates from its grand imperial past and civilization. In pre and post-revolutionary periods, a
combination of the strong sense of Shiite and Persian identity, the colonial policies and
interventions of the Great Powers and feelings of victimization and insecurity provoked the
Iranian quest to become a regional power. As officially outlined in Iran’s “Twenty-Year Vision
Document,” by 2025, Iran aims to be the leading nation in the region as an economic and
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technological power.107
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CHAPTER IV
THE IRGC’S EXTRATERRITORIAL ACTIVITIES: LEBANESE HEZBOLLAH AND
SHIITE GROUPS IN POST-2003 OCCUPIED IRAQ

Introduction

Iran employs a number of different tools in attaining its foreign policy goals. Among
them, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC- Pasdaran Enqelab-e-Islam) and Quds
Force (IRGC-QF) occupy a crucial place. In the post-revolutionary era, the Iranian military is
composed of two main segments: regular (conventional) forces and revolutionary forces. The
latter actively took the roles of securing and consolidating the revolution at home, and achieving
ideological and strategic goals abroad. The IRGC’s roots depended on the militias that actively
supported the revolution and had unquestionable loyalty to Khomeini. Over time, the IRGC has
been transformed into a type of regular military entity with a navy, ground forces, air force,
headquarters, hierarchical structure and different levels of military training centers. Today, the
IRGC is domestically an economic and political power and also has been Iran’s primary
mechanism for extraterritorial activities which is very uncommon in terms of the usual ‘use of
military force.’
In this chapter, Iran’s use of the IRGC (including the IRGC-QF) in attaining its foreign
policy goals will be addressed through two cases: its relations with Lebanese Hezbollah and
Shiite groups in post-2003 occupied Iraq.
By giving birth and with a wide scope of support ranging from finance, know-how,
military logistics, ideological and military training, Iran’s ideological original motives regarding
the Lebanese Hezbollah were replaced with strategic calculations over time. Despite the fact that
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there is no geographical connection with Lebanon, Iran’s most successful foreign involvement
has been with the Lebanese Hezbollah. Iran’s engagement with Lebanese Hezbollah functioned
as a laboratory and provided crucial experiments, which were later used in post-2003 occupied
Iraq.
In both case studies, the focus will be on Iran’s motivations and desired strategic
outcomes for these foreign engagements and the level and characteristics of IRGC’s
involvements in them. Given this focus, this chapter is outlined as follows;
-‐

The Military in Post-Revolutionary Iran, the IRGC’s establishment, structure, and
responsibilities,

-‐

Case-1: Lebanese Hezbollah,

-‐

Case-2: Shiite groups in post-2003 occupied Iraq.

The Military in Revolutionary Iran

Successful institutionalization of the Islamic Revolution has extended the life of the
revolution up to the present. In this success, the up-to-bottom network in Khomeini's faction
played a significant role. According to Ostovar, this network had three key components; “1)
Ayatollah Khomeini as the leader and moral authority of the revolution; 2) the clerical leaders of
the Islamic Republic Party; 3) the IRGC and other pro-Khomeini militias.”1
One of the most significant and influential institutions that the revolution produced is the
IRGC. The nucleus of the IRGC contains unorganized revolutionary committees (komitehs)
which were formed by many of the Islamic militants around mosques to handle local security
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and enforce their interpretation of Islamic law.2
Despite the Imperial Army’s declaration of neutrality, Khomeini could not risk
revolutionary success. Early days in the revolution, the immediate need to establish an
alternative unified military power was due to several reasons;
-‐

Control of the streets and to ensure internal security during the revolutionary
turmoil,

-‐

Distrust of leftist guerillas,

-‐

Fear of a U.S.-backed military coup conducted by the remaining members of the
Shah’s army, counterweight to regular Imperial Armed Forces,

-‐

Potential competition between the multiple guards who were loyal to Khomeini
and clerics would leave the revolutionary regime vulnerable to coup attempts,

-‐

To consolidate and improve the clerics’ power in the newly established regime
and to advance the Khomeinist ideology in state and society. 3, 4, 5, 6

To attain these goals, in May 1979, the IRGC was established by a decree from Khomeini
as a primary instrument for promoting the goals of the Khomeini revolutionary regime.7 In
Article 150 of the 1979 Constitution, the primary function of the IRGC is stated as ‘guarding the
Revolution and its achievements.’8
Alfoneh states that, according to the statute of the IRGC, which was ratified on April 25,
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1979, and passed by the parliament with slight changes to the original on September 6, 1982, the
goals of the IRGC were defined as follows;
-‐

Guarding the Islamic revolution in Iran,

-‐

Expanding the Revolution abroad according to the pure Islamic ideology and
executing the will of the Islamic Republic,

-‐

Defending the country in the face of or during the presence of foreign occupiers
within the country,

-‐

Cooperating with the government in police and security affairs, pursuit and arrest
of counterrevolutionary elements at a time of weakness of without established
police forces in order to counter armed counter-revolutionary currents,

-‐

Collecting intelligence,

-‐

Assisting liberation and justice-seeking movements of the oppressed,

-‐

Relief and rescue missions in the case of natural disasters.9

The IRGC took an important role in consolidating the power of the newly-established
regime, particularly in the revolution’s initial days. As stated by Buchta, the IRGC was the
revolutionary clergy’s strongest weapon in suppressing the opposition and uprisings of separatist
minorities such as Kurds, Beluchis, and Turkmen between 1979 and 1982.10
In addition to its internal tasks, the IRGC was also responsible for exporting the
revolution. According to Katzman, this task was different from the others. While internal
activities were mostly reactive, this task was proactive. Katzman states that “[t]he Guard
developed this function to implement Khomeini’s vision of a revived Islamic Ummah (unified
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Islamic nation), headquartered in Tehran and led by Khomeini.”11 Thus, while the regular
military is responsible for defending Iran’s borders, the IRGC was primarily an ideologicalmilitary network, which could consolidate the new regime’s power inside and ideological
ambitions outside. As stated by Eisenstadt, however, in practice, the distinctions between
different responsibilities are not so clear-cut. Notably, the Iran–Iraq war caused them to blur; the
regular military (Artesh), the IRGC and other paramilitary organizations fought side-by-side
against Iraqi forces. 12
In addition to the IRGC, two more paramilitary organizations were established just after
the revolution; Basij (“Mobilization of the Oppressed” in Farsi) and the Law Enforcement Forces
(LEF). Today, according to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, the armed forces consist of
three main components;
-‐

The regular military (Artesh);

-‐

The Law Enforcement Forces (LEF).

-‐

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Forces (IRGC)–with its paramilitary Basij
militia.

The Artesh, and the IRGC, which also controls the Basij are headed by a joint
headquarters.
The establishment of the regular military dates back to the 1920s. Both Pahlavi leaders
tried to create a European-style modern army. Especially after the 1953 coup d’état, with the
arrival of vast numbers of US-military advisors, relations between the US and Iranian Army
intensified. According to Buchta, before the 1979 revolution, more than 20,000 American
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military advisors were in charge of the Shah’s army, and the navy and the air force were
equipped with advanced US-weaponry. 13
Following the revolution, although the Imperial Army declared its ‘neutrality’ in a public
statement,14 its close relationship with the US and the army’s association with the deposed Shah
were regarded as a counterrevolutionary threat to the new regime by Khomeini and the clergy
around him. After Khomeini took power, Buchta states that the structure of the army was
unchanged; however, most of its generals and almost 17,000 officers were dismissed by 1986.
Instead, lower-ranking soldiers and those with a background of religious and revolutionary
militancy were appointed to influential posts. Trust was extremely important in the early period
of the revolution. Satisfactory indoctrination of the army took fifteen years, until the clerical
leadership gradually overcame their mistrust of the army.15 This indoctrination process was
carried out by an organization named the Ideological-Political Directorate of the Armed Forces
(IPD). The IPD integrated Khomeinist ideological propaganda into every level of military
training. 16
Up to now, the regular army had not posed any threat to the regime. Its focus has been on
national security issues, weapons acquisition, training and military exercises.17 Today, the
regular Army comprises roughly 350,000 men and possesses ground, air, and naval forces.18 The
constitutional mission of Artesh, as for every conventional regular army, is to defend Iran’s
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borders against external aggression.19
The Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) is a kind of revolutionary police. It was established
in 1990 by integrating three separate domestic security forces; the police, the gendarmerie (rural
police) and the revolutionary committees.20 In the new organization, the regular Shah-trained
police force was dismissed and those former committee members who were undoubtedly loyal to
the regime were assigned to influential positions in the LEF. As stated by Buchta, official figure
is not available regarding the number of LEF personnel, but it is estimated that roughly 100,000
to 120,000 men play a crucial role in the maintenance of internal security.

21

The Basij, the second most powerful paramilitary organization in Iran, was founded by a
decree of Khomeini in November 1979, in which he ordered the establishment of an "Army of
Twenty Million." 22 As a popular militia and reserve component for the Guards, the Basij was
known for human wave attacks during the Iran–Iraq war. Basically, the Basij has had two
responsibilities;
1. Upholding security in major urban areas as the regime’s urban shock troops
against the domestic enemies of the revolution.
2. Providing a large pool of reservists during the Iran–Iraq war.23
Today, the Basij is under the command of the IRGC and comprises approximately 90,000
active armed men 24 and around a 1 million reserve force —most of whom have received some
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military training or served at war fronts in the 1980s.25
After the Iran–Iraq war, the demobilization of Basij members created a significant
problem for the regime. Byman states that two policies were adopted to solve this problem; to
use the Basij for nonmilitary national reconstruction work, and to use the Basij as the principle
force responsible for upholding Islamic norms in society. Thus, with each passing year, the Basij
became less of a military factor and lost its status as a third military pillar, which cannot be
compared with the IRGC’s level of professionalism.26
Compared with Artesh, at its inception, the IRGC was an unprofessional and relatively
weak military force, numbering about 10,000. Its initial activities were restoring public order and
supporting the new regime’s monopoly on power. 27 Over time, its power and size expanded
significantly and has become one of the strongest security pillars of the Islamic Republic without
losing its ideological zeal. Uprisings of separatist minorities and particularly Saddam’s invasion
of Iran in 1980 forced the regime to transform the IRGC from an unprofessional irregular mass
infantry force into proper military units. According to Byman, the war also forced the regime
into expand the IRGC dramatically from 10,000 troops in 1980 to around 450,000 in 1987.28
The professionalization of the IRGC continued during and after the Iran–Iraq war. In
1982, an Operational Area Command and a joint Command Council were established, which
created organizational contact between the commanders of the IRGC and their counterparts in
the regular armed forces (Artesh).29 In 1985, the IRGC set up its naval and air force units in
addition to its ground troops.30 It was put in charge of the surface-to-surface missile (SSM) force
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and non-conventional activities.31 The IRGC also enjoyed representation and an influential voice
in the Supreme Defense Council, the highest military decision-making body.32 Byman states that,
as these reforms were enacted, not only were the professionalization and integration of the
various elements of the IRGC improved, but joint capabilities between the IRGC and the Artesh
also developed through regular military exercises and sharing command and control systems.33
There are still differences between the two forces, however.

Figure 8: Organization Chart of the IRGC

Source: Compiled by the author based on the information in Buchta’s Who Rules Iran.34
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Today the IRGC has about 120,000 men on active duty.35 This number is significantly
less than what the regular army has. The Artesh, however, is equipped with largely outdated
equipment. It can be observed that the IRGC is the more powerful institution among Iran’s
military forces, and the strategic priority has always been given to the IRGC, which is a capable
organization well versed in a variety of different tasks.36 Though the Artesh and the IRGC have
overlapping tasks in practice, the latter is less conventional in terms of its activities.
In Article 150 of the 1979 constitution, and unlike the regular armed forces, the primary
function of the IRGC is stated as ‘guarding the Revolution and its achievements.’37 This broad
responsibility in turn broadened the focus of the IRGC into all aspects of Iranian life and
extraterritorial engagements. Thus, this function, which includes both internal and external
threats and interests that consolidate the ideological agenda of the regime, makes it a politicalmilitary organization. If we take into account the practices and the aforementioned statute of the
IRGC, the scope of the tasks and responsibilities of the IRGC can be outlined under two
categories, internal and external, as follows;

Internal Responsibilities

Guarding the Islamic revolution in Iran,

The implementation of the regime’s ideology,
Cooperating with police and security forces against all kinds of counterrevolutionary
elements (There are IRGC installations in all of Iran’s major cities organized into Quick
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Reaction Groups that serve as a reserve against unrest.38),
Gathering intelligence regarding the security of the revolution,
The ideological indoctrination and training of IRGC personnel,39, 40

Security

Safeguarding internal security particularly in rural regions (in conjunction with the Law
Enforcement Forces); border security, stopping smuggling, and illegal drug trafficking (in
conjunction with the Law Enforcement Forces), assisting in the execution of judicial decisions
and providing public safety,41, 42, 43
Humanitarian assistance in the event of natural disasters and unexpected catastrophes
such as floods and earthquakes,44, 45

Extraterritorial Responsibilities

Supporting foreign liberation movements and struggle for the rights of oppressed people,
Exporting the revolution, (in time this task has been replaced by expanding the sphere of
influence through Shiite groups)
Defending the country against any kind of foreign intervention and attacks inside the
38
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country. 46
As mentioned in the previous chapter, regime survival is valued above everything for
Iran, and the IRGC is chief executor of this goal. The scope of the duties and the missions of the
IRGC have been designed according to the regime’s ideological agenda. In this line, to
implement the regime’s agenda, the IRGC has improved unconventional and asymmetric
strategies included in the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities. According to the IRGC’s commander
Yahya Rahim Safavi who served as the chief commander of the IRGC between 1997 and 2007,
“[t]he IRGC has no geographical border. The Islamic revolution is the border of the IRGC.”47
The IRGC’s extraterritorial activities have not been limited by goals of supporting foreign
liberation movements and exporting the revolution. Over time, these tasks transformed into
sustaining and expanding its sphere of influence, and conducting counter activities against Iran’s
perceived enemies through unconventional and asymmetric methods. The IRGC’s extraterritorial
activities date back to 1982 when its first contingent arrived in Lebanon.48 Owing to Iran’s eightyear war with Iraq, extraterritorial activities decreased. However, with the end of the war, the
IRGC again took a more active role outside Iran’s borders.
The IRGC Quds Force (IRGC-QF) was established under the command of IRGC in
1990.49 In a 1990 interview, Mohsen Rezai, one of the IRGC’s senior leaders and chief
commander of the IRGC before Yahya Rahim Safavi between 1981 and 1997, explained the
reasoning behind the Quds Force’s establishment and its areas of responsibility:
[T]he Qods Force, stands for assisting Muslims, Islamic states or Islamic
governments, should they ask for help in training or advice. That is now a global
46
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custom. If an Islamic state, government or people need to be put through some
training, well, the corps will go there and give them training; it will take measures to
provide training support for world Muslims or Islamic states. There was a need for a
force to perform this task, and the Eminent Leader commanded the corps to set it up.
This force is now being set up and is mainly for helping Islamic governments and
Islamic nations when there is a need to train them and transfer experience to them.50

In the meantime, the IRGC-QF has become an intelligence and unconventional warfare
component of about 5,000 men that centralized the IRGC’s extraterritorial operations under a
single command.51 Besides the Palestinian struggle, the IRGC-QF expanded its activities into
new areas beyond the Muslim world; “Iraq, Lebanon, Central Asia, Europe, and the Americas.”52
With these activities, the IRGC and its Quds Force have been a tool of foreign policy.
According to an Iraqi intelligence study which discusses the foundation of the Quds
Force after the end of the Iranian-Iraqi war and Khomeini’s death, the IRGC-QF has four main
command centers to direct its intelligence and operational activities in neighboring countries in
order to achieve its goals in these countries:
1. Ramadan Headquarters (1st Corps) is responsible for Iraq,
2. Nabi Al-Akram Command Center (2nd Corps) is dedicated to Pakistan,
3. Al-Hamzah Command Center (3rd Corps) is focused on Turkey and the Kurdish
issue,
4. Al-Ansar Command Center (4th Corps) is intended for Afghanistan and Central
Asia.53
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Besides these main command centers, the document indicates that there are also six corps
for each country or area in which they operate;54

Table 3: The Countries and Areas in Which the IRGC Operates
Corp

Responsible for

Fifth Corps

Turkish territory

Sixth Corps

Emirates and the Gulf countries

Seventh Corps

Lebanon (affiliated with the Lebanese Hezbollah, the
Islamic Jihad, and Al-Amal Islamic Organization)

Ninth Corp

Europe, America, and east Asian countries

Bosnian Corps

Bosnia

Source: CTC, West Point 55

Since 2007, according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, because of its
extraterritorial activities, the IRGC-QF has been named as a terrorism-supporting entity under
Executive Order 13224 which targets terrorists and their supporters.56
According to ‘Executive Order 13224’57, the IRGC-QF provides lethal support to the
Taliban, Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC); considered the primary instrument for
providing weapons (small arms and associated ammunition, rocket propelled grenades, mortar
rounds, 107mm rockets, plastic explosives, and probably man-portable defense systems) and
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financial support to anti-U.S. and anti-Coalition activity in Afghanistan. This support
contravenes Chapter VII UN Security Council obligations.58 Additionally, Executive Order
13224 states that the IRGC-QF has provided guidance, funding, weapons, intelligence, and
logistical support to Hezbollah's military, paramilitary, and terrorist activities. Additionally,
select groups of Iraqi Shiite militants that targetted and killed Coalition and Iraqi forces and
innocent Iraqi civilians have received support in the form of weapons, training, funding, and
guidance from the IRGC-QF.
Including the commander of the IRGC-QF, Qasem Soleimani, Iranian military
individuals have been listed on ‘the Annex of United Nations Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1737’59 and ‘UNSCR 1747,’60 and on the Specially Designated National (SDN) list
maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
pursuant to ‘Executive Order 13382’61 and ‘13438’62 on the basis of their relationship to the
IRGC and the IRGC-QF. Iranian military individuals who are listed in UNSCRs and Executive
Orders are shown below:
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Table 4: UNSCRs and Executive Orders that Include Iranian Military Individuals
UNSCRs and
Executive Orders

Designated Iranian Military Individuals

UNSCR 1737
Executive Order 13382

General Hosein Salimi, Commander of the Air Force/IRGC

UNSCR 1737

Maj Gen Yahya Rahim Safavi, IRGC
Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, Commander of
IRGC Ground Forces

UNSCR 1747

Rear Admiral Morteza Safari, Commander of IRGC Navy
General Zolqadr, IRGC officer, Deputy Interior Minister for
Security Affairs
Brigadier General Morteza Rezaie, Deputy Commander of
IRGC

UNSCR 1747
Executive Order 13382

Vice Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian, Chief of IRGC Joint Staff
Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi, Commander of Bassij
resistance force
Brigadier General Qasem Soleimani, Commander of Quds
force

Executive Order 13438

Abdul Reza Shahlai, Deputy commander in the IRGC–Quds
Force
Ahmed Foruzandeh, Brigadier General in the IRGC-QF

Source: Compiled by the Author from the Aforementioned Sources

According to claims, the IRGC and its Quds Force branch have been involved in different
forms of extraterritorial activities: Hostage taking, assassinations, subversion, bombings, aircraft
hijackings, as well as providing financial support, military assistance, social services, ideological
supports to its proxies. Owing to some of these activities, Iran has been designated as a State
Sponsor of Terrorism.
Iran’s extraterritorial activities are not limited to Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon. The
IRGC has also taken very active roles in Yemen and Syria. As an indication of Iran’s military
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extraterritorial engagement, solely in Syria, Alfoneh states that 254 people, most of whom were
affiliated with the IRGC-QF, have been killed between January 2013 and August 2015 according
to open source data collected from Persian-language accounts of funerals in Iran.63 In addition to
Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Shiite groups, the IRGC’s name is affiliated with Hamas,
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
Command (PFLP-GC).
Needless to say, Iranian ruling elites pursue political ends with the IRGC’s extraterritorial
activities. Although the secretive nature of these activities is an obstacle for research the IRGC’s
relations with Hezbollah and activities in Iraq are relatively well documented. Thus both cases
are very valuable for observing Iran’s motivations, as well as the extent and character of IRGC’s
involvement in these engagements. In this context, the remaining part of this chapter covers two
case studies; the IRGC’s relations with Lebanese Hezbollah and Shiite groups in post-2003
occupied Iraq.

The IRGC’s Relations with Lebanese Hezbollah

Lebanon achieved its political independence from France in 1943. The modern state of
Lebanon comprises many different religions and ethnic groups. Two main clusters, Muslims and
Christians, include 18 officially recognized sects. Among them, Maronite Christians, Sunni
Muslims, and Shiite Muslims constitute the three major sects. According to the 1932 census,
which was the only official census conducted in Lebanon under the French Mandate, Christian
Maronites (28.8%) had the largest population, followed by the Sunni Muslims (22.4%) then the
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Shiite Muslims (19.6%). The census with dubious reliability comprised the statistical basis for
the distribution of political power among the major religious sects with their numerical sizes in
proportion to their respective sizes.64
Accordingly, the Christian Maronites were accorded the presidency, the Sunni Muslims
were granted the premiership, and the Shiite Muslims were awarded the speakership of the
parliament. Although the Shiites perceived their speakership as politically far weaker than either
the presidency or the premiership, this political resolution based on the distribution of population
worked well until significant demographic shifts took place in the 1970s, as a result of higher
birth rates in the Muslim community and the influx of Muslim immigrants from Syria and
Palestine. 65 Since then, unease has grown about the status given based on the 1932 census,
particularly among Shiites, who were historically a rural and poor population located primarily in
the South and the Bekaa Valley.
In addition to its effects on the demographic shift, the Palestinian implantation during the
1970's created a new environment that led to the civil war and foreign intervention (Israel
operations and Syria’s military support for the Christians, so as to prevent the war spilling across
its border).
According to Wege, this new environment had a dual impact on the Lebanese political
system:
First, the dominant Maronites construed Palestinian refugees as a demographic,
religious, and political threat and acted accordingly.
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Second, Palestinians competed with the Shiites for scarce resources in the
underdeveloped south, and (after the 1974 Melkart Protocol) Palestinian military
operations brought Israeli military strikes to Shi'a population centers.66

A conjuncture of domestic conflicts and foreign interventions prepared the politicization
and mobilization of Lebanese Shiites.
Particularly, a 1969 meeting in Najaf, one of the most important Shiite religious centers,
constituted the origin of the mobilization of the Shiites. Among participants in the meeting, Musa
al-Sadr, an Iranian-born cleric who moved to Lebanon in 1960, would be the most influential
actor in the establishment of Hezbollah67 by gaining great popularity through his outreach efforts
and social activism.68
Musa al-Sadr prepared the conditions that preceded Hezbollah. In 1969, al-Sadr
established the Shiite Higher Council as a lobbying force for the Shiite community in Lebanon.
Five years later, in 1974, he initiated the Movement of the Deprived (Al-Harakat al-Mahrumin)
to amplify Shiite activism for economic and social development in Shiite villages. 69 After the
outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, Sadr organized the first major Shiite militia called
Amal (Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya, Lebanese Resistance Battalions).70 Sadr's Amal was
the seedbed for Hezbollah.71 In the meantime, several critical developments precipitated the
emergence of Hezbollah;
-‐
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major focus and rallying point for the community,
-‐

Israel's invasions of Lebanon in 1978 and 1982,

-‐

The establishment of a Shiite Islamic state in Iran in 1979.72, 73

After the disappearance of Sadr, the shift in approaches of the new leadership represented
by Nabih Berri led to splits among Lebanese Shiites. The more religious members, some of
whom would go on to leadership positions in Hezbollah, opposed the adoption of more secular
policies and tolerance toward Israel’s advance.74 Husayn al-Musawi, one of the Amal’s leaders,
called for Shiites to resist the invasion in the name of Islam.75
On July 6, 1982, the Israeli army invaded Lebanon as part of its wider ‘Peace of the
Galilee’ operation; Qassem -who is the second in command of Hezbollah with the title of deputy
secretary-general- states that the reason of the so-called ‘terrorist’ attacks emanating from
Lebanon was not the main purpose behind the operation.76 According to Norton, the true
objectives were “to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a significant political
force and to install a friendly government in Beirut.”77 Among other developments, the invasion
became a seminal event and not only triggered further radicalization of Lebanese Shi'ites, but
also paved the way for Iran’s direct involvement.
Hezbollah emerged basically in three geographic regions: the Bekaa which was the
movement's primary politico-military foundation; the southern suburbs of Beirut, its secondary
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area of strength; and certain areas of South Lebanon, its tertiary foundation.78 Among them, the
Bekaa became the center of Iran’s and Syria’s support.
The third crucial event was the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The revolution had a stimulating
effect on Lebanese Shiites. Iran saw the Lebanese Shiites as a natural proxy. The convergence of
mutual interest and ideological affinity has been the root of Iran’s most prominent, and most
well-known relationship with the Lebanese group, Hezbollah. As stated by Norton, although
‘1982’ was referred as the establishment year of Hezbollah, it existed as a cabal rather than a
coherent organization until the mid-1980s.79 Iran’s wide range of ideological and material
support was a vital instrument in the movement's improvement and emergence as a wellestablished organization.

Iran’s ideological Influence on Hezbollah

The most noted example of Iran’s efforts to export the revolution beyond its own borders
was its active involvement in Hezbollah’s establishment and development. Although the
revolution took place a long distance away from Lebanon, since its inception, the Revolutionary
Regime has had its greatest impact on Lebanese Shiites, by virtue of mutual religious and
cultural affinities, profound historical connections and shared political interests.
Notably, the Hezbollah leadership’s adherence to the thought of Twelver Shiism,
adoption of the concept of Velayat-e Faqih and embrace of Ayatollah Khomeini as the supreme
political and religious authority contributed to the success of the enduring strong Iran-Hezbollah
relationship.
Personal relationships between some Iranian clerics and Hezbollah's command leadership
78
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in Shiite spiritual centers such as Najaf, Qom and as well as Lebanon were another facilitator in
the rapid growth and expansion of Hezbollah.80
In the late 1960s and the 1970s, some Iranian revolutionaries were trained in Lebanon;
Lebanese clerics also studied in Najaf and Qom with Iranian counterparts who would later be
involved with the revolution.81
Qassem -deputy secretary-general of Hezbollah- asserts clearly the reasons that lay
behind the success of Iran-Hezbollah relations as follows:
-‐

Both Iran and Hezbollah believe in the jurisdiction of the Jurist-Theologian, and
that Imam Khomeini was himself that leader -the embodiment of this jurisdiction
in our times. Iran and the Party thus met within one framework of international
leadership legitimacy.

-‐

Iran’s choice of an Islamic republican system of government coincided with the
Islamic principles held by Hezbollah.

-‐

Political concord also existed on the issue of Iran’s absolute rejection of
superpower hegemony, the safeguarding of independence, and support for all the
liberation movements, especially those aimed at resisting Israeli occupation. Such
was the view held by Hezbollah, with a priority awarded to the confrontation of
Israeli occupation and whatever that entails regarding opposing powers or projects
of domination.82

In addition to the reasons stated by Qassem, the ‘Open Letter’ of 1985 addressed by the
Hezbollah to the downtrodden in Lebanon and the world explicitly and officially shows the
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ideological closeness and the leadership role assigned to Iran:
We, the sons of Hezbullah's nation, whose vanguard God has given victory in Iran
and which has established the nucleus of the world's central Islamic state, abide by
the orders of a single wise and just command currently embodied in the supreme
Ayatollah Ruhollah al-Musavi al-Khomeini.83

To adopt Khomeini as the leader of the Shiite world and his concept of velayat-e faqih
gave Iran tremendous influence within Hezbollah. This allowed Iran to expand its influence in
Lebanon’s domestic and foreign affairs.
Apart from ideological familiarity and close personal relationships, Iran’s direct
involvement through a variety of channels and institutions, such as the IRGC, Iran’s
representatives in Syria and Lebanon to Iran's Foreign Ministry, Iranian Intelligence services and
the Martyr's Foundation, institutionalized the relations and consolidated the establishment and
the development of Hezbollah.84 Among these, particularly the IRGC’s efforts occupied a very
important place.
Following Israel’s 1982 invasion, Iran immediately advised Syria to allow the
deployment of a small Iranian contingent to Lebanon. The imminent threat posed by Israel and
Syria’s alliance with Iran in the Iran–Iraq war easily made this demand possible and Tehran
seized the opportunity through a military agreement signed between Iran and Syria in June
1982.85
After the parliamentary vote, Iran initially deployed a contingent of 500 or so IRGC
members (there is no specific number regarding the first unit, the number ranges from 300 to
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500). In a short time, this number gradually reached 1,500, distributed throughout some smaller
villages in the Bekaa Valley.86, 87, 88 Additionally, Syria allowed a supply line of support to run
from Iran through Syria to Lebanese Shiites.89
The IRGC intensified its efforts to create Hezbollah through working with Iranian
intelligence and Iranian diplomats as well as Syrian officials.90 Deeb states that “[i]n fact until
the arrival of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards, …. Hezbullah had previously existed
simply as an idea in the writings of Muhammad Husain Fadlallah.”91 The IRGC’s influence
became evident in a short time.
The IRGC served as a conduit for all kind of Iranian support and the IRGC’s activities in
Lebanon included numerous forms of assistance. In particular, fostering a revolutionary spirit
among the Lebanese Shiites and then the militarization of Shiite activism were the net effects of
Iran’s presence in Lebanon. As stated by Byman, “[w]hen the IRGC initially arrived in Lebanon,
its base in the Baalbeck area of the Bekaa Valley became a microcosm of revolutionary Iran.”92
Kramer describes this transformation very well in quoting the experience of co-founder
and Hezbollah’s secretary-general Abbas al-Musavi who took the first training course offered by
the Revolutionary Guards in 1982:93

86

Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon  : The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis / Magnus Ranstorp  ;
Foreword by Terry Waite. (New York: StMartin’s Press, 1997), 34–36.
87
Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections  : States That Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge, UK  ; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), 82.
88
Eric Sander Lob, “An Institutional History of the Iranian Construction Jihad: From Inception to
Institutionalization (1979--2011).” (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2013), 134.
89
Martin Kramer, “Hizbullah: The Calculus of Jihad,” Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 47,
no. 8 (May 1, 1994): 26, doi:10.2307/3824797.
90
Byman, Deadly Connections, 83.
91
Deeb, “Shia Movements in Lebanon,” 692.
92
Byman, Deadly Connections, 92.
93
Abbas al-Musavi was an influential Lebanese Shia cleric, co-founder and Hezbollah’s secretary-general from
1991 until his assassination by Israel in 1992. Ranstrop states that Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi occupied not only the
most senior positions as spiritual leaders of the Hizbollah in the Bekaa but also acted as liaison with the Iranian
Pasdaran Revolutionary Guards Corps and Iran while maintaining overall control over Hizbollah's irregular and
semi-regular military units. (Ranstorp, “Hizbollah’s Command Leadership,” 305.)

127
I recall one of the sights I can never forget. We were awakened at night by the
weeping of the brethren Guards during the night prayer. Is this not the greatest school
from which one can graduate? I also recall when one of the brethren Guards gave a
weapons lesson. Suddenly, after he had given all the explanations, he put the weapon
aside and swore an oath saying: "All I have explained to you will not help you; only
God can help you." He began to talk about belief and reliance on God.... When I
joined the Guards and sat with the brethren in the first course they gave in the Bekaa
Valley, I felt I derived immense benefit. I felt I had truly penetrated genuine Islam. If
this is how I felt, as someone at an advanced level of schooling, then how must the
other youths have felt who filled the ranks of the Guards?94

Also, Kramer’s subsequent quote shows the IRGC’s successful indoctrination within a
short span of time;
The school of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard made the Muslim youths love
martyrdom.…. We were not surprised at all when, shortly after the arrival of the
Guards, a Muslim youth in Lebanon smiled at death while carrying with him 1,200
kilograms of explosives.95

Over time, Hezbollah gained power and spread to Beirut and southern Lebanon from the
Bekaa Valley. Apart from Iran’s undeniable role in the rapid growth and popularity of Hezbollah
in these three regions, Hezbollah leaders’ success in meeting the social and economic needs of
the Shiite community in the absence of any efficient Lebanese authority and the establishment of
efficient Hezbollah propaganda machinery played important roles.96
In the 1980s, Hezbollah had around 5,000 armed members actively engaged in fighting
against Israeli and Western targets. Byman states that the number of fighters gradually shrank as
the years passed, but the fighters got more skilled and professionalized. In May 2000, by the time
of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, the numbers of full time and part time fighters were
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respectively 500, and 1000.97 Similarly the number of IRGC members in Lebanon shrank over
time and decreased to roughly 150 fighters in the 1990s.98
Since the beginning of its presence in Lebanon, the IRGC had not openly engaged in
military operations. Ranstrop quotes from Qassem regarding the functionality of the IRGC as
follows: “the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard does not fight in southern Lebanon. However,
it is known that some of its members are present in the al-Biq’a area: they play an educational
and training role and do not participate in other matters.”99 Ranstrop argues that “[t]he main
nature of Iran’s mission was geared towards aiding the formation of an organizational basis and
infrastructure for a new revolutionary Shi’a group through extensive military training and
religious guidance.”100
Due to several reasons, Iran-Hezbollah relations lost their initial intensity. Hezbollah over
time became the strongest group in Lebanon and has participated in parliamentary politics since
1992.101 As Hezbollah got stronger, the Hezbollah’s material and ideological dependency on Iran
became weaker. For Iran, the cost of relations with Hezbollah and the eight-year war with Iraq
had been the most influential factors in revising its policies. Over time, strategic reasons have
come to the fore; the growing international pressure against Iran’s involvement in Lebanon and
the war’s putting the regime's survival and the revolution's success at risk led Iran to shift its
policy.102, 103 Additionally, another factor, as stated by Lob, the thought of satisfactory
consolidation of power in the mid-1980s led the revolutionary regime to adopt a less radicalized
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foreign policy.104 However, it did not mean Iran’s support for Hezbollah totally ended.
Hezbollah's goals were outlined in the 1985 Open Letter as followings:
(a) To expel the Americans, the French and their allies definitely from Lebanon,
putting an end to any colonialist entity on our land;
(b) To submit the Phalanges to a just power and bring them all to justice for the
crimes they have perpetrated against Muslims and Christians;
(c) To permit all the sons of our people to determine their future and to choose in
liberty the form of government they desire. We call upon all of them to pick the
option of Islamic government which, alone, is capable of guaranteeing justice and
liberty for all. Only an Islamic regime can stop any further tentative attempts of
imperialistic infiltration into our country 105
To attain these goals, Hezbollah pursued militant means against Israel and the West, and
tried to consolidate and expand its power in Lebanese domestic politics. In 1989, the Taif Accord
which “provided the basis for the ending of the civil war and the return to political normalcy in
Lebanon”106 and the death of Khomeini directly affected subsequent improvements. The accord
brought the more equitable distribution of political power (on a 50-50 basis) and then paved the
way for Hezbollah’s involvement in Lebanese domestic politics. Also, the accord called for the
withdrawal of foreign troops in Lebanon.107 Parallel to improvements in Lebanon, after the death
of Khomeini in 1989 and with the Rafsanjani presidency, revolutionary fervor was replaced by
pragmatic policies. The immense cost of the Iraq war (economic and human), logistic needs and
external political pressures regarding sponsoring Hezbollah caused this change of approach.
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Thus, Iran’s initial active involvement gave way to a partly constrained sponsorship.
In May 2000, Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon because of the increasing cost of
military occupation. Hezbollah immediately presented Israel’s withdrawal as a victory and this
amplified the group’s popularity amongst the Lebanese population. After a period of relative
peace between 2000 and 2006, tension increased again because of Hezbollah’s kidnapping of
two Israeli soldiers and killing eight others in July 2006. In response, Israel attacked Hezbollah.
After the deaths of 164 Israelis (forty-five civilians), and over 1,100 Lebanese (mostly civilians)
in 34 days, the fighting ended with a ceasefire. This ceasefire was also claimed as a victory by
Hezbollah by declaring Israel’s incapability to destroy it.108, 109
Overall, chiefly because of the following factors, Hezbollah began to be a more
autonomous body;
-‐

The immense cost of the Iraq war and external pressures regarding Hezbollah
sponsporship,

-‐

The death of Khomeini who was also Hezbollah’s ideological leader,

-‐

Iran’s adopting foreign policy approaches that aimed to integrate itself into the
international system,

-‐

The Taif Accord that provided the basis for ending the civil war and the return to
political normalcy in Lebanon,

-‐

Hezbollah’s increasing power in Lebanon’s domestic politics and new alliances
with domestic actors,

108

-‐

Israel’s (2000) and Syria’s (2005) withdrawal from Lebanon.

-‐

Decreasing dependency on Iran because of the growth of Hezbollah’s own
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independent funds, particularly from wealthy Shi‘ite merchants in Lebanon and
from the sizable West African, South American, and U.S. Lebanese Shiite
diaspora.110 (According to intelligence estimates, Hezbollah’s overall budget
amounts to around US$500 million annually.111)
Besides its militant activities, due to its involvement in politics and social services, there
are debates about Hezbollah’s classification as to whether it is a terrorist organization or not. For
instance, while the US, Canada, Israel classify Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, other
countries like Russia do not. In the third category, countries like Australia and the United
Kingdom distinguish between Hezbollah's guerilla and political wings, and classify its guerilla
wing as a terrorist organization.112
Since its inception, the organization has engaged in forms of violence through guerrilla
warfare. According to the Global Terrorism Database, the number of Hezbollah or Hezbollah
suspected fatalities is roughly 1200 between 1983 and 2014 in 398 incidents (including
suspected incidents). The group is most actively in Lebanon and Israel. But it also executed
violent activities in Argentine, Bahrein, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, Iran,
Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Niger, Saudi, Arabia, Spain, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, and Turkey.113

Hezbollah’s Major Attacks

Instead of a day-by-day chronology of the violence employed by Hezbollah that would be
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long, some major attacks of Hezbollah are listed below;114
Table 5: Hezbollah's Major Attacks
DATE

COUNTRY/
CITY

FATALITIES

TARGET

ATTACK
TYPE

4/18/1983

Lebanon Beirut

63

U.S. Embassy

Bombing/
Explosion

241

Marine Base
Command
Center

Bombing/
Explosion
Bombing/
Explosion

10/23/198
3

Lebanon Beirut

10/23/198
3

Lebanon Beirut

58

French
Peacekeeping
Force's base

9/20/1984

Lebanon Beirut

23

U.S. Embassy

Bombing/
Explosion

3/10/1985

Lebanon
Metulla

12

Israel Military
convoy

Bombing/
Explosion

4/12/1985

Spain
Aporto

18

El Descanso
restaurant/Spain

Bombing/
Explosion

6/14/1985

Greece Athens

1

TWA Boeing
727 Flight 847

Hijacking

7/11/1985

Kuwait Kuwait

11

Al Sharq Seaside
Café

Bombing/
Explosion

6/23/1986

Egypt Cairo

10

Property

Bombing/
Explosion

9/6/1986

Turkey Istanbul

21

Neve Shalom
Temple

Facility/Infrastruc
ture Attack

12/26/198
6

Saudi Arabia
Riyadh

62

Airport and
Aircraft
(Jetliner)

Hijacking

7/12/1988

Greece Aegina

10

City of Porras
Ferry

Bombing/
Explosion
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DATE

COUNTRY/
CITY

FATALITIES

TARGET

ATTACK
TYPE
Bombing/
Explosion

9/19/1989

Niger

171

Airports and
Aircraft
France DC - 10
aircraft

3/17/1992

Argentina
Buenos Aires

29

Israeli Embassy

Bombing/
Explosion

Bombing/
Explosion

7/18/1994

Argentina
Buenos Aires

85

JewishArgentine
Mutual
Association
(AMIA)

8/25/1998

Israel Kiryat
Shemona

12

Israeli Citizens

Bombing/
Explosion

40

Lebanon
Government
Soldiers and
Civilians

Bombing/
Explosion

11

Supporters of the
Lebanese
government

Armed Assault

5/7/2008

5/9/2008

Lebanon Tripoli

Lebanon Beirut

Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)

Most of the initial attacks aimed to get foreigners to retreat from Lebanon. For instance,
in two separate attacks in 1983 and 1984 respectively; 86 people in an American Embassy
bombing, 299 people in attacks on French Peacekeeping and the Marine Base Command Center
were killed. Some attacks aimed to support Iran during the Iran–Iraq war. For example, to force
Kuwait to abandon its support for Iraq, Hezbollah executed ten attacks in Kuwait and caused 16
casualties. Other group attacks aimed to free members arrested by other countries such as the
hijacking of TWA flight 847 in 1985. Furthermore, Hezbollah attacked rival movements to
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minimize their influence on the Lebanese Shiite community. As mentioned above, because of
these activities Hezbollah was officially listed as a terrorist organization (at least its military
wing) by eleven countries, including the EU.

Types of the IRGC’s Support

Among many forms of Iranian support, the IRGC’s role in the creation of Hezbollah can
be defined as the most influential one. Besides military training and augmenting warfighting
capabilities vital to the survival and the success of Hezbollah paramilitary activities, IRGC
members also engaged in recruitment and indoctrination in which they preached the virtues of
revolutionary ideology and stressed the value of martyrdom.115
A very short time after the IRGC’s arrival in Lebanon, the Baalbeck area of the Bekaa
Valley became a small revolutionary Iran. Byman states that “[w]omen wore veils, pictures of
Ayatollah Khomeini were ubiquitous, and the debates in Iran were mirrored in Lebanon.”116
Hezbollah accepted the doctrine of the velayet-e faqih, the leadership of Khomeini and adopted
other Iranian views; such as “the division of the world into oppressors and the oppressed, enmity
to Israel and to the United States, and the rejection of national boundaries in favor of religious
identity.”117 Given this emphasis, Hezbollah followed the Iranian ideological line.
Iran’s influence is also seen in Hezbollah’s organizational structure. The key decisionmaking body of Hezbollah, Majlis al-Shura, included one or two high-ranking IRGC
representatives or officials from the Iranian embassies in Beirut or Damascus.118, 119 These
Iranian officials provided a direct link on matters that required strategic guidance or Iranian
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assistance or arbitration.120
Majidyar quotes from an interview with veteran Iranian diplomat Hossein Sheikh alIslam that “the IRGC’s Intelligence Directorate (which later became the Quds Force) and the
Iranian Embassy in Damascus played an instrumental role in the creation and organization of
Hezbollah.”121
Based on intelligence estimates, Iran financed Hezbollah with roughly $100 million
annually. 122, 123, 124, 125 This money, particularly in its initial period, enabled Hezbollah to sustain
and expand its power. Hezbollah could “attract both veteran Shiite fighters formerly employed
by Amal and Palestinian groups, and eager young recruits, by offering salaries of $150-200 per
month.”126 In addition to monthly income, several special privileges were offered to these
fighters such as cost-free education and medical treatment for them and their families.127
This financial contribution not only financed the organization’s military activities
(recruitment, weapons procurement, logistics, etc,) and the needs of militias, but also allowed
Hezbollah to run “an array of social welfare and financial services for the Shi’a community,
including religious schools, clinics and hospitals, as well as cash subsidies to Shi’ite families
below the poverty line, which naturally boosted the popularity and growth of the pro-Iranian
movement in the Beqaa.” 128
Overall, the IRGC’s support for Hezbollah may be divided into the following main
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categories;
-‐

The IRGC’s indoctrination fueled Shiite consciousness and spread revolutionary
values among the Lebanese Shiite community. The IRGC created a microcosm of
revolutionary Iran in its Beqaa Valley base. This transformed the Lebanese Shiite
community into a pro-Iranian Revolutionary stand. The ideological mobilization
enabled Hezbollah to find human resource and material support from the
Lebanese Shiite community and to sustain its longevity and flourishing.

-‐

Military training provided by the IRGC allowed Hezbollah to attain its goals
through violent activities and subsequently made it one of the most influential
actors in Lebanon.

-‐

Providing safe havens allowed Hezbollah to improve organizational structure, to
establish training centers, to have a long range strategy and to plan paramilitary
and political activities.

-‐

Material aid (financial, weaponry and logistical) provided by Iran empowered
both Hezbollah’s military and political wings.

-‐

By joining in decision-making, the IRGC not only contributed to Hezbollah’s
organizational/structural establishment, but also to its strategy-making through
know-how and intelligence.

Consequently, taken as a whole, Iranian support was essential to Hezbollah’s longstanding life and success.

Iran’s Motivations for Supporting Hezbollah

Iran’s motivations for supporting Hezbollah were distilled from an interconnecting set of
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ideological and strategic calculations. The first decade of Iran-Hezbollah relations was mostly
shaped by Iran’s revolutionary ambitions. Iran tried to export the revolution to all Muslim
communities, however, the initial enthusiasm of the Revolution did not take root in Sunni and
Shiite minority communities. Hezbollah was the first group that allowed Iran to export its
ideology and influence, which is why, in the words of Byman, “none is more important to
Tehran than the Lebanese Hezbollah”129 among proxies. Iran exercised almost complete control
over the organization by shaping its ideology, structure and joining its decision-making.
However, over time, as Hezbollah gained power and its dependency on Iran decreased and as
Iran adopted more rational policies in place of ideological ones, Hezbollah became for Iran a
strategic tool for Iranian foreign policy goals rather than an idealistic phenomenon.
Although Iran’s motivations for supporting Hezbollah have varied in strength over time,
supporting Hezbollah served as a strategic tool in two main goals;
-‐

A Tool of Deterrence and a Bargaining Chip

Since its inception, revolutionary Iran has primarily been concerned with regime survival
and this deeply influenced its strategies. Alfoneh reveals the thinking of Mohammad Montazeri,
who was one of the founders of the IRGC, regarding the strategy behind the use of Hezbollah in
regime survival:
In order to achieve ideological, political, security and economic self-reliance we have
no other choice than to mobilize all forces loyal to the Islamic Revolution, and
through this mobilization, plant such a terror in the hearts of the enemies that they
abandon the thought of an offensive and annihilation of our revolution…. If our
revolution does not have an offensive and internationalist dimension, the enemies of
Islam will again enslave us culturally, politically, and the like, and they will not
abstain from plunder and looting.130
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Fulton asserts that “by demonstrating a capability to strike U.S. and Israeli interests
anywhere in the world, or creating a perception of this capability, Iran’s leaders hoped to stave
off a military strike, or at least make it extremely costly for their foes.”131
In this context, Hezbollah has been seen as a deterrence and retaliatory force against
Iran’s adversaries. Especially for the US and Israel which are disproportionately powerful in
terms of conventional military capabilities, Hezbollah stands as “a useful pressure point or
eventually becomes a bargaining chip.”132 During the Iran–Iraq war, Hezbollah targeted
countries that were directly providing military, financial, or logistical support to Iraq. Chubin
states that “Iran’s direct interventions to expand Hezbollah’s targeting helped the Iranian
government achieve such important foreign policy objectives as obtaining American weapons,
persuading France to expel the regime’s opponents and strengthening Syria’s hold on
Lebanon.133
-‐

Project power

In addition to being a deterrent and retaliatory force that targeted the adversaries of Iran,
Hezbollah also allowed Iran to project power to sustain and expand its sphere of influence by
becoming a greater voice in regional affairs. Signaling Hezbollah as a forward base for Iran to
punish the enemies of Islam and protect Muslim’s rights, allowed Iran to project its power to the
Muslim world where it appointed itself as leader despite being religiously Shiite and ethnically
Persian. Furthermore, the execution of active anti-US and Israel policies through Hezbollah
aimed to gain prestige not only in the Arab world, but also among anti-US states and groups
(South America).
131

Will Fulton, “Iran’s Global Force Projection Network: IRGC Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah” (American
Enterprise Institute, 2013), 2, http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/-irans-global-force-projectionnetwork-irgc-quds-force-and-lebanese-hezbollah_135304149797.pdf.
132
Chubin, “Is Iran a Military Threat?,” 73.
133
DeVore, “Exploring the Iran-Hezbollah Relationship,” 99.

139
Norton defines Hezbollah as a stalking horse for Iranian interests, which offered a degree
of deniability when confronted with international pressure over Hezbollah activities.134 Iran has
not had any direct involvement in conflict with Israel and enjoyed hostility without direct
engagement.135 Thus, Iran was able to achieve its interests without provoking military retaliation
and without paying the consequences that more direct involvement might entail.136
Furthermore, Iran’s influence in Lebanese domestic politics and pressures on both the US
and Israel also consolidated the revolutionary regime’s power in its domestic politics.
The IRGC’s activities in Lebanon were Iran’s first and most successful extraterritorial
engagement. It may be seen as a laboratory for its future foreign engagements in post-2003
occupied Iraq and the 2011 Syrian civil war. In this success, shared religious and ideological
doctrines, preexisting networks between leaders and clerics, mutual interest and needs, and the
power vacuum in Lebanon. Besides these factors, the IRGC’s status in Iran’s power structure
was a defining point in the success. Although the level of involvement was questioned by
different factions in Iranian Politics, the IRGC’s autonomy from the civilian leadership and its
own independent economic infrastructure deepened this relation and made it durable.

Τhe IRGC’s Relations with Shiite Groups in Post-2003 Occupied Iraq

Since the 1979 revolution, Iraq has been one of Iran’s main foreign policy concerns. Just
after the revolution, to take advantage of Iran's demoralized regular army, thinking it would be
ineffective, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in September 1980. According to Foran
and Goodwin, the following motivations were behind this decision;
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-‐

The fear of export of the revolution to Iraq's large Shi'a population;

-‐

Seeking to become the political leader in the Arab world;

-‐

The thought of supporting of Iran's own Arab minority in the oil-rich Khuzistan
province.137

Although after several months, Iraqi forces were repelled and Iraq switched to a
defensive position, Iranians could not immediately achieve a decisive victory. The war lasted
eight years. When the war ended after Iran’s acceptance of UN decision number 598, there were
not significant territorial changes, but very high costs. As stated by Foran and Goodwin, “[i]ran
had suffered at least 160,000 dead (other estimates claim 300,000 or more) and some $450
billion in damage to cities, villages, ports, and oil facilities.”138 The Iran–Iraq war strengthened
the regime at home. However, it limited its influence outside of Iran’s borders. Instead of
pursuing its ideological agenda, the cost of war pushed Iran to adopt more pragmatic policies.
Until the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran adopted a more cautious foreign policy for the
sake of improving good relations with the West and with regional actors. Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait on August 2, 1990 offered several unexpected benefits for Iran. Iran condemned the
invasion and voted for the UN decision that obligate to withdraw its forces immediately without
conditions. Increasing pressures, costs and isolation convinced Saddam to retreat. Iraq promised
to recognize the Iranian border and to redeploy the troops in the Iranian and Kuwaiti fronts.139
The 9/11 attacks changed the course of relations in the Middle East. The Bush
administration’s first significant reaction to the attacks was to emphasize the need to combat
states that harbored and supported terrorists. Particularly three states, Iran, Iraq and North Korea,
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were targeted and called the ‘axis of evil.’ After the ‘axis of evil’ speech, the toppling of the
Saddam's regime in Iraq and the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan by the US created a very
complex situation for Iran. On one hand, the fear of being the next target as a member of the
‘axis of evil’, on the other, the removal of sworn enemies surrounding it on the east and west.
For both issues, while Iran sought means to counter US presence in the region, it also tried to
take advantage of the ensuing power vacuum by supporting proxies, deterrent activities and
keeping the nuclear issue on the table. The IRGC’s roles in both strategies are unquestionable. In
this context, the following section will address the IRGC’s activities to implement its goals in
post-Saddam Iraq.

Iraq’s Importance to Iran

Iran’s relations with Iraq have been very complicated and problematic. There is no exact
figure that shows the proportion of Shiites in Iraq’s total population. According to the few
available surveys regarding religious identity in Iraq, more than half of the country’s population
is Arab originated Shiite. This figure ranges from 47% to 65% according to different sources.
However, 60 percent is the widely accepted proportion in the literature.140, 141 Thus, Iran
naturally saw Iraq in its potential sphere of influence and tried to promote its religious influence
and propagate velayat-e faqih. Despite the large Shiite population, the Iraqi Sunni-dominated
government was an obstacle to Iran’s determination to spread its revolution next door.
Both states have historically competed for regional hegemony rather than an ideological
struggle, but this competition culminated in the eight-year war. As indicated by Ehteshami,
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“personality clashes, geopolitical rivalries, regime types, and deep suspicion at the leadership
level combined to escalate a manageable border dispute into a more general conflict, which
resulted in all-encompassing interstate war. … The war was ultimately about territory, influence,
and survival—it was not about religion or some historically rooted difference.”142
Apart from Iraq, Iran was geographically surrounded by potential and already existing
rivals and threats; Turkey was a NATO member and a long-time US ally; Azerbaijan, despite its
Shiite dominance, had close relations with the US; the south Arab states, namely the Saudis,
were already in conflict with Iran. Additionally, with the invasions of Afghanistan in 2002 and
Iraq in 2003, countries on both Iran’s eastern and western borders were vulnerable to the US. In
this environment, Iran felt under pressure. Since the 1979 revolution, Iraq has been one of the
Islamic Republic's main foreign policy challenges. Iraq not only challenged Iran’s hegemonic
ambitions by isolating it from the Arab world, but also posed a direct security threat to its
territory, economy, and population.143 The US invasion of Iraq and the ensuing destruction of the
Saddam regime fundamentally altered the regional balance of power. The invasion encapsulated
both opportunities and threats for Iran.
Depending on the level of Iran’s capabilities to shape post-Saddam Iraq, an allied Iraqi
government would provide a number of benefits in favor of Iran;
-‐

An ally Iraqi government would guarantee its western border and then allow
Tehran to concentrate on its south where a possible U.S. invasion would probably
be launched.

-‐

In addition to Syria and Lebanon, an ally Iraqi government would allow Iran to
augment its penetration of the Arab world. Iran also would find the opportunity to
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extend its influence in Lebanon without any obstacle.
-‐

It would tilt the balance of power in the Persian Gulf in favor of Iran; a friendly
Iraq could join Iran, Syria and Lebanon in an alliance against Israel and other
Sunni rivals.

-‐

Lastly, an ally Iraqi government would place Iran in a stronger bargaining
position and weaken the U.S. strategy of containing Iran. Thus Iran’s position
would be strengthened in a wide variety of ways, including negotiations on Iran’s
nuclear program.144

On the other hand, after removing the Baath regime and ensuing occupation of Iraq by
the US, Iran would become sole arbiter in the post-Saddam Iraq. A permanent US existence or a
client regime in Baghdad would pose a great threat in Iran’s calculations;
-‐

The presence of the US in its two neighbors caused Iran to think of itself as the
next target. Bush administration’s preemptive doctrine was an influential factor in
this thought.

-‐

As the new neighbor, the US might easily influence Iran’s domestic affairs and
intensify its efforts to change its regime. Iran always considered the economic and
military sanctions that the United States had imposed on it and its supports for the
opponents of the regime as a part of this goal.

-‐

The US, as sole authority in Iraq, might install a client regime in Baghdad instead
of directly governing Iraq, which is more probable in terms of taking international
reactions into account. This would also be detrimental to Iran’s national security.
In this scenario, Iran might experience both invasion and regime change options.
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Either a permanent US presence or a client regime in Baghdad would not only prevent
Iran from acquiring the aforementioned benefits, but would also force Iran to be on the alert
against the world’s most powerful military.
Since the beginning of the crisis, Iran tried to shape improvements and adopted a strategy
that included numerous steps. At the outset, in order to satisfy the international community and
keep all its options open, Tehran declared its policy to be ‘active neutrality’ and stated its
willingness to play an active role in resolving the crisis. The Iranian foreign minister summarized
Tehran’s position to the Iranian Parliament as ‘neutral but not indifferent.’145
Iran’s preliminary preference was to keep Saddam in power. A weak Saddam would be
better than a pro-American government in Baghdad according to Iranian leaders. To avert the
invasion, Iran opted for diplomacy. Before the US attack, Iran made every effort to prevent the
US invasion of Iraq. Iranian leadership tried to convince Iraqi authorities to comply with UN
resolutions so as to deprive Washington of reasons and began a diplomatic campaign to rally
Russia, China and EU members as well as regional countries against the war.146 However, these
efforts were fruitless.
Following the occupation of Iraq, the victory of the coalition forces and the removal of
Saddam did not take long. Iranians perceived the invasion of Iraq as a prelude to an offensive
against themselves. Tehran carried out all its capabilities to defuse the threats resulting from the
U.S. presence next to Iran’s boundaries. Iran aimed to prevent a possible US attack on Iran,
shorten the US presence in Iraq, and prevent the United States from establishing a client state or
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a body composed of Americans to rule Iraq.147, 148, 149
To these ends, Iran first entertained the idea of a friendly Shiite dominated regime in Iraq
without the US presence. Thus, Iran tried to directly shape Iraq’s domestic politics through using
its influence on Shiites. Maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity, the restoration of peace and
stability in Iraq was an essential precondition for the holding of elections. In this context, while
Iran tried to ensure that the Shiite-inhabited areas of southern and central Iraq remained calm, it
also urged the more radical leaders of the Iraqi Shiite community to exercise restraint in their
dealings with the coalition.150 According to Iranian leaders’ calculation, as stated by Takeyh, a
degree of stability may remove the reasons behind the existence of coalition forces in Iraq.151 On
the contrary, as stated by Barzegar, “instability in Iraq will not only increase security costs for
Iran; it will also expose the region to more interference by foreign forces. This will have
damaging consequences for regional power relations and any security arrangements.”152 Thus,
Iran adopted a policy of building close relations with all Shiite factions for shaping Iraq’s
domestic politics in favor of its interests. Additionally, in parallel with shaping Iraq’s internal
politics, Iran had also militarily harbored, organized, trained and armed Shiite groups through the
IRGC and its Quds Force as previously practiced in Lebanon, to repel a possible attack in case of
any post-invasion eventuality. Iran signaled an asymmetrical striking capability in order to deter
a possible U.S. and Israel attack and to prevent the institutionalization of a U.S. presence in Iraq.
In the case of Iraq, Iran’s primary means of attaining its goals was to support the Islamic
Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI, formerly the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq
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(SCIRI)) and its military wing Badr organization; Dawah party and conditionally Muqtada alSadr movement and its Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militant group. Iran’s relations with most of these
Shiite groups had been intensified particularly since the beginning of the Iran–Iraq war. Iran
supported and sheltered these groups and supported their leaders’ efforts to form political
movements and militias.153 After the 2003 occupation, relations between Iran and these groups
regained its strategic importance.

The Shiite Groups Supported by Iran

The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI, formerly the supreme Council of Islamic Revolution
in Iraq (SCIRI))

The SCIRI has been the closest Iraqi Shiite faction to Iran, which had a military wing
known as the Badr Corps trained and equipped by the Revolutionary Guards.154 The longestablished relations between Iran and the ISCI date back to the early 1980s. The SCIRI was
organized by Iran as an umbrella organization including various Iraqi Shiite groups to undermine
the Saddam regime. Many SCIRI leaders were in exile in Iran during Saddam’s regime. The
SCIRI was formed under the Sayyid Hadi al-Mudarassi leadership in 1982. Subsequently, during
the Iran–Iraq war, SCIRI was based in Tehran under the leadership of Mohammad Baqir alHakim. It promoted the idea of installing an Iranian-style government in Iraq and agreed with
Khomeini’s concept of velayet-e faqih.155
The group fought with Iran against the Saddam regime, and then supported the Shiite
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uprising that started with the 1991 Gulf War. When Saddam Hussein succeeded in crushing the
uprising, the Badr Brigades retreated into Iran.156
After the overthrow of the Saddam regime, the group quickly tried to empower its
position in Iraq. Taremi states that when the United States invaded Iraq, the Badr Corps had
about 16,000 men who had also served throughout the Iran–Iraq War and were a battle-tested
force.157
Then the SCIRI made several significant changes; it intensified its efforts to become a
political actor rather than an armed opposition. It participated in the 2005 elections and won 30
of the 128 seats designated to the United Iraqi Alliance. On the other hand, it also continued to
resist Sunni parties through the Badr Corps. In 2007, the SCIRI changed its name to ISCI;
dropped “revolution” from their name to disassociate itself from militancy. Furthermore, the
Badr organization officially separated from the ISCI to become an autonomous political party led
by Hadi al-Amiri.158 Under his leadership, the Badr Corps started to become stronger; while the
ISCI was getting weaker. In 2009, the ISCI's leader Abdulaziz al-Hakim died and was succeeded
by his son, Ammar al-Hakim. However, he did not command the same degree of authority and
respect.159 Over time, ISCI lost its central role in Shiite politics.

Da’wa Party:

Da’wa is Iraq’s longest surviving Shiite political party. The actual date of its emergence
is unclear. Its emergence is placed as occurring in 1958 by most academic scholars, although
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according to al-Jihad (the Iraqi Islamic movement's weekly newspaper), the party was organized
in October 1957.160 By late 1979, Da'wa had formed a military wing (later called Shahid asSadr).161
The ideological outlook of the party owes much to the intellectual work of Muhammad
Baqir as-Sadr.162 Da’wa, along with other Shiite groups, came together to form the SCIRI (ISCI)
in Tehran in 1982, after the increasing tensions between Iran and Iraq. During the war, Iran
backed Da’wa against Saddam’s regime. However, within two years, Da’wa acknowledged its
dissimilar ideological stance by rejecting the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini and questioning
the concept of velayet-e faqih and then began to distance itself from the SCIRI.163 Since then this
improvement has led to splits not only within the Iraqi Shiite opposition and but also within
Da’wa itself.164
The SCIRI (ISCI) chairman Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim was a supporter of Khomeini’s
velayet-e faqih concept, thus consequently established very close relations with the Iranian
regime. While many Da’wa members followed al-Hakim’s lead, others refused him and sought
to maintain their independence from Iranian political and ideological control.
Most Da’wa members remained in exile in Iran until the American invasion in 2003. The
US invasion of Iraq presented Da’wa with an opportunity to join in power-sharing in Iraq that it
had pursued for over 40 years.165 Following the invasion, Da’wa joined the political process.
Although its potential was limited due to the lack of an armed militia, through the support of
powerful groups such as ISCI and Sadrists, Nouri al-Maliki was selected as prime minister in
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2005 as a compromise choice.166 Since then, all Iraqi prime ministers have been members of the
Da'wa Party, although Nouri al-Maliki eventually formed a new organization called the State of
Law without changing his ties to Iran or his sectarian inclinations.167 Da’wa and the ISCI have
retained close ties to Iran, although they have different approaches. As stated by Takeyh
“although both parties have no inclination to act as Iran's surrogates, they are likely to provide
Tehran with a sympathetic audience, and even an alliance that, like all such arrangements, will
not be free of tension and difficulty.”168

Muqtada al-Sadr and Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM)

As stated by Bruno, Muqtada al-Sadr, who has since emerged as one of the most
prominent Shiite leaders in the country, had been virtually unknown before the collapse of the
Saddam regime.169 He comes from a line of extremely influential Iraqi Shiite clerics. His father
is Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, the founder of the Sadrist Movement in the
1980s.170
Sadr was opposed to the invasion and the presence of coalition forces in Iraq. In response
to the invasion, Muqtada al-Sadr formed the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militant group, also known
as the Mahdi Army, in 2003 to use violence for expelling coalition forces. Like other Shiite
militant groups, the Sadr movement and the Mahdi Army flourished in a power vacuum that
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existed due to political destabilization after the invasion.171 Sadr tried to take the advantage of
this power vacuum.
The Mahdi Army was relatively unknown until its clashes with the US forces. “One of
the earliest occurred in Najaf and Karbala in April 2004, and again in Najaf in August 2004,
where a standoff around the Imam Ali Mosque left hundreds of Iraqis and nearly a dozen U.S.
soldiers dead.”172
Soon after the clashes in 2004, thinking that violence alone could not accomplish his
goals, Sadr increased his efforts in Iraq’s political arena. He followed the pattern of Hezbollah;
he used the Mahdi Army to increase visibility and engage in social works. This led the Sadrist
movement to win 32 of 275 parliamentary seats in December 2005 national elections.173 Since
then, the Sadrist movement has become one of the most influential actors in Iraqi politics.
Sadr and his Mahdi Army are followers of Twelver Shiism. In addition to its strong
Shiite identity, the movement is vehemently Arab nationalist and populist. Sadr believes that
“Iraq’s Shiite Arabs are the rightful leaders of the Iraqi Shiite community and thus assert that
Iraq’s government should put Iraqi interests first.” 174 Thus, Sadr kept his distance from the
Iranian regime and opposed its interventions. For Iran, although Sadr and the Mahdi Army were
unreliable proxies, Iran had also found them useful for achieving its conditional purposes. Thus,
Iran likely provided organizational know-how and material aid. For example, Iran provided Sadr
a safe haven and allowed him to run Mahdi Army operations from their territory between 2007
and 2011. Furthermore, the IRGC had assisted him in reorganizing the Mahdi Army during his
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exile in Iran.175
In addition to the above-mentioned prominent Shiite groups, Iran also organized and used
the Special Groups, such as Kataib Hizb Allah 176, Asaib Ahl al-Haq177 and the Promised Day
Brigades 178, for attaining its goals in post-2003 occupied Iraq.
Apart from political influence-building in Iraq, Iran used paramilitary activities to shape
the environment against other actors within Iraq: the Coalition Forces, Sunni and other ethnic
groups. The IRGC and IRGC-QF played a very active roles in this process.179 On September 10,
2007 Ambassador Ryan Crocker, United States Ambassador to Iraq, stated that “Iran plays a
harmful role in Iraq. While claiming to support Iraq in its transition, Iran has actively
undermined it by providing lethal capabilities to the enemies of the Iraqi state.”180 The same day,
General David Petraeus, commander of the Multi-National Force in Iraq, stated in testimony that
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“[i]t is increasingly apparent to both coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of the
Iranian Republic Guard Corps Qods Force, seeks to turn the Shi‘ite militia extremists into a
Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and
coalition forces in Iraq.”181
The unclassified documents based on the Harmony Program, launched by the Combating
Terrorism Center at West Point (CTC) in 2005, clearly show the level of the IRGC and the
IRGC-QF involvement in Iraqi affairs. These documents contain captured Iraqi intelligence
reports, working papers, captured Iranian documents in Iraq, and U.S. intelligence reports
paraphrasing a former Shiite groups and organizations members’ descriptions of their
activities.182 To show the level and nature of the IRGC/IRGC-QF involvement in Iraq, all
documents regarding the IRGC’s activities were evaluated in depth. The title and summary of the
documents are shown below:

Table 6: Harmony Documents that Show the IRGC's Activities in Iraq
Document ID & Title
ISGQ-2003-00037289
Iraqi Intelligence
Documents 4

181
182

Summary
This document includes numerous Iraqi intelligence reports
dated as 11 Jul 2001 and 25 Jul 2001. Document describes the
following Iranian activities;
-

The Iranian regime’s supplies for its agents and Badr
Corps including significant quantities of explosives, 107
mm and 122 mm rockets mines, guided missiles,
launchers, timing devices and pistols with silencers to
carry out sabotage activities in Iraq.

-

Sabotage activities in Baghdad on orders from the
Iranian Regime.

Ibid.
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Document ID & Title

Redacted Intelligence
Report 001-028
Debriefing of Detainee
Under Coalition
Forces Control

Summary
-

Badr Corp recruits from the Iraqi volunteers in Iran.
Also, the criminal, Muhammad Baqir Al-Hakim,
increased the salaries of their agents.

-

Muhammad Baqir Al-Hakim’s coordination with the
Iranian regime to print 10,000 pamphlets (small booklets
and a flyer) urging citizens to revolt against the state.

There are 28 U.S. intelligence reports that paraphrase former
Special Group members’ description of their trips to Iran, Syria
and Lebanon and the details of training given by the members
of the IRGC, IRGC-QF, and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH).
Detainee reporting includes following issues in general:
Daily details of traveling to Iran; pre-travel coordination,
meeting with other trainees in Iraq, legal/illegal ways and
methods of crossing border, transportation details, maps and the
descriptions of course areas, the organizational breakdown of
the Iraq-based IRGC/LH paramilitary instructed trainer
specialties, comparison of Lebanese and Iranian instructors (For
instance; The SG trainees like and respect the Lebanese
Hezbollah trainers because the Lebanese trainers speak Arabic
and treat the SG trainees with respect. The Iranian trainers and
the SG trainees did not get along during the SG training.)
Regarding courses, detainees mention following issues;
There were numerous courses conducted at the military
facilities in Iran;
Paramilitary instructor training
Mortar Specialty Training Course
IED Specialty Training Course
Weapons Specialty Training Course
Fighter Course
Tactics Course
The Engineer course
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Document ID & Title

Summary
Support course
Overall leader course
Special Forces Training
Air defense training
Sniper training (Russian Draganov, German made 12.7, and M16 rifle with a laser sight attached to it)
In addition to course types, detainees identified following topics
in these courses;
Introduction to Tactics,
How to guard an area, building and set up a perimeter,
How to fill and stack sandbags to create a large sturdy structure
that one can hide behind for cover,
How to apply camouflage to hide,
Types of terrain,
The group practiced walking in different formations,
Ambushes, respond to an ambush,
The types of fighting that are used in urban environments,
Small arms maintenance,
Personal security,
Operational security,
Counter-Interrogation training,
Physical surveillance,
Detection of physical surveillance,
Counter-surveillance,
Use of maps,
Live firing range day for small arms,
Watching videos and pictures of successful Lebanese Hezbollah
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operations.
Furthermore, relations among Badr Organization, Da’wa Party,
ISCI, Muqteda al-Sadr and Iran, the nature of relations, Iran’s
material supports to these groups, and Lebanese Hezbollah
activities in Iraq explicitly were stated in 28 documents.

RLSP-2005-000618
A Letter From the
Office of the Iranian
Supreme Leader

The letter from the Office of Iran’s Supreme Leader to the
Leader of the IRGC dated JAN 05, 2005 suggests that in case of
an unexpected result in 2005 Iraqi elections that does not bring
Iran’s allies to power in Baghdad, Quds Force should prepare
for coup d’état operations and carry out the necessary planning.

ODP1-2005-00009023
Iraqi Intelligence
Document Studying
Iran

This document includes Iraqi intelligence correspondence dated
between 1993 and 1996. The correspondence contains following
topics:
Iranian influence in Iraq,
Important Headquarters and Iranian Intelligence Stations,
especially which follow Iraqi affairs,
Information gathered from Iranian regime’s radio regarding
Iraq,
Mas'ud Al-Barzani’s visit to Iran,
Iran’s intelligence activities in Northern Area of Iraq,
Information source: Mujahidin-e Khalq Organization (MKO),
an anti-Iranian terrorist organization.

ISGP-2003-00023756
Working Paper by the
Iraqi Anti-Espionage
Corps

This working draft was prepared by the Anti-Espionage General
Office at the Intelligence Service about ‘the disloyal Badr
Corps.’ The content of document is as follows;
Its beginning and formation,
Organization of the Badr Corps (Headquarters, Composition of
the Divisions, Locations, Formations of the Badr Corps),
System for the Administrative Division of the Corps,
Military operations carried out by the Badr Corps 9 against Iraq,
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Iranian Administration of the disloyal Corps,
Conflicts inside the Corps,
Figures of the Corps,
Its relations with Sadr and Da’wa party.

ISGP-2003-00027262
Iraqi Intelligence
Reports (March 2003)

This document contains series of Iraqi intelligence reports
regarding the activities and locations of coalition forces in
March/April 2003. Additionally, it includes discussion of Iraqi
militia groups fighting against regime forces.

ISGZ 2005-00112219954
Iraqi Intelligence
Study of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard
Corps

This document is a very detailed study on Quds Force. The
content of the document is as follows;
The Leadership,
Goals and Duties,
Staff Command and al-Quds Forces Command Centers,
Forces and Corps Designated to Countries,
Quds Elements in the Embassies,
The Islamic Associations and Covert Companies,
Coordination with the Ministry of Intelligence,
Training Camps,
Courses’ Curriculum,
Organizational Structure,
Report on Badr 9th Corps,
Relationship and Correlation between Al-Malali Organization
and Badr 9th.
Among headquarters, Ramadan Headquarter (1st Corps) is
responsible for Iraq. Additionally, Al-Hamzah Command
Center (3rd Corps) is intended for Turkey and in charge of
coordinating with anti-Turkish Kurdish groups, subduing the
Iranian Kurds, as well as carrying-out terrorist operations
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against the Iranian Kurdish groups in Iraq.
Brigade Malik Ashtar was under the command of the Ramadan
command center during the Iranian-Iraqi war. Following the
completion of operations inside the Iraqi territories, the Brigade
was attached to Al-Quds Force.
The document also gives detailed information about Badr
Corps, which is under the IRGC and mentions relations between
leaders of Quds Force and Mullah Baqir Al-Hakim, and AbuMahdi Muhandis.

ODP1-2005-008247
Iraqi Intelligence
Document Describing
Iranian Intelligence
(1993)

This Iraqi intelligence document contains reports and
correspondences that describe Iranian intelligence services, the
IRGC and the IRGC-QF in detail. The document includes
following topics; Duties of Headquarters and Corps, the
leadership, extraterritorial activities of IRGC-QF such as in
Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan, and North Africa.

ISGQ-2003-00052520
Iraqi Intelligence
Reports (2000 &
2001)

This document comprises numerous Iraqi intelligence service
correspondences prepared in 2000-2001 aimed to urge Iraqi
organizations and authorities regarding operations of Iranian
intelligence services and groups supported by IRGC.

ISGQ-2003-00032998

This document includes numerous Iraqi intelligence reports
from the late 1990s, including the descriptions of fighting
against Iraqi opposition groups such as the Badr Corps. The
reports detail Iraq’s suspicions of Iranian support for Iraqi
groups and describe various activities along the Iraq/Iran border.

ISGQ-2005-00038283
Iraqi Intelligence
Study about the Badr
Corps

This document is a very detailed study of Iraqi intelligence that
was prepared in 2002. The study is largely based on confessions
made by two members of the Corps’ cadre arrested by the
General Security Office. The document covers the following
topics;
Corps’ formations connected to the Corps’ Assistant
Commander,
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Corps’ axes,
Corps’ formations connected to the Chief of Staff of the Corps,
Locations of some Corps’ formations,
Corps’ fighting force, leading elements, armament, equipment,
administrative affairs, financial resources, recruiting methods,
Training and preparation,
Privileges granted to the Corps’ elements,
Facilities granted to the Corps’ elements,
Law for the Purchase of the Service,
Corps’ relationship with the sons of the fugitive tribes to Iran,
Organizational activity on the inside and its method,
Execution of the operations and Methods of infiltration,
Transportation methods of weapons and missiles to Iraq
Important meetings after September 11, 2001,
Corps’ plans upon the occurrence of the crisis,
Corps’ instructions for the Northern region.

ISGQ-2004-02311818
Statement by Badr
Corps

This 2007 document was prepared for Badr Corps members
around the time of the coalition invasion of Iraq. The document
enunciates strategies to act against Sunni groups and also to
cooperate with the coalition forces in the belief that Badr
members could seize power through the political process.

CMPC-2003-000562
Iraqi Intelligence
Documents 1

This document includes a series of Iraqi Intelligence
correspondence and reports prepared in 2003 including
information about following topics;
The conference held by the Intelligence Service to discuss the
plan that was designed by the Ministry of Defense to deploy
units of the Iranian National Liberation Army in case of any
aggression against Iraq,
The IRGC’s and Basij forces' maneuvers during December
2002,
The activities of the Iranian National Liberation Army,
A meeting that was held with Mas’ud Rajawi, the Commander
in Chief of the Iranian Liberation Army, to determine what
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steps to take in case of an American attack on Iraq,
The important activities of Iranian troops,
Iranian traitor activities in the southern and middle sectors,
Iranian Weapons Sources and a report about new arms deals
made by Iran information about Iranian agents’ activities
obtained from the field of operations.

MNCI-2005-001140
Iraqi Intelligence
Report about the Quds
Force Activities in
Iraq

This document is an Iraqi intelligence report about Quds Force
activities in Iraq. The Document covers the following issues;
The activities of Arkan Isnad al-Kawthar, which practices
economic, construction, commerce, supply and passenger
transportation openly. It was established by Al-Quds force to
create a suitable infrastructure for its intelligence officers in
Iraq, on a large scale, in order to provide support to those
groups who are loyal to Iran. The Guard General Mansur Haq is
in the leadership of the Al-Kawthar organization, and he works
under the direct supervision of Qasim Sulaymani, who is the
General Commander of the Al-Quds Force.
According to the document, assignments and responsibilities of
Arkan Isnad al-Kawthar are as follows:

NMEC-2007-624223
Insurgent Group

-

To secure and support the Badr Corps, and the different
groups belonging to Al-Quds force, such as the
movement of Hezbollah, Sha’aban, Sayid al-Shuhada’
Movement, and Tharallah.

-

To distribute the food supply and products among the
citizens to gain the support of the society.

-

To establish companies as a cover in order to transport
the elements of the Al-Quds force into Iraq.

-

Coordination and supervision of the activities of all the
economic and social organizations belonging to the
Iranian regime in Iraq.

This document describes a large militant organization in
southern Iraq. The document outlines the number of fighters and
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Outline and
Administrative
Documents

political operatives available in numerous southern cities. The
exact organization is not identified.

MNCI-2005-001143
Report on Tharallah
(God’s Rebel’s)

This document is a report prepared on Iraqi Tharallah group,
which is active mostly near Iraq’s southern city of Basrah. The
document describes the linkages between the Tharallah group
and the Quds Force, the leadership, its illegal activities.

Source: CTC-West Point.

As understood from the unclassified Harmony documents project, launched by the
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (CTC), the IRGC was very actively involved in Iraqi
domestic affairs before and during the 2003 occupation of Iraq. As seen in the documents, the
range of support to Iraqi Shiite groups by the IRGC is very broad.
All in all, since the beginning of the crisis, there was a three level strategy that were
gradually and reactively adopted by Iran:
-‐

Preventing the US invasion,

-‐

Preventing a permanent US presence or a client regime in Baghdad

-‐

Establishing a friendly Shi’ite dominated regime in Iraq

To these ends, Iran followed subsequent strategies;
-‐

Diplomacy:

Besides Afghanistan, the second front with the US seemed very risky to Iran. According
to calculations of Iranian ruling elites, a weaker Saddam would be better than being surrounded
by the US, which openly threated Iran with an attack and regime change. Iran tried to prevent the
US invasion of Iraq and started a diplomatic campaign to rally Russia, China and EU members
as well as other countries in the region against the US attack.
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-‐

Shaping Iraqi domestic politics:

Iran encouraged, organized and coordinated all Shiite groups to establish an ally Shiitedominated regime. To this end, Iran tried to remove all obstacles to a stable Iraq. By this means,
Tehran could accelerate the coalition forces’ withdrawal by eliminating the reasons for their
presence in Iraq and could achieve the preconditions for holding elections, which would
subsequently enable the establishment of a friendly Shiite-dominated government.
-‐

Controlled chaos for deterrence by using Shiite groups:

With this strategy, Iran aimed to signal its asymmetrical striking capability to deter
Coalition Forces, particularly the US, and to prevent the institutionalization of a U.S. presence in
Iraq and a possible attack on Iran. Additionally, Iran also used this strategy against Sunni groups
to suppress them.
At the beginning of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Iran’s Iraq policy was driven by a fear of
U.S. intentions. Since the inception of the crisis, Iran systematically worked with Iraqi Shiite
leaders and groups. Based on findings from resources and Harmony documents, it seems that the
IRGC (including IRGC-QF) served as a node of Iran’s various forms of support for Iraqi Shiite
groups, ranging from military training, harboring, providing military supply (explosives,
ammunition, weapons) and intelligence, to organizing and coordinating the activities (including
sabotage and attacks) of Shiite groups. With the 2005 elections, Iran reached the goal of
establishing a friendly Shiite-dominated regime in Iraq.
Since the deployment of the IRGC contingent to Lebanon in the early 1980s, particularly
the 2005 Iraqi elections, 2006 Hezbollah-Israel war, 2011 Syrian crisis, the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS)’s activities in Iraq have produced situations enhancing Iran and Shiite roles in
the power structure of the region.
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It is also worth noting that post-ISIS period Iran publicly confirmed the presence of the
Quds force and the Quds Force Commander General Qassem Soleimani in Iraq, in contrast to the
previous period. In June 2014, ISIS made considerable advances in Syria and Iraq, which are
close allies of Iran. ISIS’s advances in both states were accepted as significant threats to Iran’s
interests. Iran openly declared its concerns and emphasized the importance and safety of Shiite
cities such as Karbala and Najaf, as well strategic cities such as Damascus, Baghdad and Irbil.
Thus, Iran progressively increased its involvement in both states. To preserve its gains, Iran did
not hesitate to show its activities against the common enemy, ISIS. Photos of Soleimani in Iraq
engaging with various groups were actively shared in the social media. Soleimani, with 100
Quds Force members, planned to create a volunteer militia similar to the National Defense Force
in Syria to fight against ISIS alongside the weak and demoralized Iraqi army.183
The Tikrit operation is a good illustration of IRGC-QF and Gen. Soleimani’s level of
involvement in Iraqi affairs. In March 2015, a combination of 30,000 Iraqi militiamen and
security forces launched a campaign to retake Tikrit from ISIS. Gen Soleimani has been pictured
on the outskirts of the city in photos shared widely on social media. According to media reports,
Gen Soleimani and members of the Guards and the Quds Force were actively involved in the
operation.184, 185
Lastly, although it is not the focus of this study, a brief mention of Iran’s activities in
Syria would contribute to further understanding of the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities. With the
beginning of the 2011 crisis in Syria, Iran faced losing its vital ally in the region. The toppling of
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184
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the Assad regime and the institution of a new Sunni regime not only would cause the loss of a
long-time ally, but would also block access to their most important proxy group, the Lebanese
Hezbollah, among a scarcity of regional allies. Thus, as in Iraq, Tehran aimed to preserve Syria's
territorial integrity and keep Bashar al-Assad in power. To this end, Iran politically, financially
and militarily supported the Assad regime. Besides training, advising, intelligence gathering and
analysis, the IRGC and the IRGC-QF members are believed to be fighting for Assad. As an
indication of the IRGC’s current extraterritorial engagement, according to Terrill, between
2012-2015, at least four high-ranking IRGC generals -Iranian Brigadier General Hasan Shateri
who was from the Quds Force and whose funeral was attended by Major General Qasem
Soleymani; Brigadier General Mohammad Jamali-Paqal‘eh, who is believed to have been
commanding Quds Force units in Syria at the time, IRGC Brigadier General ‘Abdollah
Eskandari (probably also of the Quds Force), and IRGC general Mohammad ‘Ali Allahdadi were
killed in Syria.186 Moreover, as stated by Alfoneh, 254 people, most of whom were affiliated
with the IRGC-QF have been killed between January 2013 and August 2015, according to open
source data collected from Persian-language accounts of funerals in Iran.187
Additionally, as a last example showing clearly the involvement of IRGC members in the
Syrian war, BBC news released captured tapes that had been filmed as part of a project
conceived to help recruitment and other internal uses for the IRGC. From conversations in the
footage, it is understood that they are somewhere to the south of the northern Syrian city of
Aleppo. The Iranians seem to be in command of the group. The commander says that they are
fighting as part of the National Defense Force. He also states that ‘Syrian fighters are friendly
with their Iranian counterparts and at ease fighting alongside them because they were trained in
186
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Iran and are familiar with Iranians and their attitudes.’ According to the BBC research, the
commander on camera is Ismail Haidari who is a senior commander of the IRGC.188
In this chapter, the level and characteristics of the IRGC’s involvement in extraterritorial
activities were addressed through two cases. Findings from the two cases and the dynamics
between Iranian foreign policy goals and the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities will be evaluated
in the following chapters.

188
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CHAPTER V
ASSESSING THE IRGC’S EXTRATERRITORIAL ACTIVITIES

Introduction

In chapter two, the characteristics of Iran’s foreign policy and foreign policy goals were
presented. In chapter three, the regime’s use of the IRGC (including the IRGC-QF) in attaining
its foreign policy goals was analyzed through two cases; the IRGC’s relations with Lebanese
Hezbollah and Shiite groups in post-2003 Iraq.
In chapter two, Iran’s broad foreign policy goals are defined as follows;
-‐

Regime survival which is an indispensable (sine qua non) goal of Iran foreign
policy above all else,

-‐

State security and survival (the defense of Iranian territory against external
threats),

-‐

Projecting power and becoming the dominant power in the region.

In chapter three, Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Shiite groups in post-2003 Iraq cases
showed how the IRGC has taken active roles in achieving these foreign policy goals.
Since the deployment of the IRGC contingent to Lebanon in the early 1980s, the
influence of IRGC’s activities have been seen in Lebanon, the Iran–Iraq war, the 2005 Iraqi
elections, 2006 Hezbollah-Israel war and 2011 Syrian crisis, which produced situations
enhancing Iranian and the Shiite influence in the region.
In addition to these strategic gains, the IRGC has served as an asymmetrical striking
capability to deter its enemies. Iran has intentionally avoided any conventional confrontation
with its enemies. This strategy has made the IRGC an important tool in implementing national
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and ideological interests, as well as against perceived threats.
Iran’s use of the IRGC in extraterritorial activities leads to several questions: What is the
basis of these activities in international law? Are these activities categorized as state sponsorship
of terrorism? If so, what is the regime’s real motivation behind the decision to use the IRGC’s in
extraterritorial activities, in spite of the risk of being labeled as a terrorism sponsor?
Since the revolution, Iran has always prioritized internal security concerns above external
ones. Iran's first priority has consistently remained the survival of the regime. Thus, other set of
questions arises at this point: How have the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities served this end?
How does the regime legitimize the IRGC’s activities? How does the IRGC contribute to the
regime’s legitimacy? To answer these questions, this chapter will focus on how the IRGC’s
extraterritorial activities contribute to the survival of the regime. This chapter is structured as
follows:
-‐

International Law and the IRGC’s Extraterritorial Activities

-‐

State Sponsorship of Terrorism and the IRGC’s Extraterritorial Activities

-‐

Why do States Support Terrorism?

-‐

What is the difference between ‘regime survival’ and ‘state survival’?

-‐

Domestic and External Conditions that Made the Regime Survival the Obsession
of the Ruling Elites

-‐

Analysis and Conclusion

International Law and the IRGC’s Extraterritorial Activities

"Armed forces" are defined in Article 43(1) of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva
Conventions as comprising:
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The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups
and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its
subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not
recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal
disciplinary system which, ' inter alia ', shall enforce compliance with the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict.1

The IRGC fits all above-mentioned descriptions and it is officially recognized as a branch
of Iran's Armed Forces under Article 150 of the Iranian Constitution. According to Article 150,
the scope of its duties and responsibilities are to be determined by law. The Chief Commander of
the Guardians is appointed by the Supreme Leader. The IRGC has a hierarchical command
structure that includes about 120,000 uniformed men on active duty, naval and air force units in
addition to its ground troops, and it has its own statute.
Initially, the scope of the duties and the missions of the IRGC have been designed
according to the regime’s ideological agenda. However, in the meantime because of domestic
and external pressures, Iran has adopted more pragmatic policies that are driven by strategic
calculations instead of ideological ones. Afterward, the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities have not
been limited by goals of supporting foreign liberation movements and exporting the revolution,
over time these tasks have been transformed to sustaining and expanding its sphere of influence,
and conducting counter activities against Iran’s perceived enemies.
While the IRGC has the characteristics of regular conventional armed forces, the Regime
has unconventionally and asymmetrically used it in Lebanon and post-2003 occupied Iraq. The
UN Charter defines the conditions of legitimate use of armed forces. The following statements
define the frame of legitimate uses of armed forces;
1

“Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977,” International Committee of the Red Cross, accessed
February 19, 2016,
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Article 2(3) provides that
[a]ll members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.2

Article 2(4) contains an encompassing prohibition against the use of military force:
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat of force
against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 3

There are two exceptions to the prohibition on the use of armed force:
-‐

According to Article 39, under an authorization by the Security Council under
Chapter VII of the Charter, in response to “any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace or act of aggression… in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or
restore international peace and security.” Article 41 proposes “the Security
Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be
employed” As a last option, in case of inadequacy of measures provided for in
Article 41, according to Article 42, the Security Council may decide to use of
military force.4

-‐

In a case of self-defense under Article 51:

-‐

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of

2

“Charter of the United Nations Chapter I,” United Nations, accessed February 19, 2016,
http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/.
3
Ibid.
4
“Charter of the United Nations Chapter VII,” United Nations, accessed February 19, 2016,
http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html.
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self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain
or restore international peace and security.5
In addition to the above-mentioned conditions, ‘intervention by invitation’ and
‘humanitarian intervention’ are other possible legal justifications for the use of force, which are
based largely on customary international law. In circumstance of ‘intervention by invitation’,
“the government of a State is entitled to request assistance from other States in the suppression of
rebel groups.” 6 The last condition is “a developing customary international law right of
unilateral humanitarian intervention – that is an intervention, for humanitarian purposes, which
has not been authorized by the Security Council.”7
Given the conditions of the use of military force, in both the Lebanese Hezbollah and
post-2003 occupied Iraq cases, the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities are out of the abovementioned legal frame of use of force. Furthermore, following major resolutions condemn the
state participation in acts of international terrorism;
-‐

General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970:

Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of
irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory
of another State;8

Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or
participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in
5

Ibid.
Michael Byers, “Terrorism, The Use of Force and International Law After 11 September,” International &
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8
“General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-Operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,” UN Documents,
October 24, 1970, http://www.un-documents.net/a25r2625.htm.
6
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organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts,
when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force;9

-‐

General Assembly Resolution 42/22 of 18 November 1987:

States shall fulfil their obligations under international law to refrain from organizing,
instigating, or assisting or participating in paramilitary, terrorist or subversive acts,
including acts of mercenaries, in other States, or acquiescing in organized activities
within their territory directed towards the commission of such acts.10

Despite their non-binding nature, these resolutions, under customary international law,
created shared values to refrain any states from supporting terrorist activities.
The IRGC’s support for Hezbollah has been crucial for Hezbollah’s long-standing life
and its success. Iran provided the organization with a wide range of support; the IRGC’s
indoctrination-fueled Shiite consciousness and the spread of revolutionary values among
Lebanese Shiite community. The ideological mobilization enabled Hezbollah to find human
resources and material support from the Lebanese Shiite community and to sustain its longevity
and flourish. Military training given by the IRGC allowed Hezbollah to attain its goals through
violent activities and subsequently made it one of the most influential actors in Lebanon. By
providing safe havens, Iran allowed Hezbollah to improve its organizational structure, to
establish training centers, to have a long-range strategy and to plan all paramilitary and political
activities. Iran’s material aid (financial, weaponry and logistics aid) empowered both
Hezbollah’s military and political wings. By participating in decision-making, the IRGC not only
contributed to Hezbollah’s organizational/structural establishment but also to its strategy-making
through its know-how and intelligence providing.
9

Ibid.
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According to the Global Terrorism Database, the number of Hezbollah or Hezbollah
suspected fatalities is roughly 1200 between 1983 and 2014. Because of such activities, the
organization is designated as a terrorist organization by the states mentioned in the previous
chapter.
In post-2003 occupied Iraq, Iran adopted a multi-layered strategy; Iran adopted a policy
of building close relations with all Shiite factions for shaping Iraq’s domestic politics in favor of
its interests. Additionally, in parallel with shaping Iraq’s internal politics, Iran had also used the
IRGC and its Quds Force as previously practiced in Lebanon to repel a possible attack in case of
any post-invasion eventuality. Iran signaled an asymmetrical striking capability to deter a
possible U.S. and Israel attack and to prevent the institutionalization of a U.S. presence in Iraq.
Additionally Iran also aimed to suppress all Iraqi rivals, particularly Sunnis that potentially posed
threats to its interests.
Based on the Harmony documents mentioned in previous chapter, it is clear that the
IRGC and IRGC-QF served as a node of Iran’s support for Iraqi Shiite groups, which ranges
from the broad spectrum of military training, harboring, providing military supply (explosives,
ammunition, weapons) and intelligence, to organizing and coordinating the activities (including
sabotage and attacks) of Shiite groups. With the 2005 elections, Iran has reached the goal of
establishing a friendly Shiite dominated regime in Iraq.
High-ranking US officials, Ryan Crocker, United States Ambassador to Iraq, and General
David Petraeus, commander of the Multi-National Force in Iraq, explicitly condemned Iran’s
activities in Iraq. Both stated that Iran provided lethal capabilities to the Shiite groups and sought
to create a Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests.
Taken together, both cases, the activities of the IRGC and the IRGC-QF, do not fit
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regular use of army and these activities are widely accepted as the state sponsorship of terrorism.
This raises questions about the ‘state sponsorship of terrorism’ and Iran’s classification as such.
Thus, in the section that follows, the state sponsorship of terrorism will be briefly examined.

State Sponsorship of Terrorism and the IRGC’s Extraterritorial Activities

State-sponsored terrorism is a sub-topic of terrorism. Davis and Jenkins divide the actors
of a ‘terrorist system’ into the following categories; “top leaders, lieutenants, foot soldiers,
recruiters, external suppliers and facilitators, and heads of supportive states.”11 In this actor
categorization, state-sponsored terrorism can be found in the categories of ‘external suppliers and
facilitators, and heads of supportive states.’ As can be understood from the name of phenomena,
there are two components of the topic; terrorism and state behavior. In the following section
concentration will be on both components.
Rapoport posited four distinct waves of modern terrorism. The first wave is ‘anarchist’
(1880s-1920s), the second is ‘anti-colonial’ (1920s-1960s), the third wave is ‘new left wing’ that
ended in the 1990s, and the fourth and most recently is ‘religious wave’ which began in 1979
with the Iranian Revolution.12 In modern terrorism history, the assassination of Archduke Franz
Ferdinand on June 28, 1914 was the watershed which was also end of the Ropoport’s first wave.
Rather than the assassination, the suspicion of rival state involvement in the sponsorship of the
killing catalyzed the major powers into taking violent action and caused World War I. Taking
into account the results of this suspicion, although it was a turning point in history, this early
example of state-sponsored terrorism does not characterize today’s state-sponsored terrorism.
11
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The height of state-sponsored terrorism was represented by the decades of the 1970s and 1980s.
As a result of technological advances and subsequently dramatic explosion of international
media influence, terrorism gained a firmly international character during the 1970s and 1980s.13
Cronin explains the progression of the relations between national causes and terrorist
organizations during and after these periods;
Individual, scattered national causes began to develop into international organizations
with links and activities increasingly across borders and among differing causes. This
development was greatly facilitated by the covert sponsorship of states such as Iran,
Libya, and North Korea, and of course the Soviet Union, which found the
underwriting of terrorist organizations an attractive tool for accomplishing
clandestine goals while avoiding potential retaliation for the terrorist attacks.14

This interaction between states and terrorist organizations has created the phenomena of
state sponsorship of terrorism.
The term ‘terrorism’ has no precise or a widely accepted definition in academic and
policy environments. Simon states that there are more than 200 definitions of terrorism.15 What
is called terrorism thus seems to depend on one’s point of view. As stated by Cronin, “Terrorism
is intended to be a matter of perception and is thus seen differently by different observers.”16 In
literature, according to Richard Jackson, there are several approaches to determine terrorism;
first approach is defining terror as a an ideology, the second is an actor-based approach that
defines terrorism as a particular form of political violence committed by non-state actors who
attack civilians, the third and most common approach defines terrorism as a violent strategy or
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tactic that actors employ in pursuit of particular political goals.17 At this point I find fruitless to
argue which definition explains the phenomena of ‘terrorism.’
Richard Jackson’s perspective on definitional ambiguity is explanatory;
Most definitions of terrorism by leading scholars for example, describe it as a form of
illegitimate violence directed towards innocent civilians that is intended to intimidate
or terrify an audience for political purposes. The question of what makes an act of
violence legitimate or not, who is considered a civilian, how innocence can be
measured, what the real intentions of often clandestine actors might be and what
counts as a political aim, are all highly contested and subject to competing claims.18

As we can understand from this perspective, it is not easy to create a widely-accepted
definition of terrorism, but we know it when we see it thanks to its well-known characteristics.
Thus, instead of being busy with questions of definition, I find focusing on common
characteristics of terrorism more useful in understanding it. Hoffman defines terrorism as having
five distinguishing characteristics:
-‐

Ineluctably political in aims and motives

-‐

Violent – or, equally important, threatens violence

-‐

Designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate
victim or target

-‐

Conducted by an organization and

-‐

Perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity.19

There is a strong link between definition of terrorism and its goals. As goals of terrorism
have varied overtime, we have faced the new versions of the definition. Andrew H. Kydd and
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Barbara F. Walter state that despite the changing nature of terrorism, five goals have remained
valid; “regime change, policy change, territorial change, social control, and status quo
maintenance.”20 In Walter and Kydd’s words;
Regime Change is the overthrow of a government and its replacement with one led by
the terrorists or at least one more to their liking. Policy Change Policy change is a
broader category of lesser demands, such as al-Qaida’s demand that the United States
drop its support for Israel and corrupt Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia. Territorial
Change is taking territory away from a state either to establish a new state or to join
another state. Social control constrains the behavior of individuals, rather than the
state. Finally, status quo maintenance is the support of an existing regime or a
territorial arrangement against political groups that seek to change it.21

In order to analyze the range of goals and their relative frequency, Kydd and Walter
examine forty-two terrorist organizations, which are designated as Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (FTOs) by the U.S. State Department. Of the forty-two groups, “thirty-one seek
regime change, nineteen seek territorial change, four seek policy change, one seeks to maintain
the status quo.”22 These goals of terrorism, to some extent, may overlap with states’ political
objectives against a target state and that may allow them to move together against a common
target. This is the point where ‘state sponsorship of terrorism’ emerges.
As in ‘terrorism’, definitional ambiguity also exists for the term of ‘state-sponsored
terrorism.’ Before asserting the definition, it is important to clarify at the outset what the
expression of state sponsorship does not include. Firstly, the term "state sponsorship" does not
cover domestic state terrorism that can be practiced against a regime’s own population for
different reasons. Second, the term does not include instances of state terrorism that occur during
war. Each of these conditions has different political and legal meaning.
20
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According to the U.S. State Department, state sponsors of terrorism are described as
“countries determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of
international terrorism.”23 This definition refers to three laws which explicitly designate only one
form of sponsorship; “the recurring use of any part of the territory of the country as a sanctuary
for terrorists and terrorist organizations.”24 However, the spectrum of state sponsorship of
terrorism is not as limited as it is in this definition.
State sponsorship is generally defined as any country’s deliberate support of terrorist
groups for achieving a desired political or strategic objective against another country. This
deliberate support can be implemented by providing funds, weapons, logistics, training,
intelligence and bases. One prominent feature of this definition is ‘a desired political or strategic
objective’ of sponsor state. In this approach, overlapping of ‘desired political or strategic
objectives’ and ‘the goals of terrorist groups’ establish the origin of this phenomenon in the most
of the cases; however, in the some forms of sponsorship, this overlapping may not exist.
Among many definitional approaches, Daniel Byman’s definition has a particular
explanatory power. Byman, who has authored some of the most recent works on state-sponsored
terrorism, defines state sponsorship of terrorism as “a government’s intentional assistance to a
terrorist group to help it use violence, bolster its political activities or sustain the organization.”25
In his definition, he defines state sponsorship by eliminating sponsor states’ political objectives
for extending its spectrum.
Although, in recent history, many authors have examined state-sponsored terrorism in
specific cases, such as Iran, Soviet Union, and Pakistan’s support for terrorism, there has not
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been improved broad generalization and a specific definition.
In addition to the changing nature of terrorism over time, the absence of generalization
mostly originates from the varieties of the methods of state support, the sponsor state’s level of
involvement, and the sponsor state’s objectives for providing support. Unsurprisingly, most
authors tend to address the issue in the context of the sponsor state’s level of involvement. In
terms of the legal consequences of complicity, this perspective makes sense.
Richard Erickson, in his book Legitimate Use of Military Force against State-Sponsored
International Terrorism, identifies four levels of state involvement “from greatest to least:
sponsorship, support, toleration, and inaction through inability to act.”26 Erickson’s
categorization of the level of involvement ranges from sponsorship where a state directly
controls international terrorism as a means of gaining strategic advantage, to inaction where “the
state does not wish to ignore international terrorists within its borders but lacks the ability to
respond effectively.”27 In ‘support’ the state does not control the terrorists, but the activities of
the terrorists which serve the interests of the state are encouraged, and the state provides
expertise and material aid to the terrorists. In ‘toleration,’ the state neither actively supports
terrorists, nor impedes its activities.28
While Jenkins and Hoffman have researched the subject in depth, they have not broadly
focused on defining levels of involvement. Hofmann, in Inside Terrorism, states that sponsor
state supplies the “resources of an established nation state’s entire diplomatic, military, and
intelligence apparatus”29 to terrorist organizations. Jenkins, in Defense against Terrorism,
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mentions that states contribute to organizations “money, sophisticated munitions, intelligence,
and technical expertise.”30 As seen, for these two authors, there is no specific categorization of
the level of involvement.
Byman performs a comprehensive analysis of the topic in his book ‘Deadly Connections:
States That Sponsor Terrorism.’ Byman identifies six specific types of state sponsorship:
-‐

Strong Supporters,

Strong supporters decisively support the terrorist group and are capable of providing
broad range of state resources to this group.
-‐

Weak Supporters,

Weak supporters have desire to support the terrorist organization, but not the capacity to
offer necessary resources.
-‐

Lukewarm Supporters,

In this category, states seem rhetorically support the terrorist group, but do little actual
tangible support.
-‐

Antagonistic Supporters,

Antagonistic supporters appear to be supporting the terrorist group in search of
controlling it or weakening its cause.
-‐

Passive Supporters,

Passive supporters do not directly provide aid to the terrorist group but intentionally turn
a blind eye to its activities.
-‐

Unwilling Hosts.

In this category, states are incapable of stopping terrorists, thus unwillingly allow their
territory and resources to them. In Byman words, “such hosts are not ‘supporters’ of terrorism
30
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but rather its victims.31
Byman attempts to take this argument further in an analysis paper entitled “The
Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism.”32 In it, he describes ‘a spectrum of
sponsorship’ that ranges from ‘direct control to support through incapacity.’33 He introduces two
new sub categories; active and passive support. In Passive Support of Terrorism, according to
Byman, “active state sponsorship involves a deliberate regime decision to assist a terrorist group,
often in the form of arms, money, training or sanctuary.”34
Byman identifies three types of active state sponsorship of terrorism:
a) Control: Some states directly control the terrorist groups they support: the
group is in essence a cat’s paw of the state.
b) Coordination: Absolute control is rare, but states often try to coordinate
the activities of terrorist groups to best serve the state’s interests. These
groups, however, have their own agendas and operate with some degree of
independence from their sponsors.
c) Contact: States are regularly in contact with terrorist groups, at times
engaging in minor tactical coordination or simply trying to keep channels
open for possible future coordination.35
In passive sponsorship, “a regime can be said to be guilty of passive support if it
knowingly allows a terrorist group to raise money, enjoy a sanctuary, recruit or otherwise
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flourish without interference, but does not directly aid the group itself.”36 Byman’s passive
sponsorship is characterized as:
The regime in question itself does not provide assistance but knowingly allows other
actors in the country to aid a terrorist group; the regime has the capacity to stop this
assistance or has chosen not to develop this capacity; and often passive support is
given by political parties, wealthy merchants or other actors in society that have no
formal affiliation with the government.37

Passive state sponsored terrorism, argues Byman, also manifests itself in three different
forms:
a) Knowing toleration: Some governments may make a policy decision not to
interfere with a terrorist group that is raising money, recruiting, or otherwise
exploiting its territory. In essence, the regime wants the group to flourish and
believes that by not acting it can help it do so.
b) Unconcern or ignorance: Some states may not seek to further a terrorist group’s
activities, but they may not bother to stop it, either because they do not believe its
activities are extensive or because they do not believe the group’s activities affect
the state’s interest.
c) Incapacity: Some states do not fully control their territory or the government is
too weak vis-à-vis key domestic actors that do support terrorism to stop the
activities.38
According to Byman, a state’s level of involvement depends on two parameters; State
policy (it ranges from support to oppose), and State capacity (it ranges from high to low.)
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Figure 9: A Notional Spectrum of State Support

Source: Deadly Connections; States that Sponsor Terrorism, (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1139

In the scope of Figure 9 rather than suggesting state support as an “all-or-nothing”
classification, it is more accurate to describe it as a spectrum. In terms of two parameters, figure
one depicts the spectrum of involvement between the state and the terrorist organization. The
lowest level of involvement is ‘incapacity’ in which the state possesses no capability to assist or
impede the terrorist organization that is operating within its borders, and the highest level of the
involvement is ‘direct Control’ in which the state exercises complete control over the
organization, to include ideology and operations.

Why do States Support Terrorism?

As mentioned earlier, there are several levels of state involvement. The lowest level of
involvement is ‘incapacity’ which generally originates from the sponsor state’s failing or failed
state character. James A. Piazza, in Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote
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Transnational Terrorism?, defines failed and failing states as “the states that due to severe
challenges cannot monopolize the use of force vis-a-vis other non-state actors in society and are
therefore incapable of fully projecting power within their national boundaries.”40 Due to the lack
of the ability to project power throughout their national territory and having incompetent and
corrupt law enforcement capacities, failed and failing states provide opportunities and suitable
conditions for terrorist groups to organize, train, generate revenue, and set up logistics and
communications beyond those afforded by the network of safe houses in non-failed states.41
Bruce Hoffman, in Inside Terrorism, also addresses some states’ relatively weak position
and their relations with terrorist organizations. According to him they are economically,
politically weak and their conventional military forces are obsolete and outclassed by their
adversaries. “Using terrorist proxies rather than government agents allows a degree of deniability
to them, which in turn reduces the chances of retaliation from more powerful states that possess
stronger economies and militaries. [italic added]”42 Bruce Hoffman’s perspective evokes the
asymmetry debate. “The term ‘asymmetric strategies’ is often used to label approaches that
underdogs might employ to avoid direct military confrontation; and to focus instead on
exploiting key political and military vulnerabilities such as the perceived Western sensitivity to
casualties and collateral damage.”43 The growing technological gap in conventional military
capabilities between weak and a strong state pushes the weak state to attempt to circumvent the
strong state’s conventional superiority in order to avoid a force on-force military confrontation.
Therefore, the high possibility of defeat in case of a war with a stronger state, and in order to
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deny its role as an aggressor, avoid retaliation, a weaker state can sponsor terrorism covertly
Richardson also looks at the issue through the same lenses;
State sponsorship of terrorism has had relatively low risk because it is so difficult to
prove and may serve to achieve a state's foreign policy objectives. If it does not, it is
easily deniable. Moreover, the primacy placed on human life by Western,
democracies leaves them very vulnerable to attack through their individual citizens
because there are so many of them in so many places. So state sponsorship is often
low cost, easy to deny, and difficult to prove, and has potential for a high payoff. It
should come as no surprise that relatlvely weak states resort to the support of
terrorists to strike against their more powerful enemies.44

Audrey Kurth Cronin ties this perspective to globalization. According to her; “the
objectives of international terrorism have also changed as a result of globalization. Foreign
intrusions and growing awareness of shrinking global space have created incentives to use the
ideal asymmetrical weapon, terrorism, for more ambitious purposes.”45
Byman makes a comprehensive categorization in terms of states’ motivations behind
their support for terrorist groups. According to him, “understanding motivations is vital both for
predicting when a state might support a terrorist group and for determining how to end this
backing.”46 He examines the motivations of nine states’ sponsorship in 38 instances. The
motivations are divided into three categories; strategic, ideological, and domestic. All three
categories of motivations and their sub categories are shown below;
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Table 7: Categorization of States Motivations in Support for Terrorist Groups
Strategic

Ideological

Domestic

Destabilize or weaken
neighbor

Enhance international prestige

Project power

The interplay between ideology and Military or
strategy
operational aid

Aid kin

Changing a regime
Shaping an opposition
Source: Deadly Connections; States that Sponsor Terrorism, (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 21-5047

In order to advance the security and power that are core concerns for any state, strategic
motivations are the most common in contrast to domestic and ideological concerns. In this
category, the use of terrorists “becomes war and politics by another means, enabling a state to
destabilize, or even topple, its rivals, and to shape politics in a neighboring country or one farther
way.”48
In addition to strategy, Byman states that exporting an ideology is also a common reason
for states that support terrorist groups. “Many states seek to export their ideology and political
system and use terrorist groups as a proxy to this end.”49 It is a way of creating sphere of
influence. Prestige also serves to this end, enhancing their political status at home and their
influence abroad.
Byman’s last category is Domestic Politics. This category is particularly common “when
the regime seeks to demonstrate its support for causes that its own people see as representing
their ‘kin,’ be they ethnic or religious.”50 This support in turn strengthens a regime’s political
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position at home through bolstering its own popularity domestically. Another sub category is
‘Military or operational aid.’ “More rarely, regimes use a terrorist group to gain military aid or
other forms of assistance in the state’s own struggles in a civil war or against regime
dissidents.”51
If we look at both cases, we can observe that Lebanese Hezbollah and Shiite groups in
post-2003 occupied Iraq have Hoffman’s terrorism characteristics; ineluctably political in aims
and motives; violent – or, equally important, threatening violence; designed to have far-reaching
psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target; conducted by an
organization; and perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity.52
Additionally, Lebanese Hezbollah and Shiite Groups in post-2003 occupied Iraq had the
following goals, using violence to attain these goals.

Table 8: The Goals of Lebanese Hezbollah and Shiite Groups in post-2003 Occupied Iraq
Lebanese Hezbollah

Shiite Groups in post-2003 occupied Iraq

To expel all foreigners that they saw as
threat to themselves
To change political system in which
Shiites perceived their position as far
weaker
The social control of Lebanese people
Regime Change (to establish an Iran-like
regime)

To end presence of Coalition Force, namely
the US Forces in neighbor Iraq
To suppress other groups
To gain power in political system
To establish a new regime in which Shiites
have decisive authority

Source: Created by the Author

These goals recall Kydd and Walter’s five goals of terrorism; regime change, policy
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change, territorial change, social control and status quo maintenance. Three of five goals, regime
change, policy change and social control clearly can be seen in Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi
Shiite groups’ goals.
In Lebanon and Iraq, groups aimed to gradually overthrow the existing regime and
replace it with one led by Shiites. To this end, groups followed two strategies; First, following
militant activities for expelling foreign forces in order to create room for themselves to maneuver
and suppressing opposition groups in order to shape domestic politics in favor of themselves;
second, joining political activities to become the dominant, decisive power in a political system.
These activities and its ends undoubtedly served Iran’s foreign policy goals. Iran
deliberately supported Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Shiite groups and provided a broad range of
state resources in the form of ideological direction, organizational assistance, diplomatic
backing, training, operational direction, money, arms, logistics and sanctuary.53
The convergence of mutual interest, ideological closeness and these groups’ ideological,
financial, military, and operational needs has been the basis of Iran’s relations with these groups.
If we look at Iran’s motivations through Byman’s categorization, Iran unquestionably supported
Lebanese and Shiite groups for all three reasons; strategic, ideological, and domestic.
Initially, Iran used the IRGC in extraterritorial activities to spread its ideology and
revolution. However, the realities of international politics, the costly Iran–Iraq war, the
inapplicability of expansionist policies and the need for foreign capital and technical expertise to
carry out economic reconstruction forced Iranian leaders to temper ideological foreign policy.
Pragmatist and reformist measures were proposed against revolutionary policies in order to
enhance domestic and regional stability and to integrate Iran into the international system. But
Iran has always kept ideological rhetoric and reasons on the table, in case of a potential future
53
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need. Since then, instead of explicit support, Iran has covertly and more professionally supported
its proxies.
The regime proclaimed itself as the protector of Muslims and all oppressed people. By
supporting Lebanese and Iraqi Shiite groups, the regime also considered domestic public
opinion, consolidating its legitimacy at home by tying it to a popular cause.
In terms of strategic ambitions, we can observe all sub-categories of strategic ambition in
the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities; Destabilizing or weakening a neighbor, projecting power,
changing a regime, and shaping an opposition. By organizing and providing a broad range of
support to Lebanese Hezbollah and Shiite groups in Iraq, Iran targeted all actors who were
potential threats to their success.
By creating room to maneuver for their political wings, Iran tried to shape opposition,
including rival Shiite groups, Sunnis and foreign forces who posed a potential threat to its goals.
At the same time, Iran tried to change regimes and bring friendly ones into power in
Lebanon and Iraq, which would expand its sphere of influence and create the opportunity of
being a regional power.
Iran also aimed to project its power by supporting these groups. ‘Power projection’ is
briefly defined as the ability of a state to apply its power components beyond its borders. In the
past, power projection denoted the use of naval power. Under Eisenhower, the US navy practiced
“gunboat diplomacy.” Hagan describes gunboat diplomacy as, “the finite application of force to
effect discrete political ends in distant places.”54 As stated by Hagan, the US used the aircraft
carrier and the Marine Corps for this purpose.55 Over time, the means of power projection
expanded beyond hard power applications because of new characteristics of the international
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system. In other words, after WWII, the post-colonial and post–cold war environment forced
states to act within international norms. In proportion to their capabilities, major states began to
use new means such as substantial networks of economic and military aid, arms sales
agreements, and explicit and de facto alliances in order to sustain or develop their worldwide
interests.56
The lack of hard and soft power capabilities made proxies the sole means for Iran to
influence discrete political ends beyond its borders. With this capability, Iran tried to signal itself
as being in the same category as the major powers. In addition to political ends, Iran’s capability
to shape Lebanese and Iraqi domestic politics in favor of Shiites, and to be influential on policies
of the US and Israel consolidate its popularity at home, self-professed status as the defender and
leader of Muslim world, and its sympathy and prestige in the anti-US bloc.
Iran also used these groups to extort its sworn enemies; the US, Israel and Iraq. Since the
revolution, Iran had very problematic relations with the US, Israel and the Saddam regime in
Iraq, which had a considerable effect on Iran’s immediate threat perceptions and did not allow
Iranians to live in peace. By destabilizing and weakening them, Iran tried to guarantee state
survival.
Iran’s relations with Iraq have been complicated and problematic. Both states have
historically competed for regional hegemony. With the Iran–Iraq war, mutual hostility peaked.
Iran started to use Shiite groups against Saddam Regime after organizing and supporting which
would constitute the roots of the activities in Post-2003 occupied Iraq. To some extent, the
removal of the Saddam regime significantly lessened the perceived threat from Iraq. However,
US Middle East policies have increased long-standing concerns about potential US military
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intervention against Iran.
Khomeini’s ideological, antagonistic approach to the US (“the Great Satan”) and Israel
(“the Little Satan”); subsequently, he hostage crisis and Iran’s support for Hezbollah created
incurable bias for all parties. In time, this bad condition further deteriorated because of
developments like the U.S. President George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech. Additionally, the
alliance between the US and Israel and increasing US presence in the region doubled Iran’s
survival concerns. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new unipolar world order provided
room to maneuver to the United States. The 1990–91 Gulf War and the 2003 Invasion of Iraq
and Afghanistan caused enlarged-presence and paved the way for the United States to settle in
the region. Thus, not only do Iranians geopolitically find themselves stranded among Sunni
states, but also feel surrounded by the United States’ asymmetrically powerful conventional
military forces.
Thanks to the IRGC’s direction and support for Hezbollah, Iran could influence Lebanese
domestic politics and Israel’s policies, even though Iran is hundreds of kilometers away from
Israel. In Iraq, Iran used the IRGC supported Shiite groups to weaken Saddam's regime before
the 2003 occupation. Post-occupation, the IRGC organized and supported Shiite groups for
multiple purposes; to shape Iraq’s domestic politics through empowering Shiites and weakening
the opposition, to prevent further US settlement in Iraq. Most importantly, in both cases, IRGC
directed and supported these groups as a deterrent tool against possible future attacks.
Comparatively, Iran seems weaker than the US or the US-Israel alliance in terms of
conventional military force. In such an antagonistic relation, Iran knew that there is a high
possibility of defeat in case of a war and that there is no way to survive by depending on
conventional military force. Instead of conventional confrontation, by signaling a capability to
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strike its enemies, Iranian leaders aimed to deter a potential military strike. Thus, using proxies
provided following benefits to Iran; it is cheaper than developing conventional military
capabilities, it is easy to deny, difficult to prove, and thus it has low risk in terms of provoking
military retaliation.
Obviously, since the mid-1980s strategic motivations are the most influential ones for
Iran’s decision-making, in contrast to domestic and ideological motivations.
In chapter two, Iranian foreign policy goals were briefly defined as follows;
1. Regime survival (above all else)
2. State security and survival (the defense of Iranian territory against external
threats),
3. Projecting power and becoming the dominant power in the region,
‘Regime survival’ is emphasized as the indispensable (sine qua non) goal of Iran foreign
policy, above all else. Since its inception, revolutionary Iran has primarily been concerned with
regime survival and this deeply influenced its strategies. Besides all other goals, which also serve
regime survival, the IRGC and the Quds Force were primarily used to attain this goal, which has
been overlooked among other goals.

What is the Difference between ‘Regime Survival’ and ‘State Survival’?

The realist school, which was dominant throughout the Cold War, portrays international
relationship as a struggle for power among self-interested states. In time realism evolved, and
neorealism -structural realism- became the most popular international relations theory because of
its persuasive power in explaining state behaviors. That’s why IR instructors devote a large
percentage of time to covering neorealism.
According to Waltz, the father of neorealism, the international arena is an anarchic and
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self-help system. In other words, there is no an authority to protect states from one another. In
Waltz’s words, “[s]elf-help is the principle of action in such an order, and the most important
way in which states must help themselves is by providing for their own security.”57 According to
this perspective, in this anarchic and self-help system states can never trust other states, today's
friend may be tomorrow's enemy, thus each states has to survive on its own. States are the
primary actors and constitutive units of the international system. In this international
environment, all states as units primarily seek to survive by pursuing power and balance against
its powerful rivals.
However, in Iran's case, I argue that ‘regime survival’ is the primary goal rather than
‘state survival.’ ‘Regime survival’ occupies the first place in the Iranian leader’s agenda, and
directly effects its domestic and foreign affairs decision-making and, of course, defines the
IRGC’s extraterritorial activities. Briefly, herein the regime represents Iran’s current political
system and the ruling elites who hold the power. The meaning of the regime and its components
will be explained broadly in the following part.
As stated by Hunter, who cites R S. Northedge: ‘foreign policy is a dialogue between the
inside and the outside,’ “ the pattern of states external behavior is determined by a constant
interaction between its domestic needs and realities - internal determinants - and the
characteristics of the external environment within which they operate.” 58 Thus, in the next part
of this chapter, I will try to analyze the domestic and external conditions that created the Iranian
leader’s obsession of regime survival.
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Domestic and External Conditions that Made the Regime Survival Priority of the Ruling
Elites

At this point, it would contribute to our understanding of the dynamics of defining policy
preferences and decision-making to start by searching for answers to the questions of ‘what does
regime mean?’ and ‘who constitute the regime in Iran?’
In the scholarly literature, a variety of definitions for a political regime exist. Among
them is Skaaning’s definition, which is based on detangling the existing conceptual origins of ten
broadly accepted definitions. Skaaning defines four principles in the definition of political
regime: character of rulers, access to power, vertical power limitations, and horizontal power
limitations. He states that “political regime designates the institutionalized set of fundamental
formal and informal rules identifying the political power holders (character of the possessor(s) of
ultimate decisional sovereignty) and it also regulates the appointments to the main political posts
(extension and character of political rights) as well as the vertical limitations (extension and
character of civil liberties) and horizontal limitations on the exercise of political power
(extension and character of division of powers – control and autonomy).”59
As stated by Walt, “a revolutionary state rests on new principles of legitimacy, displays
new symbols of authority and identity (names, flags, anthems, etc.), adopts new rules for elite
recruitment, and creates new political institutions and governmental procedures.” 60 The 1979
Iran revolution was not merely a ruler change. The revolution changed rulers, access to power,
vertical and horizontal power limitations in Iran.
Initially, the revolution was made by many segments of Iranian society. All anti-Shah
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groups -Marxists, liberal National Front, secularists, Islamic activists- participated in it. Shortly
thereafter, the Shah was removed from power. Rather than returning to their mosques and
madrasas, Khomeini and his followers began to take steps to increase their power and to control
the government. In time, all participants who took part in the revolutionary government and
were not supporters of Khomeini were eliminated. The power sharing moved from a very broad
range of ideologically different anti-Shah segments to a very narrow group of clerical elites.
After the revolution, the concept of velayat-e faqih developed by Ayatollah Khomeini
was the basis of Iran’s political system. According to the concept of velayat-e faqih, the supreme
leader is the temporal, spiritual and legal leader of the ummah (Muslim community) during the
absence of the Twelfth Imam. Velayat-e faqih has provided the constitutional justification for the
regime’s political reconstruction.
The new regime has a dual and unique political system; in addition to deriving its
legitimacy from the velayat-e faqih system, it also employs republican institutions. In the
political structure of Iran, there is a parliament and a president, both selected by Iranian voters.
However, it has also a supreme leader who is more powerful than the president and is not
democratically elected. Moreover, the unelected institutions of Iran's government are more
powerful than the elected ones.
The Supreme Leader is constitutionally the ‘guardian jurist’, ‘leader of the Islamic
revolution’ and ranked above the state president. Ultimate power resides in the Supreme Leader
who appoints and dismisses all key senior positions - the head of the judiciary, the supreme
commander of the IRGC, the supreme commander of the regular military and the security
services, the head of state radio and television, and the clerical jurists in the Council of the
Guardian- ; he controls all important institutions of state such as the courts, the police, the
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military, and can veto candidates for office and veto parliamentary legislation.61
The influence on decision-making by the ultimate power of the supreme leader and
unelected institutions (such as guardian -partly unelected- and expediency councils) establishes
an elaborate system of checks and balances, which seek to safeguard regime survival and to
maintain the status quo. Thus, it can be said that the state system is designed according to this
sensitivity, and the supreme leader is “the ultimate gatekeeper.”62
Thaler supports this thought with the following: “multiple institutions that perform
identical or similar functions—and therefore compete with each other for resources and status—
has generated a diffuse and complicated system. In theory, this multifarious, redundant design
prevents any one center of power from gaining undue influence over the entire system and
ensures the overall survival and security of the regime and the central position of the Supreme
Leader.”63
The decisiveness of the supreme leader, guardian council (Six of twelve members
appointed by the Supreme Leader) and expediency council on the decision-making process limits
the democratic and republican process. With these characteristics, it is not easy to position Iran
in a particular regime type. As stated by Chebabi, Iran “[l]ike totalitarian regimes, it proclaims
the absolute supremacy over public life of an ideology, i.e. ‘Islam’; like authoritarian regimes it
permits a limited degree of pluralism; and like democracies it holds elections in which the people
sometimes have a genuine choice, to wit Mohammad Khatami’s upset victory in the presidential
elections of May 1997….”64
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Rakel, based on Linz and Chebabi’s assessments, identifies the regime type as follows;
“the political system of the IRI between 1979 and 1989, when Ayatollah Khomeini was the
supreme leader, was classified as close to totalitarian and, since 1989, as authoritarian with some
limited democratic features.”65
All in all, the regime is designed to prevent any individual, institution, and faction from
dominating the system and insulate the regime against internal and external threats.
To understand how ideologically valuable the regime is, Khomeini’s following statement
is very explanatory;
A government which is a branch of the Prophet Mohammad's absolute guardianship
is one of the primary Islamic precepts and takes priority over all subsidiary precepts,
even over praying, fasting and pilgrimage ... if necessary, [a] governor can close or
destroy mosques ... the government can unilaterally terminate its religious agreements
with the people if an agreement violates the expedience of the country or Islam. And
[it] can abandon every commandment- both worshipping and non-worshipping
precepts- which is against the expedience of Islam.66

Khomeini repeatedly stated “the regime preservation (hefz-e nezam) was of highest
necessity among all that is required (oujab-e vajebat)”67 even fundamental religious practices.

Domestic and External Conditions during Khomeini Period

The first decade of the regime was completely dominated by Khomeini. Khomeini made
all his efforts to consolidate the new regime during his leadership. To this end, Khomeini tried to
prevent all potential internal disputes between the Parliament and the Guardian Council, and
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created the Expediency Council for mediating between two intuitions.
Despite the fact that he eliminated and suppressed all existing and potential opposition,
Khomeini faced ‘four unsuccessful coup attempts’68 and revolts in some regions. However, the
regime survived. In the successful consolidation of the new regime, three key components were
influential; “1) Ayatollah Khomeini as the leader and moral authority of the revolution; 2) the
clerical leaders of the Islamic Republic Party; 3) the IRGC and other pro-Khomeini militias.”69
Among them, the IRGC made a significant contribution to this success by preventing initial
domestic threats against the regime. Buchta states that the IRGC was the revolutionary clergy’s
strongest weapon in suppressing the oppositions and uprisings of separatist minorities such as
Kurds, Beluchis, and Turkmen between 1979 and 1982.70 In addition to the suppression of all
opposition, the following reasons were the key factors for the establishment of the IRGC;
-‐

To control the streets and to ensure internal security and stability,

-‐

To consolidate and improve clergies’ power in the newly established regime and

-‐

To advance the Khomeini’s ideology in state and society.

71, 72, 73, 74

Before the death of Khomeini, domestic factors, particularly the Iran–Iraq war and the
task of “exporting the revolution," contributed to the new regime’s power inside, which was
mostly succeeded by the IRGC.
Walt, in Revolution and War, puts forward that “[t]he greater the divisions within the
revolutionary state (either within the elite or between the government and the population at
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large), the more bellicose its foreign policy will be.” According to him, this proposition takes
two distinct forms:
-‐

A conflict among factions within the revolutionary regime promotes conflicts
with other states in order to secure greater power for themselves.

-‐

In order to rally popular support, to justify internal repression, and to provide a
scapegoat should domestic problems persist, revolutionary leaders pursue
conflicts with other states.75

In both forms, the aim is to consolidate the regime’s power at home.
Between September 1981 and May 1982, with three major military attacks, Iranian forces
successfully repulsed the Iraqi forces to the original border in most places.76 Although there had
been opportunities for a negotiated settlement in mid-1982 as Iran’s forces approached the
border, Iran did not choose to sue for peace. Instead, Iran declared that its forces were "going to
liberate Jerusalem, passing through the holy city of Karbala" in Iraq just after the Israeli invasion
of Lebanon in June 1982.77
In this decision, in addition to the regime’s expansionist ideology, it seems that the ruling
elites practically calculated that both the Iran–Iraq war and active participation in Lebanon
affairs could contribute to consolidating the revolution and Khomeini’s power by rallying
popular support and justifying internal repression. Another benefit of war was to keep the regular
army under control; as stated by Wehrey “as long as the regular army was stretched thin and
fully deployed on the western border (with Iraq), it could not mount any sort of a coup d’état
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against Khomeini and his cohorts.”78
Additionally, the war created a valid reason for investments that were made for the
IRGC, which actively took part in the war. During the war, the IRGC, which was constituted by
unarguably loyal members to the regime, evolved into a complete military thanks to these
investments. The IRGC’s involvement in the war and Lebanese affairs also created legitimacy in
society. Then, material investments and gained legitimacy made the IRGC a balancing power
against the regular army, whose loyalty was in question for Khomeini.
The IRGC’s initial ideological activities in the name of ‘export of the revolution’ in
Lebanon also served to weaken and punish the regime’s perceived external enemies by
Hezbollah as a military strategy. According to Skuldt, roughly 57% of Hezbollah attacks
explicitly targeted countries that were directly providing military, financial, or logistical support
to Iraq.79
All in all, in the first decade of the revolution, while the new regime had been fighting for
its survival, the IRGC had been the key institution for preserving the regime in the following
ways;
-‐

Iran’s inherently multiethnic population and ideologically different groups’
struggle for power in the post revolution vacuum created a significant threat to the
new regime. This was coupled with the shadow of the regular army’s potential
coup threat.

-‐

In this environment, the IRGC suppressed all ideological opposition and ethnic
uprisings. The IRGC became a balancing power and removed the potential threats
against the regime that might come from the regular army.
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-‐

The triumph of the IRGC over all existing domestic threats preserved and
consolidated the power of the new regime in its initial years.

-‐

Khomeini and the IRGC commanders viewed the Iran–Iraq war as not only
matters of military strategy. As stated by Wehrey, it was more than a struggle for
the territorial integrity; it was also “an opportunity to further consolidate and
institutionalize the revolution, purging it of known and potential opponents.”80
Similarly, the IRGC’s commanders also viewed the war as “a mechanism to
consolidate their internal position and marginalize the regular forces politically”81

-‐

In addition to the Iran–Iraq war, with the IRGC’s involvement in Lebanon affairs,
creating and supporting Hezbollah, besides strategic calculations, the regime
aimed to consolidate the revolution’s following ideological and moral basis:
•

Export of the revolution,

•

Islamic unity and responsibility of other Muslim and ‘oppressed’ nations,

•

Confrontational and assertive anti-western (namely anti-Americanism, or antiZionism)

•

Rejection of all forms of domination,

As a military strategy, the regime also aimed to get the states to abandon their support of
Iraq and to create room to maneuver by driving Israel and the West out of Lebanon.
-‐

These improvements showed to Khomeini and the ruling elite how vital it was to
have absolutely loyal armed forces for safeguarding regime survival. During the
first decade, the IRGC’s power and size significantly expanded and became the
strongest security pillar of the new regime. To invest in the development of the
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IRGC had been the strategic priority of Khomeini. The more the IRGC got
stronger, the more Khomeini and the regime got stronger. The IRGC’s activities
in Lebanon and in the Iran–Iraq war legitimized all efforts of the IRGC’s to get
stronger than other security institutions. Thus, this prepared the conditions of
becoming a major domestic political, economic, and security power center and the
bedrock of the regime’s ideology.

Domestic and External Conditions during Post-Khomeini Period

The realities of international politics, and need for foreign capital and technical expertise
to carry out economic reconstruction convinced Khomeini to temper the ideological principles of
the early days of the Islamic Republic. This started a slight transition to pragmatist policies.
Subsequently, the end of the costly Iran–Iraq war, the death of Khomeini, and the collapse of the
bipolar international system created new conditions for the regime. Despite the
institutionalization of revolution, the regime couldn’t feel itself secure.
After Khomeini’s death, the Assembly of Experts made Ali Khamenei the Supreme
Leader. He had played an important role in the Revolution and served as the president for two
successive terms from 1981 to 1989.82 His death removed a towering and symbol figure of the
revolution from the scene. Khamenei was not as charismatic and powerful as Khomeini. Since
becoming the supreme leader, Khamenei has tended to follow Khomeini’s principles instead of
initiating his own approaches. While he has been trying to balance ideology and the realities of
international politics, he has avoided both confrontation and accommodation with the West in
general. Khamenei’s lack of authority has affected domestic political improvements, and as well
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as foreign policymaking. He was not able to suppress different factional approaches. Since the
mid-1980s, different approaches to policy-making and rivalries for power created factions. This
degree of political diversity did not disturb Khomeini, so long as the factions remained loyal to
him and to certain fundamental principles of revolutionary Iran.
Additionally, the absence of a charismatic and dominant leadership has opened room to
maneuver for key individuals who actively had taken part in the revolution. These key
individuals, constant power-holders in the political structure and society, have constituted the
ruling elites. Each of them has his own sphere of influence; some control the different
institutions of the state and others represent the factions. They are absolutely loyal to the regime,
because, besides their ideological motivations, each of them knows that their power depends on
the continuity of the regime.
In the post Khomeini period, despite the institutionalization of the revolution to some
extent, regime survival remained as the top priority of the ruling elites. New domestic, regional
and global conditions introduced new threat perceptions for the regime. In the following section,
these threat perceptions and its results will be analyzed.
Factional rivalry has seen as part of a check-balance system as long as it does not threaten
the revolutionary regime. As stated by Wehrey “[f]actional maneuvering is a key manifestation
of the competition for power and influence, and foreign -and domestic- policy issues are used as
tools and are extensions of this competition.” 83 In other words, the factions use foreign policy to
bolster their domestic position. On the contrary, an opponent can discredit a faction for
threatening the regime because of its policies.
In the May 1997 elections, Mohammad Khatami was elected as the President of the
Islamic Republic. Khatami, as a protagonist of the Reformist faction, attempted to avoid past
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ideological priorities, and he tried to improve basic principles of democratic political system;
such as freedom of speech, rule of law, civil society and pluralism.84
Besides domestic political reforms, Khatami inaugurated important changes in Iranian
foreign policy. The post-Soviet and post-Iran–Iraq war environment was the main reason for this
policy orientation. Afghanistan and Pakistan were in chaos and challenged by Wahhabist
religious fanaticism. The newly independent states of Central Asia and the Caucasus were trying
to overcome weak social, political and economic conditions. Iraq was suffering sectarian and
ethnic tensions. There were very hostile relations with pro-American Sunni regimes.85 Last and
most importantly, there was the growing US presence in the region.
To minimize the uncertainties originating in this chaotic environment, Khatami adopted
the strategy of improving Iran’s regional and international relations. Khatami tried to behave less
ideologically and promote relations with European countries, stability of the region, and active
participation in international organizations.
In the aftermath of Sept. 11, within hours after the attacks by al-Qaeda extremists,
Khatami condemned the attacks, and he was ‘the first cleric in the Muslim world to call for ‘holy
war’ (jihad) against terrorism.’86 The Khatami government cooperated with the US against the
Taliban regime, which had harbored the anti-American al-Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan.
Relations between the United States and Iran seemed to be warming up. However, following
President Bush’s 2002 ‘Axis of Evil’ speech in which Iran was accused of supporting terrorism,
pursuing nuclear weapons, and destabilizing Afghanistan, the relations with the US reversed.
Khatami’s moderate domestic and international stance received its first major setback and

84

Soltani and Amiri, “Foreign Policy of Iran after Islamic Revolution,” 203.
Imad Salamey and Zanoubia Othman, “Shia Revival and Welayat Al-Faqih in the Making of Iranian Foreign
Policy,” Politics, Religion & Ideology 12, no. 2 (June 1, 2011): 203.
86
Ramazani, “Reflections on Iran’s Foreign Policy,” 62.
85

203
opened a new era in Iran’s international relations. After the speech, US-Iran relations entered a
long stalemate. Thus, this improvement gave conservatives the opportunity to discredit
Khamenei in the eyes of Iranian public.
The conservatives viewed Khatami government as a direct threat to their position in the
power structure. As stated by Gheissari and Nasr, “[i]f the Revolution of 1979 presented a
unique opportunity for the clerics to dominate Iranian politics, the Khatami movement presented
their opponents with a chance to challenge that domination.”87
Khatami’s policies surfaced the ideological disagreements between conservatives and
reformists. Divisions went deeper with time, and Khatami’s re-election in 2001 created further
ideological polarization between the two factions. The division, in the words of Kamrava and
Hassan-Yari, caused a very tough power struggle that affected “all aspects of Iranian politics and
society; ranging from fundamental differences in foreign and domestic policies to the dismissal
of “reformist” ministers, clamping down on supposed public immorality, closing down numerous
newspapers and jailing their editors, drastically increasing the number of public floggings, and
unleashing violent vigilantes on activists and other well-known figures.”88
The conservative resistance bloc against the reformist bloc, under the leadership of
supreme leader Khamenei, included “the top echelon of the Revolutionary Guard, the leadership
of various ’foundations’, conservative clerics associated with the Guardian and Expediency
Councils (that oversee the legislative and judicial processes), the judiciary and key seminaries in
Qom.”89
From 1997 on, the conservatives’ strategy was to prevent the erosion of ideological
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precepts of the revolution and expand their dominance in the state structure. The best way that
the conservatives could maximize their prospects for survival was to gain power at their rivals'
expense.
These international and domestic improvements prepared the end of Khatami’s
presidency and the conditions of presidential victory of Ahmadinejad in 2005. Ahmadinejad
heavily used foreign policy for domestic consumption. He introduced a new tone in foreign
policy orientation and stressed its inefficiency based on cooperation and interaction with the
West that had been followed by the two previous presidents of Iran. Instead, he adopted a foreign
policy based on confrontation with the West and interaction with other states.
During his presidency, it can be said that Iran’s foreign policy recalled the policies of the
Revolution’s early years. In Rubin’s words, he seemed to be “a hardliner á la Khomeini and used
a very hostile tone, especially against the US and Europe, and also Israel.”90 Ahmadinejad
adopted a more confrontational, assertive and active foreign policy to present Iran as an
independent regional power. However, this new strategy not only deepened hostile relations with
the US and Israel but also provoked Sunni-Arab states who were concerned with Ahmadinejad’s
nuclear ambitions and increasing support for Shiite groups.
According to Saikal, by “claiming that the United States and its allies, especially Israel,
were determined to destroy the Islamic regime” he tried to build Iran’s military and nuclear
power and maintained support for Iran’s partners including Syria, Lebanese Hezbollah, and
proxies in Iraq. On these controversial issues, he received the conservatives’ and the IRGC’s
support.91
After the first period of Ahmedinejad, the unprecedented character of the 2009 election
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and its immediate aftermath, when hundreds of thousands of protestors occupied the streets for
protesting the manipulation of the election results, showed how factional disputes can destabilize
a system, and, ironically, how the most powerful faction, the Conservatives, was the least
institutionally organized of factions.92 The consensus on the revolutionary precepts among
factions did not seem to the conservatives to be enough protection for regime survival. The
factional disputes stand as a potential threat for the regime, unless the conservatives are not as
powerful as to control and shape domestic politics.
This motivation doubled with developments after 9/11, which drastically changed the
regional security environment. The US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003 led to the
enlarged presence of the United States and paved the way of its settling in the region. Iran’s
sworn enemies, the Saddam regime and the Taliban, were eliminated and no longer a threat.
However, the stationing of US forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Qatar, Tajikistan, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, Turkey and Pakistan caused Iranians to feel themselves
completely surrounded. Additionally, the US and Israel’s explicit threats and talk of regime
change caused unease among the conservatives. They feared a counterrevolution supported by
the United States as happened in the overthrow of Mosaddegh in 1953. Thus the regime adopted
a multifaceted strategy, which ranged from improving nuclear weapon and ballistic missiles to
the use of Hezbollah and Iraqi Shiite groups. This would establish a negotiating position for
containing the US and deter possible foreign intervention.
Since 1997, and particularly after 9/11, the IRGC has played a vital role in challenging
both internal and external vulnerabilities. Parallel to this responsibility, significant investment
was made to the IRGC, which ranged from the advanced weapon system to increasing life
standards of members. As expected, this resulted in increasing power of the IRGC and
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subsequent militarization of the political system to some extent.
As one of the most loyal supporters of the regime, the scope of the IRGC’s influence on
foreign-policy-making, strategic decision-making, in the economy and even in cultural life has
been significantly expanded. For instance, although the Revolutionary Guards' involvement in
politics was relatively small in numbers -in single digits- between 1980 and 2004, it has grown to
unprecedented levels since 2004, when former IRGC members won at least 16 percent of the 290
seats.93 According to Gheissari and Nasr, they constitute one-third of the conservative parliament
that was elected in early 2004.94 Besides the IRGC’s expanding political role and influential
institutional diffusion, during Ahmadinejad presidency, the IRGC accelerated and expanded its
reach into the economy, the roots of which date back to the wake of the Iran–Iraq War.
Ahmadinejad “favored the IRGC by offering it numerous lucrative no-bid contracts, especially in
the areas of oil and natural gas extraction, pipeline construction, and large-scale infrastructure
development.”95 According to Hen-Tov and Gonzalez “[b]ased on available data, it is reasonable
to estimate that the Guards controlled less than five percent of GDP shortly after the end of the
Iran—Iraq War in 1989. Now (2011), they directly or indirectly oversee at least 25 percent of
GDP, and more likely about 35 percent and growing.”96
All in all, even though the nature of threats held different characteristics in Khomeini and
post-Khomeini periods, the IRGC has been the most influential instrument against these threats.
During Khomeini's leadership, the IRGC suppressed all ideological oppositions and ethnic
uprisings; the IRGC became a balancing power and removed all potential threats against the
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regime that might come from the regular army. In the post-Khomeini period, increasing factional
disputes after 1997, demonstrations in 2009, the post-9/11 security environment and explicit
regime change threats increased the ruling elites’ sensitivities. This led the conservatives’ efforts
to concentrate their power. Similarly, as in Khomeini leadership period, the regime saw the
IRGC as the key instrument against both internal and external challenges. In this line, the ruling
elites chose to empower the IRGC as a strategic move.
The leaders of the IRGC also know that the IRGC’s own survival was entirely dependent
on the survival of the regime. If the regime lives, the IRGC exists. To justify its existence and all
investments made by the regime in the hearts and minds of society, it has needed valid reasons.
Thus, its extraterritorial activities have aimed to appeal to Iranian society’s nationalist and
religious sentiments, in addition to its functions against domestic and external threats. In a nut
shell, there has been a two-way interaction and a mutual interdependence between the IRGC and
the regime; the regime has empowered the IRGC; the IRGC has consolidated the regime.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The 1979 Iranian Revolution is the most important turning point in Iran’s recent history.
The revolution put Iran in a controversial and exceptional position in the Islamic World, and the
regional and global arena. There were many factors that constituted ground for the revolution.
Particularly, the Shiite clerical power in society can be accepted as the most important one.
Since 1501, when Shiism became the state religion with compulsory conversion as a
political move against the expansion of foreign influences, Shiism and clerics have been an
active component of Iranian politics. In a series of events, the Tobacco Monopoly revolt (18901891), the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1906), the Oil Nationalization Movement of Prime
Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh (1951-1953), and the Iranian Islamic Revolution (1978-1979),
reactions to the domination of Iran and exploitation of its wealth and resources by foreign
powers, clergies played a prominent role. Their historically rooted influence and well-established
network in society made them a victor of the 1979 Revolution under Khomeini’s leadership.
The 1979 Iranian Revolution was not merely a change in rulers. It made Khomeini’s
ideology, which is a blend of his interpretation of Shiism and Persian nationalism, the dominant
characteristic of the post-revolutionary era, and has influenced every aspect of life. The
revolution has changed its political structure, the priorities of policy makers, the economic
spheres of Iran, but even more fundamentally, culture and society. After the revolution, Iran
declared itself a theocratic republic guided by religious principles and named itself the Islamic
Republic of Iran. The revolution also completely transformed Iran’s foreign policy and
international standing.
Throughout Iranian revolutionary foreign policy history, the pattern of Iran’s external
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behavior were directly or indirectly determined by numerous factors: Iran’s geographical and
demographic realities, historical experience (lessons learned), post-revolutionary ideology which
is a blend of nationalism and Khomeini’s interpretation of Shiism, the post-revolutionary
political structure and decision-making process, national interests, immediate domestic needs,
ruling elites’ priorities (ideological/individual), regional improvements and threat perceptions.
Based on observations and assessments from internal and external determinants of Iran’s
foreign policy making, Iran’s foreign policy goals are defined as follows: Regime survival is the
indispensable (sine qua non) goal of Iranian foreign policy and above all else; State security and
survival (the defense of Iranian territory against external threats); Projecting power and
becoming the dominant power in the region. The goal of ‘regime survival’ is an outcome of
Khomeini’s ideology as well as his heritage, and occupies first place in the Iranian leader’s
agenda and directly affects domestic and foreign affairs decision-making.
Iran employs a number of different tools in attaining these foreign policy goals. Among
them, the IRGC is the most crucial and controversial one. The IRGC has actively taken the lead
in achieving all three goals, the preservation of the regime is a unique task and its reason for
existence. However, the IRGC’s way of achieving these goals are very controversial.
Iran deliberately supported several armed non-state actors and provided them a broad
range of state support in the form of ideological direction, organizational assistance, diplomatic
backing, training, operational direction, money, arms, logistics, and sanctuary. The IRGC has
served as an outpost o provide this support.
The regime’s initial ideological motivations, parallel to changes in foreign policy
approaches, have been replaced with rational and strategic calculations. The need for foreign
capital and technical expertise to carry out economic reconstruction, which mostly originated
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from the costly Iran–Iraq war and international isolation, made this transformation a necessity.
However, the IRGC’s extraterritorial-capability has always been used it covertly and
professionally. In terms of strategic purposes, the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities served as a
tool of deterrence and retaliatory force against the adversaries of Iran, a bargaining chip and a
way of projecting power to different audiences.
The controversial nature of these activities emerges at this point. Despite the fact that the
IRGC has the characteristics of a regular conventional armed force, based on the international
law and state sponsorship of terrorism literature, the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities are outside
the legal frame of ‘use of military force’ and mostly fit the characteristics of ‘state sponsorship of
terrorism.’
If we take into account Iran’s foreign policy goals which are very common for all states,
the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities as a strategy to achieve these goals challenge international
norms and provoke other regional actors who are mostly Sunni and have strong prejudices
against Iran. This condition creates an obstacle to Iran’s integration into the international system,
which is increasingly globalized and interconnected, and an environment, which is costly for Iran
to live within and highly isolating. Paradoxically, these attitudes put Iran in a situation that
contradicts the goals of ‘state security and survival’ and ‘becoming the regional power.’
Thus, the real reason behind the regime’s insistence for this strategy is preserving the
current political system and the power of current ruling elites. Briefly, it is called ‘regime
survival’ in this study. There are several issues that have created this phenomenon. In the
following section, the reasons that have created the ruling elites’ motivations and sensitivity of
regime survival will be addressed.
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Structural and Ideological Basis of Regime Survival

As stated by Hunter, “the character of states’ political systems and their decision-making
apparatus and processes greatly influence their external behavior.”1 The 1979 Iranian revolution
was not merely a ruler change. In Walt's words, it created the new principles of legitimacy, new
symbols of authority and identity, new rules for elite recruitment, new political institutions, and
governmental procedures.2 Walt’s definition of ‘a sharp departure from those of the old regime’3
explains what happened in Iran with the 1979 Revolution. Following the revolution, Khomeini’s
ideological doctrines formed all facets of life: political, educational, legal, social, and religious.
The main concern of the new political leadership was the survival of the newly
established political regime. Survival was the raison d’etre of the new polity. Khomeini defined
regime preservation as the highest priority even over fundamental religious practices. In the
words of Stanley, Khomeini’s formulation regarding the survival of the regime is as follows;
“the regime is the embodiment of Shia Islam’s authority on Earth and to abandon it would be to
abandon the will of God. Thus, the survival of this government and its form is an existential
imperative as well as an expression of self-interest and Iranian nationalism.”4
The political system of the Islamic Republic, which enjoys the concept of velayat-e faqih
and republican characteristics, is the embodied form of Khomeini’s ideology. The preservation
of the Islamic Republic is defined as the ultimate religious value of the regime’s ideology by
Khomeini which can be died for. Tucker quotes Stephen Hanson’s “ideology unites activists
around a set of shared beliefs and symbols and provides a ‘higher cause’ that legitimates their
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struggle.”5 Regime preservation (hefz-e nezam) has been a ‘higher cause’ of revolutionary
ideology. The IRGC, which can be characterized as the loyal armed forces of the regime, by
definition ‘guardian of the revolution,’ has been the primary instrument for implementing this
task.
Moreover, the political structure, institutions, rules for elite recruitment, and
governmental procedures have been designed accordingly. The Supreme leader, and several
institutions –particularly unelected components of the regime- have been loyal protectors of the
regime. The ultimate power of the Supreme Leader and unelected institutions’ (such as partly
unelected Guardian Council and Expediency Council) influence on decision-making establishes
an elaborate system of checks and balances, which seek to ensure regime survival and to
maintain the status quo. To prevent potential instability that was a threat to the regime, Khomeini
established the Expediency Council in 1988 to mediate disputes between the Parliament and the
Guardian Council. Even this decision was made in order to preserve the regime in case of
political dispute that might harm the regime’s legitimacy. The IRGC, which is an institutional
armed organization and an alternative to the regular army, is established solely to preserve the
regime. Thus, the political structure is designed in a way to prevent any individual, institution,
and faction from dominating the system and several institutions are created to insulate the regime
against internal and external threats.
With these characteristics it is not easy to position Iran in a particular regime type. As
stated by Chebabi, Iran “[l]ike totalitarian regimes, it proclaims the absolute supremacy over
public life of an ideology, i.e. ‘Islam’; like authoritarian regimes it permits a limited degree of
pluralism; and like democracies it holds elections in which the people sometimes have a genuine
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choice, to wit Mohammad Khatami’s upset victory in the presidential elections of May
1997….”6 The regime has totalitarian, authoritarian, and democratic features. Furthermore, after
the Ahmadinejad presidency, the IRGC’s increasing influence on strategic decision-making and
cultural life started the debate of Iran’s being a ‘praetorian state.’7 For the sake of simplification,
as classified by Rakel, the regime type can be defined as close to totalitarian during Khomeini’s
leadership; since 1989 as authoritarian with some limited democratic features.8
Khomeini named the new regime as ‘Islamic republic.’ He avoided to use the very notion
of democracy that is an undesirable Western concept and stated that ‘Islam itself is democratic.’
Although the new regime was born of a popular movement that inherently had democratic
aspirations; in practice, since establishment, the ruling elite has violated them in many ways that
range from the manipulation of electoral processes, inhibiting free speech, human rights
violations, and suppression of all opposition to control of the media. The regime did not refrain
from acting in undemocratic ways.9 The regime’s priority has been survival, and its leaders’
priority has been to stay in power, not democratic republican aspirations.
Skuldt, in her study, draws attentions to the connection between the regime survival
strategies and Buena de Mesquita et al.’s selectorate theory.10 I also find this approach useful in
explaining the dynamics between regime survival and the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities. As
stated by the authors of The Logic of Political Survival, all political leaders’ -whether democratic
or autocratic, in any type of regime- primary objective is to remain in power. In their words,
Our starting point is that every political leader faces the challenge of how to hold on
to his or her job. The politics behind survival in office is, we believe, the essence of
6
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politics. The desire to survive motivates the selection of policies and the allocation of
benefits; it shapes the selection of political institutions and the objectives of foreign
policy; it influences the very evolution of political life. We take as axiomatic that
everyone in a position of authority wants to keep that authority and that it is the
maneuvering to do so that is central to politics in any type of regime.11

According to the authors, in order to survive, the leaders need to create and maintain a
winning coalition in exchange for a share of public/private goods. The winning coalition, which
is the faction that keeps a leader in power, emerges from a group called the selectorate that is
authorized to choose the leader. The leadership position is always desirable and therefore
competitive. Thus, all leaders are preoccupied with their survival against a challenger.
In order to remain in power, the leader must guarantee the winning coalition’s support by
allocating resources to the members of the coalition. In a democracy, the size of the winning
coalition is larger relative to the size of the selectorate than in autocracies. The leaders try to
generate more support by providing public goods to the coalition’s members. This ends up in a
probability that a member of the winning coalition may join a challenger’s coalition with the
belief of continuing to receive the same benefits. In an autocracy, the winning coalition is
smaller and each member has more to gain or lose, because given valuable private goods are not
accessible to the larger population instead of equably distributed public goods. In the words of
the authors; “the survival of leaders in small winning coalition systems depends on their ability
to provide private goods to their supporters.”12 Fewer members given larger and more valuable
gains, in turn, generate stronger loyalty. The members of small winning coalitions have much to
lose if the leader is replaced, and thus as long as the leader remains in power, it means that they
guarantee the expected benefits.
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Given this context, in the case of Iran there are two levels of winning coalitions that
originate from the nature of the dual political system; the first includes unelected components of
the political structure –such as the members of the Expediency Council, Guardian Council, Head
of Judiciary, Commanders of the Armed Forces- under the leadership of the supreme leader,
mostly conservatives that have a long history in this coalition; the second gathers around the
president who constitutes the elected component of the political structure.
The leaders and members of the IRGC have been part of the permanent winning coalition
since the revolution. Their power and wealth have grown over time. As one of the beneficiaries
of the regime, the IRGC has always been loyal to the supreme leader and the regime and always
played a key role against both internal and external threats. Because, as mentioned earlier, it is
clear that the IRGC’s institutional survival is dependent on the regime’s survival. Mutual
dependency between the IRGC and the regime and the IRGC’s benefits from the regime makes
sense in terms of the logic of ‘winning coalition’.

Domestic and External Threats against the Regime

During the first decade of the revolution, the regime was dominated by Khomeini as the
leader and moral authority of the revolution. The consolidation of the new regime had been the
primary goal during his leadership. Instead of a power struggle among Khomeinists, the regime
faced threats from ‘others’ who did not have any connection to Khomeini. The initial domestic
threats originated from ethnic fragmentation and military coup attempts. The IRGC was
Khomeini’s ‘strongest weapon’ in suppressing the opposition and uprisings of separatist
minorities. Keddie characterizes the Khomeini period as follows: “The decade of Khomeini’s
rule was marked by the ever-growing power of his followers and elimination, often by violence
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and despite resistance, of opposition groups, and by increasing enforcement of ideological and
behavioral controls on the population.”13 Besides these domestic factors, in particularly the
IRGC’s role in the Iran–Iraq war and the task of ‘exporting the revolution’ contribute to further
consolidation and institutionalization of the revolution.
In the post-Khomeini period, increasing factionalism -particularly Khatami’s reformist
domestic and foreign policies were perceived as a threat that might erode the ideological precepts
of the revolution and conservatives power. Then, the conservatives adopted a strategy that
expanded their dominance in the power structure.
Additionally, the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003 led to the enlarged
presence of the United States and paved the way for its settling in the region. Although Iran’s
sworn enemies, the Saddam regime and Taliban, no longer being a threat, Iran was surrounded
by US military supremacy. Furthermore, the US and Israel’s explicit threats and talk of regime
change caused unease among Iranian ruling elites. Thus, the regime adopted a multifaceted
strategy, which ranged from improving nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to the use of proxy
groups. Since 1997, and particularly after September 11, 2001, the IRGC has taken the vital role
of challenging both internal and external vulnerabilities. This has resulted in increasing the
power of the IRGC and subsequently the militarization of the political system to some extent.
The IRGC has been an active part of regime survival strategies as a loyal supporter with
its Basij force, which is the principle force responsible for upholding Islamic norms in society
and social control at home; and with the Quds Force, which is an intelligence and unconventional
warfare component of the IRGC abroad.
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Need for Legitimacy

In any type of regime, democratic or autocratic, the maintenance of power and stability of
the political system necessitate the pursuit of legitimacy –“the terms by which people recognize,
defend, and accept political authority”14 According to Weber, an authority becomes valid once
the actors subject to it believe in its legitimacy. In his words:
Custom, personal advantage, purely affectual or ideal motives of solidarity do not
form a sufficiently reliable basis for a given domination. In addition there is normally
a further element, the belief in legitimacy.15

As stated by Campell, “Weber holds that beliefs in legitimacy maintain the stability of an
order of domination he by no means wishes to confer any actual legitimacy upon that order.”16
According to him, Weber emphasizes here the empirical significance of validity. In the words of
Weber:
Experience shows that in no instance does domination voluntarily limit itself to the
appeal to material or affectual or ideal motives as the basis for its continuance. In
addition every such system attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its
legitimacy.17

Lipset defined legitimacy as the “capacity of the system to engender and maintain the
belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate one for the society”18
Both Weber and Lipset emphasized the ability of a ruler to persuade the ruled of the
14
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legitimate nature of a political system. In a broader sense, the system is legitimate insofar as
people believe that it should be obeyed. Thus, legitimacy can be accepted as a powerful ordering
tool and “a necessary component of authority and thus of power.”19
As Weber pointed out, the modes of legitimation may include tradition, charisma or
rational-legal authority: Tradition, “the authority of the "eternal yesterday", i.e. of the mores
sanctified through the unimaginably ancient recognition and habitual orientation to conform”;
Charisma “the authority of the extraordinary and personal gift of grace (charisma), the absolutely
personal devotion and personal confidence in revelation, heroism, or other qualities of individual
leadership”; Rational-legal authority “domination by virtue of "legality", by virtue of the belief
in the validity of legal statute and functional "competence" based on rationally created rules.”20
For instance, contemporary nation-states in the Western world can be classified as Rational-legal
authorities; some states may blend various type of legitimations.
As stated by White, “all regimes, from naked tyrannies to pluralistic democracies, seek to
legitimate themselves.”21 Although the pursuit of legitimacy is a necessity for all kind of
regimes, it proves significantly more difficult for the authoritarian states. For authoritarian
regimes there are essentially two ways to keep domestic stability and maintain power: coercion
and repression on one side, the quest for legitimacy on the other. In Non-Democratic Regimes:
Theory, Government and Politics, for a new dictatorship, Brooker put forward the same
prescription in different words. His two-pronged approach is as follows:
-‐

The new regime claims to be legitimate and seeks to have its claims to legitimacy
accepted by state and society.
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-‐

It also deploys a range of organizations, organs or administrative devices that
strengthen its (at least partially coercive) control over state and society -so that
even if the claims to legitimacy are unsuccessful, the regime may still be able to
hold and effectively use the public offices/powers it has seized or
misappropriated.22

Although Brooker proposes these means for a new dictatorship, I believe that these are
valid for most of the non-democratic regimes.
Brooker’s first approach includes two ways of seeking legitimacy: electoral means of
legitimation and ideological means of legitimation. In electoral means of legitimation, the regime
uses “an electoral/democratic façade is in a sense their recognition that public offices should
indeed he owned by the public and that to be legitimate a government must be based upon the
people’s choice, the popular will, or some other democratic basis.”23 Although ideological
legitimation has not been as common as the electoral legitimation, it can be observed in several
cases. In ideological legitimation, the ruler or the regime has the right to rule based on
ideological values. According to Brooker it is “to some extent the modern equivalent of the now
largely extinct religious claims to legitimacy.”24
North analyzes ideology’s effect in seeking legitimacy. Regimes need to depend on some
ideational element or ideology to legitimize their rule by establishing an abstract relation
between the ruler and the ruled. He links legitimacy to policing cost. Legitimacy created by
ideology is a cost-effective method of ruling. In the words of North:
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The costs of maintenance of an existing order arc inversely related to the perceived
legitimacy of the existing system. To the extent that the participants believe the
system fair, the costs of enforcing the rules and property rights are enormously
reduced by the simple fact that the individuals will not disobey the rules or violate
property rights even when a private cost/benefit calculus would make such action
worthwhile.25

Brooker’s second approach for maintaining power and preserving stability is
strengthening control, which can be defined as coercion and repression. As an important source
of stability, and to strengthen their control over state and society, the regimes “deploy a
(competent) security/intelligence organ or organization.”26 Although coercion and repression are
often predominating methods during the consolidation of power, the rulers also seek to find
different means for legitimating their rule.
Hurd defines three generic reasons why an actor might obey a rule: “(1) because the actor
fears the punishment of rule enforcers, (2) because the actor sees the rule as in its own selfinterest, and (3) because the actor feels the rule is legitimate and ought to be obeyed.”27 In this
context, depending on the characteristics of the ruler and ruled, the methods of maintaining
power and preserving stability range from the material benefits that authoritarian regimes offer to
the ‘winning coalition’, electoral/ideological legitimation of coercion and sometimes become a
mix of methods.
Another means in the legitimization is the external use of force for internal political
purposes (domestic policy making through foreign policy means). Skuldt, in her study, explains
this phenomenon through the logic of diversionary war theory.28 According to this logic, rulers
may pursue a belligerent foreign policy in order to distract the public from internal
25
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socioeconomic and political problems, to unify the nation against an external threat, and thereby
increase their own domestic political support. It is often assumed that this strategy is more likely
to take place in democracies because of electoral accountability, less likely in authoritarian
regimes because of the coercive basis of their authority and their insulation from society.
However, because of the problem of legitimacy, greater need for the maintenance of internal
unity and domestic political support makes autocratic regimes more prone to diversionary
actions, which may be in different forms such as hostile diplomatic action, limited military
action, and substantial military force. The construction of an external threat and pursuit of a
diversionary action against that threat may serve well to increase the internal unity of the
autocratic regime as well as its support in society and to legitimize it by appealing patriotic
symbols of the nation.29
The revolutionary regime, since its inception, has been in the pursuit of legitimacy to
maintain its power and domestic stability. Indeed, the revolution against the Shah, which was
started by the participation of a number of different groups, ended with Khomeini’s hijacking. In
the ethnically and politically fragmented Iranian society, Khomeini adopted a two-pronged
approach to maintain domestic stability and hold his power: (1) Coercion and repression, which
was executed by the IRGC (and its branches) against domestic threats. This issue was discussed
in detail under the title of “Domestic and External Threats to Regime Survival.” (2) Seeking
legitimacy through electoral and ideological means.
The new regime was based on the convergence of two means of legitimacy; political and
religious, in the words of Brooker, electoral and ideological. The regime’s dual system included
the velayat-e faqih system, which is the embodied form of Khomeini’s ideology, and also
29
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republican institutions, which are an electoral/democratic façade that aimed for public
recognition. The dominance of the Supreme Leader and the network of unelected components of
the government over elected institutions have overshadowed the democratic characteristics of the
regime and made it a façade. The limited political pluralism, which originates from vague
candidate eligibility criteria and a multi-layered vetting process, can be given as an example of
this phenomena.
Although the ideological incentives have been taken place with rational calculations of
national interests, the core ideological principles -velayat-e faqih, the presumption of Islamic
leadership, anti-Americanism, or anti-Zionism- have been the limits of decision-making. With
the application of the expediency concept, the regime created the capability of softening the
ideological strictness and legitimization of decisions that contradict ideological principles.
Otherwise, the loss of these core ideological principles would make the existence of the Supreme
Leader, the IRGC and unelected theoretical components of the political structure questionable.
The first decade of the revolution under Khomeini’s leadership can be defined as
charismatic legitimation in Weber’s typology. With the death of Khomeini, the regime’s
ideological legitimization began to weaken. In contrast to Khomeini’s powerful personality as
the father of the new regime, Khamenei’s lack of acceptance within the clerical community and
his relatively low profile as a Supreme Leader resulted in questions to his ideological legitimacy.
The increasing factionalism and, subsequently, Khatami’s reformist domestic and foreign policy
were perceived as threats to the regime by the conservatives gathered around the Supreme
Leader. This perception was doubled with antagonistic relations with the US-Israel alliance and
the increasing presence of the US in the Middle East. Additionally, arguments about the
manipulation of the election results in 2009 and the regime’s fierce post-election suppression of
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demonstrators showed how ‘electoral legitimacy’ is still in question.
In such domestic and foreign political environment, the IRGC was the most important
actor. It could use Hezbollah and Iraqi Shiite groups against Israel and the US; it also suppressed
perceived threats to the clerics’ power. In other words, the IRGC became the protector of
velayet-e faqih inside, a warrior against the US and Israel (executor of anti-US and anti-Zionist
strategies) outside, which are the core principles of ideology.
In addition to the IRGC’s strategic purposes, their extraterritorial activities also
consolidate the ideological legitimacy of the regime in various ways. Their activities against the
great Satan -the US- and little Satan -Israel-, which are deemed the enemies of the Muslim
world, aim to appeal to the religious and nationalist feelings of society.
The successes of Hezbollah and Iraqi Shiite groups were perceived as successes for the
IRGC and the regime. This has increased the regime’s popularity at home. To fight for a ‘higher
cause’ outside and being successful in this fight constitutes an effective strategy for the
establishment of domestic cohesion inside and keep alive ideological motivation. This
phenomenon of foreign policy produced social control can be expressed by the term ‘boomerang
effect.’ In the logic of diversionary action, the boomerang effect can be explained as follows:
The IRGC’s extraterritorial activities against perceived enemies and for national interests can be
defined as a kind of permanent war. This permanent war outside is a way of distracting society
from domestic problems and unifying them against an external threat, which ends by increasing
political support for the regime inside. Lastly, the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities based on
ideological motivation and national interests legitimize its existence and the regime’s
empowerment of it
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